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The major thesis presented is that the state housing finance agencies
(HFA's) have been more effective than the U.S Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) in producing housing that satisfies legislatively-defined
public purposes because on the whole, their role in the development process,
position in government, and structure and dynamics of organization have been
more consistant with the nature of public purpose housing development.
This conclusion is reached on the basis of an examination of the first
six state HFA's to receive full housing development lending powers in com-
parison with their counterpart local HUD offices. The HFA's included are:
the Illinois Housing Development Authority, Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, Michigan State Housing Development Authority, New Jersey Housing
Finance Agency, New York State Housing Finance Agency, and New York State
Urban Development Corporation (UDC).
After Chapter 1 provides an introduction and Chapter 2 gives a history
of each agency, Chapter 3 then reviews the legislatively-determined public
purposes of the various agencies to be used in Chapter 4 for evaluating agency
effectiveness. Chapter 4 finds that the HFA's have been as effective as
HUD in fulfilling the public purposes that they share with HUD while being
clearly more effective in achieving fiscal solvency. In particular, the
HFA's are seen to have performed equally as well as HUD in terms of volume
of housing produced, location in "slum" areas, and level of rents; better
than HUD with regard to promoting racial and economic integration, housing
low income families and elderly individuals, achieving good design, and
maintaining financially solvent projects and operations. HUD, however, is
seen to have housed a higher percentage of minorities and to have provided
more rehabilitated housing and a slightly higher percentage of housing for
large families. If UDC is excluded from these comparisons because of its
unique role as a developer, the financial solvency of the remaining HFA's
in comparison with HUD is seen to be overwhelming, although they have pro-
duced fewer units and a lower percentage of units in "slum" areas than their
counterpart HUD offices.
The remainder of the thesis provides reasons for HFA effectiveness. In
Chapter 5 the role of the HFA's as mortgagee rather than as mortgage insurers
or developers is seen as facilitating their being able to effectively manage
the high risks of public purpose housing through actively controlling cer-
tain risks and shifting others to developers. The other part of their mort-
gagee role, that of obtaining loanable funds, is seen in Chapter 6 to pro-
vide both constraints and opportunities for being effective.
The position of the HFA's on a state rather than a Federal is seen in
Chapter 7 as being more consistent with the local nature of housing develop-
ment. Chapter 8 finds that although many of the HFA's have a degree of
autonomy from the rest of government which increases their effectiveness,
all are subject to controls by local officials and special interests.
As seen in Chapter 9, because of the complexity of the public purpose
development process, those HFA's with simple structures and flexible rules
and procedures have been the most effective. While Chapter 10 finds that
the effectiveness of leadership has had some impact on organizational
effectiveness, leadership appears to be less important than other factors
discussed in this thesis.
Thesis supervisor: Langley C. Keyes, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
State housing finance agencies have emerged as one of
the most powerful new forces in residential development
lending. Between 1970 and 1974, state agencies financed a
total of nearly 200,000 dwelling units. Their influence
has been particularly noticeable in certain of the nation's
largest housing markets. During the first five years of
the 1970's, state and local housing agency financing
accounted for over twenty percent of all starts in the New
York City area, about twelve percent in greater Boston,
approximately seven percent in the Detroit metropolis, and
roughly three percent in Chicago and its environs.
The impact of state housing finance agencies (HFA's)
is now spreading geometrically. While in the first half of
the 1960's only one HFA existed which could independently
provide financing for residential development, in 1966-68
five more agencies gained such powers, and by the end of
1974, a total of thirty-six HFA's were in existence in
1
thirty states. As the number of agencies has expanded,
so has their range of programs. HFA's in various states
1
New York State has five housing finance agencies of various
types including the Urban Development Corporation, Housing
Finance Agency, Mortgage Agency, Battery Park City Authority,
and New York City Housing Development Corporation; New Jersey
has both its Housing Finance Agency and a Mortgage Finance
Agency; Massachusetts has both its Housing Finance Agency and
Home Mortgage Finance Agency. Twenty-seven other states have
one agency each.
now finance single family developments, provide loans to
lenders, engage in secondary mortgage purchases, and lend
money directly to homebuyers, in addition to providing con-
struction and permanent financing on multi-family develop-
ments. Like private lenders, all of the housing financed
by the HFA's is privately owned.
What makes HFA's different from private lenders is
their powers and their public purposes. State HFA's have
the ability to provide below market interest rate mortgage
loans using funds they receive from issuing tax-exempt
securities and can further reduce rents by passing along
Federal and occasionally state subsidies. State agencies
have received these special financing aids to enable them
to fulfill certain statutorily defined public purposes.
Chief among these purposes are increasing the availability
of decent housing within the means of low and moderate
income families, rebuilding slum areas, and promoting racial
integration.
Sharing in most of the same public-purpose goals and
in the ability to provide subsidies has been the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). A
developer interested in building subsidized housing in a
state with an active HFA has had the alternative of going to
1
either the HFA or the local HUD office. While the HFA's
are mortgage lenders and HUD is a mortgage insurer, projects
financed by the HFA's generally are done so without mortgage
insurance and subsidized projects insured by HUD generally
receive financing from private lenders with scant review on
the part of the lender. In both systems, aside from the
developer, the public agency is the most important actor in
shaping the character of the development. The similarities
in the public purposes between HUD and the HFA's invite
comparisons between these agencies to not only provide a
benchmark for assessing the performance of the HFA's, but
also to bring into sharper focus the underlying determinants
of agency success.
The six oldest HFA's have now amassed sufficient
experience to allow meaningful examination. The Illinois
Housing Development Authority (IHDA), the Michigan State
Housing Development Authority (MSHDA), the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), the New Jersey Finance
Agency (New Jersey HFA), the New York State Housing Finance
Agency (New York HFA), and the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation (UDC), each came into being with full
Even though the Section 236 interest reduction program
(National Housing Act of 1974) which had been the primary
Federal subsidy used by the HFA's has been effectively ter-
minated, the new Section 8 program of the Housing and Commun-
ity Development Act of 1974 will operate in a similar manner.
financing powers in 1968 or earlier, at least two years
1
before any other HFA. Through the end of 1974, these
agencies had been responsible for about 92 percent of the
dwelling units directly financed by all state housing fi-
2
nance agencies. The experiences of these six agencies and
of their counterpart local HUD offices will provide the
empirical basis for this dissertation. Since one of the
HFA's, the New York State Urban Development Corporation,
has fulfilled the role of a developer in addition to that
1
The Delaware State Housing Authority, Vermont State
Housing Authority, and West Virginia Housing Development
Fund were each created in 1968, although later in the year
than the New York State Urban Development Corporation.
Unlike those of the more "advanced" agencies, the Delaware,
Vermont, and West Virginia statutes at least initially
lacked the technical language necessary to allow them to
finance privately owned developments without the aid of
HUD mortgage insurance. Similarly, the Hawaii Housing
Authority, which was originally created in the 1940's, was
unable to finance private developments until 1970.
2
Excluded from this figure and from detailed consideration
in this thesis are the 51,400 dwelling units financed by
the New York City Housing Development Administration and
the 6,750 units financed by the New York City Housing
Development Corporation. Unlike the advanced state
agencies, the Housing Development Administration financed
its housing through general obligation bonds of the city.
The primary reason for excluding these agencies from con-
sideration, however, is that they are city rather than
state agencies.
of a mortgagee and since these roles cannot always be
separated, comparisons between the state HFA's and HUD
will be performed both inclusive and exclusive of the
experience of UDC.
Major Thesis
The major thesis presented is that the state housing
finance agencies have been more effective than the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development in producing
multi-family housing that satisfies legislatively-defined
public purposes because on the whole, their role in the
development process, position in government, and structure
and dynamics of organization have been more consistent with
the nature of public purpose housing development. The HFA's
will be seen to have been as effective as HUD in reaching
the legislatively-defined housing and housing-related goals
they share while being clearly more effective in achieving
fiscal solvency. Certain state agencies will be seen to
have better fulfilled particular public purposes not shared
by HUD, although HUD will be seen to have accomplished more
with regard to certain goals it only possesses. The extent
to which particular HFA's take advantage of their oppor-
tunities to operate in a hand-crafted, non-bureaucratic
manner consistent with the nature of the public purpose
development will be found to be the critical factor in
determining their effectiveness. The exclusion of the New
York State Urban Development Corporation from consideration
will be seen to greatly amplify conclusions as to the fiscal
solvency of the HFA's but reduce the extent to which they
have fulfilled certain public purposes.
In defining the nature of public purpose development,
four characteristics will be seen to stand out as being the
most significant:
1) Riskiness - The process contains high inherent risks,
2) Debt-dependency - Borrowed funds with high loan to
value ratios play a crucial role,
3) Local specificity - Housing markets are local in
scope, and
4) Complexity - The process is complex, with each
project having its own peculiarities.
While each of these attributes is endemic to all
housing development, the public purpose goals held by the
HFA's and HUD will be seen to add significantly to the
riskiness, debt-dependency, local specificity, and com-
plexity of the process. This characterization of the
nature of public purpose housing development provides the
context in which differences between the HFA's and HUD
in terms of their roles in the development process, posi-
tion in government, and structure and dynamics of organiza-
tion have significance.
The HFA's and HUD play different roles in the housing
development process. Nominally, the primary difference is
that the HFA's serve as mortgagees and provide financing
directly to the private developer, generally without
mortgage insurance, while HUD acts as a mortgage insurer
and protects lenders against loss on mortgage loans given
to private housing developers. HUD and the HFA's both,
however, ultimately bear responsibility for any losses on
bad loans and must find ways to cope with this risk. A
critical difference in the roles played by the two types of
agencies will be seen to be the manner in which they attempt
to control risk. HUD will be seen to act relatively pass-
ively and rely upon the resources of its Special Risk
Insurance Fund to pay claimants. The HFA's will be seen to
control risks primarily by becoming actively involved in
project operations to a greater degree than even most pri-
vate mortgagees and by passing certain risks onto the
developer. The one state agency to experience financial
difficulties, the New York State Urban Development Corpora-
tion (UDC), will be seen to have done so in large part
because it took on the role of a developer in addition to
the role of a mortgagee. Rather than be able to pass risks
along to developers, UDC has absorbed risks normally taken
by private developers.
The other critical difference in the role played by the
two types of agencies relates to the debt-dependent nature
of public purpose housing. As a result of their ability to
tap the tax-exempt capital and money markets the HFA's
have had the ability to provide below market rate mortgages
and consequently produce housing at lower rents and/or
higher quality than is possible with financing at market
rates. On occasion this financing advantage has also
determined whether a project could qualify for subsidies.
Tax-exempt borrowing, however, will be seen to be an
inefficient means of financing housing because of the tax
revenues forgone by the U.S. Treasury.
The ability of HFA's to secure loanable funds at a
favorable interest rate has also depended upon the per-
ceived security of the bond or note offering. Because the
form of state back-up provided to most HFA's has come to
be regarded by the investment community as insufficient
protection by itself, state agencies have had to provide
secure mortgage loans and generate high reserves to sell
their bonds at a favorable rate of interest. One of the
ways that many of the HFA's have ensured that their loan
portfolio is secure, however, has been through the avoid-
ance of certain types of risky loans. Such risk avoidance
has often meant the shirking of certain social goals,
although generally not those public purposes found in each
agency's enabling legislation.
A second type of difference between the HFA's and HUD
lies in their respective positions in government. HFA's
operate on a state rather than a Federal level and to
varying degrees have the statutory power to function
independently of the rest of government. The provision of
Federal subsidies for disbursement by state HFA's on partic-
ular projects is one of many recent instances of revenue
sharing. What is different is the fact that the Federal
government has also continued to disburse the same subsidies
directly itself. While Federal disbursement has gone through
local HUD field offices, it has been subject to national
regulations. This competition provides a rare opportunity
to compare state and Federal agencies performing roughly
the same task in order to address the perennial question of
which level of government can best meet particular prob-
lems. Given that the jurisdiction of most state HFA's
spans only a handful of housing market areas compared with
about 250 metropolitan areas and about 3000 non-metropolitan
areas for HUD, the HFA's will be seen to have been better
able to formulate policies appropriate to varying local
conditions.
The other distinction relating to position in govern-
ment is the degree of independence given to each agency.
Most state HFA's, unlike HUD, are public benefit corpora-
tions with primary authority resting with a board of
directors appointed by the governor. Various controls
exerted by regular governmental bodies and influences
exerted by special interest groups will be seen to limit
the independence of HFA's and at times to reduce their
effectiveness in achieving public purposes. The fact
that HFA operating funds generally come from fees generated
by agency operations rather than from governmental alloca-
tions, combined with the exemption that most HFA's have
from civil service, has allowed many of them to be inde-
pendent with regard to staffing, has allowed many of them
to pay higher salaries, and has required them, in a certain
sense, to be profit-motivated.
The final major variable in explaining agency effective-
ness is organizational structure and dynamics. Theorists
have found that the degree of bureaucratization that will
lead to the greatest organizational effectiveness depends
upon the complexity of the problems that the organization
faces. Organizations that work with complex problems, like
public purpose housing development, function best with non-
bureaucratic organizational patterns characterized by simple
structures and relatively informal operations. Most state
housing finance agencies will be seen to have taken advan-
tage of opportunities they have had to operate in a rela-
tively non-bureaucratic manner.
The final factor used to explain variations in organi-
zational success, quality of leadership, has frequently
been omitted from other studies of organizational effective-
ness. This dissertation will measure leadership in terms
of the success of agency heads in satisfying the criteria
formulated in what appears to be the clasic work on the
subject. These criteria are: (1) defining a mission,
(2) institutionalizing it throughout the organization,
(3) defending organizational integrity, and (4) ordering
internal conflict. Successful leadership on the basis of
these criteria will be seen to be an important factor in
determining agency success, but less important than the
factors discussed earlier.
Organization of Dissertation
Historical introductions of HUD and the six state
agencies serve as the subject for Chapter 2. Chapter 3
presents criteria of organizational effectiveness while
Chapter 4 proceeds to rate the various agencies according
to these criteria. Chapters 5 through 10 attempt to
explain differences in effectiveness in terms of the nature
of public purpose housing development. Chapters 5 and 6
discuss differences in the role of the various agencies in
the development process with Chapter 5 focusing on the
manner in which each has dealt with risk and Chapter 6 on
how each has facilitated the flow of mortgage credit with
1
Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston,
Illinois: Row, Peterson & Company, 1957), p.62.
particular emphasis placed on the workings of the bond
market. Next, the impact of agency position in government
on agency effectiveness is considered, with Chapter 7
taking into account the level of government (State versus
Federal) and Chapter 8 looking at the degree of agency
autonomy. Chapter 9 discusses how individual agencies
have organized themselves in terms of the degree of bureau-
cratization while Chapter 10 examines the effectiveness of
leadership. The conclusion to the dissertation comes in
Chapter 11. It brings together the major findings of the
earlier chapters and looks at future prospects for state
housing finance agencies.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL FINANCE AGENCIES
The diffusion of state housing finance agencies among
the states has followed a relatively predictable pattern.
The political scientist, Jack L. Walker, found that
certain states act as leaders for their regions in that
they generate new programmatic ideas or are the first in
their region to adopt innovations put in practice by
leaders of other regions.
As it does with many new programs later emulated by
other states across the country, the New York legislature
in 1960 was the first to create a housing finance agency.
Massachusetts, a co-leader with New York in the Northeast
as well as the leader in New England, joined New Jersey in
following New York's lead and in becoming part of the
second generation of HFA's born in 1966-67. The State of
Michigan, which is considered a "leader" state in the Mid-
west, was the first state to introduce the concept to that
2
region in 1966, followed by Illinois a year later.
1
Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the
American States," The American Political Science Review, 63
(September, 1969), 880-99.
2
The diffusion of innovation to and within other regions of
the country has a similarly predictable pattern. Colorado,
which is considered the "leader" state in the Rocky Mountain
Region, in 1973 became the first state in that region to
23
State housing finance agencies have now been introduced
into every region of the country (see Table 1), and the
newer agencies are now emulating the experiences of their
more advanced brethren. The applicability of the experi-
ences of particular agencies to a new setting, however,
depends to a large degree upon the similarity of the
historical forces shaping the development of the old and
new agencies. A full understanding of the behavior of the
particular agencies being considered also requires an
examination of their shared histories. Likewise, an under-
standing of the behavior of HUD requires consideration of
its history.
Thus, this chapter begins by recounting the shared
history of the HFA's and then relates the history of each
of the six HFA's being analyzed in detail in this disserta-
tion: the New York State Division of Housing and Community
adopt a bona fide housing finance agency despite the fact
that Idaho adopted such an agency a year earlier which
lacked "moral obligation" language necessary to make it
possible to sell bonds. Similarly, Virginia, which along
with Louisiana, is the "leader" state in the South, in 1972
was the first Southern state to adopt a bona fide HFA,
despite the prior enactment of housing agencies in North
Carolina and South Carolina which lacked moral obligation
language. Louisiana also created an HFA in 1972, but it too
had defective language until amended two years later. The
one partial exception to the rule came on the West Coast.
There, the vetoes of Governor Ronald Reagan in California
in 1972 to 1974 kept the State from playing its traditional
leadership role in that region although the Cal-Vet program
has been providing low cost mortgage loans to homebuyers
since 1921. In 1973, Oregon became the first West Coast
state to enact an HFA to promote housing development.
Table 1
State Housing Agencies
Status and Volume of Housing Activity of Major Financial Programs: January 1, 1968-November 1, 1974
Direct Mort. or Con-
struction Fin. Pro- Secondary
jects Completed or Lending
Debt Under Construction
Debt. Auth. Outstanding Proj. Num $ Num.
Year 11-1-74 11-174 cost of Volume of
Created (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) Units (Millions) Units
Alaska Housing Finance Corp. 1971 E 115 B B 104 2,533
Colorado Housing Finance Auth. 1973 50 None B B B B
Connecticut Housing Finance Auth. 1971 100 125 40 2,018 53 2,487
Delaware State Housing Auth. 1968 2 0b Noneb 14 1,092 B B
Georgia Residential Finance Agcy. 1974 100 None B B B B
Hawaii Housing Auth. 1970 E D 128 5,679 D D
Idaho Housing Agency 1972 E 4 3 164 B B
Illinois Housing Development Auth. 1967 500 229 209 9,792 17 860
Kentucky Housing Corp. 1972 200 72 75 93 4,700
Louisiana Devel. Auth. For Hsg. Fin. 1972 30 None D D D D
Maine State Housing Auth. 1969 1 0 0b 4 9  10 568 34 1,906
Maryland Comm. Devel. Admin. 1971 9 4 4 160 B B
Massachusetts Home Mtg. Fin. Agcy. 1974 D None C C B B
Massachusetts Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1966 1,250 522 582 25,614 C C
Michigan State Hsg. Devel. Auth. 1966 600 397 341 14,971 C C
Minnesota Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1971 600 129 47 2,708 80 3,460
Missouri Hsg. Devel. Comm. 1969 200 51 451 2,643 C C
New Jersey Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1967 E 408 426 14,915 413 20,000
New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agcy. 1970 E 408 C C C C
New York State DHCR 1955 1 5 0c 138 747 20,677 C C
New York State Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1960 2,Finc 1,496 C C
(continued on next page)
Table 1 continued
Direct Mort. or Con-
struction Fin. Pro- Secondary
jects Completed or Lending
Debt Under Construction
Debt. Auth. Outstanding Proj. Num. $ Num.
Year 11-1-74 11-1-74 Cost of Volume of
Created (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) Units (Millions) Units
State of New York Mort. Agcy. 1970 750 264 C C 254 13,249
New York State Urban Devel. Corp. 1968 2,000 1,167 1,233 33,245 C C
North Carolina Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1973 200 None B B B B
Ohio Hsg. Devel. Board 1970 D D B B B B
Oregon State Hsg. Division 1973 200 None B B B B
Pennsylvania Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1973 E 12 81 3,644 B B
Rhode Island Hsg. & Mort. Fin. Agcy. 1973 E 71 4 183 63 3,100
South Carolina State Hsg. Auth. 1971 E None B B B B
South Dakota Hsg. Devel. Auth. 1973 E 43 17 1,164 9 464 est.
Tennessee Hsg. Devel. Agcy. 1973 1 50b 3 3b B B 26 986
Vermont Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1974 74 14 C C 11 400
Virginia Hsg. Devel. Auth. 1972 E 156 72 3,072 74 3,927
West Virginia Hsg. Devel. Fund. 1968 130 52 41 2,031 16 900
Wisconsin Hsg. Fin. Agcy. 1972 290 72 21 103 17 1,224
TOTAL 7,436 4,046 144,508 1,264 60,196
K E Y
A - Program implemented but production data was not obtained. (a) Unlimited for federally insured or guaranteed
B - Statutory authorization but program not implemented. mortgages.
C - Non statutory authorization. (b) Data as of December 1, 1974
D - Information not obtained. (c) Housing programs only.
E - No limit
Source: Adopted from Council of State Housing Agencies, "State Housing Agencies; Roles and Accomplishements," Feb. 1975.
Renewal/Housing Finance Agency, the Michigan State Housing
Development Authority, the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, the Illinois Housing Development Authority, the
New Jersey Housing Finance Agency, and the New York State
Urban Development Corporation. It concludes with the story
of Federal housing agencies. A brief history of each of
the state housing finance agencies in each of the other
states is reserved for Appendix 1.
Shared History of HFA's
Certain events on a national scale that occurred after
the creation of most of the HFA's being considered have had
a profound effect on the collective development of the state
HFA's. The impact of these events has fluctuated from
providing salvation to creating near disaster.
Probably the greatest boon to the HFA's was the enact-
ment of Section 236 of the 1968 Housing Act. It provided
both a boost to those agencies already in existence and an
additional reason for creating such agencies in those states
not possessing them. Basically, the Section 236 program
provided for subsidy payments to reduce mortgage interest
rates down to one percent so that moderate income families
could afford the required rents. While the predecessor
Section 221(d) (3) program also provided subsidies for
moderate income housing, its reliance on direct Federal
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loans precluded state financing on a permanent basis.
Subsection (b) of Section 236, however, provided:
That interest reduction payments may be made with
respect to a rental or cooperative housing project
owned by a private nonprofit housing corporation or
other nonprofit entity, a limited dividend corpora-
tion or other limited dividend entity, or a cooper-
ative housing corporation, which is financed under
a State or local program providing assistance
through loans, loan insurance, or tax abatements,
and which, prior to the completion of construction
or rehabilitation is approved for receiving the
benefits of this section.1
Pursuant to this subsection, HUD set aside funds to be
applied specifically to state-financed projects. It also
set aside Rent Supplement funds providing deeper subsidies
2
for low income families. Initially, the funds were dis-
bursed by local HUD offices to the various state agencies.
How much money came to a particular HFA depended both upon
how much the Central HUD Office allocated to the local HUD
office, and upon how well the HFA could negotiate a share
of its allocation. Beginning in 1973, however, allocation
of Section 236 funds for most states was shifted to HUD's
Central Office. How well the states were able to take
advantage of the Section 236 program is the subject of much
of the rest of this thesis.
1
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Sec. 236(b).
2
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Sec. 101.
Another event that encouraged the growth of state
housing finance agencies was the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. At a time when certain other tax
preferences were being curtailed, this Act created new
incentives for developers of subsidized housing. It kept
the highly accelerated double-declining balance method of
depreciation for all newly constructed housing, created
a new five-year write-off for rehabilitation for occupancy
2
by low-income tenants, and limited the amount of tax on
3
the sale of Section 236 developments. Even those devel-
opers that have insufficient income to fully utilize tax
shelters themselves have been able to profit from the sale
of limited partnership interests in the project to welathy
investors. Coupled with the high mortgage amounts provided
by the HFA's as a percentage of total development costs,
tax shelters have enabled developers to realize a substan-
tial profit while accepting limitations placed upon the
4
amount of cash flow they can receive from rents.
1
I.R.C. Sec. 167(j).
2
I.R.C. Sec. 167(k).
3
I.R.C. Sec. 1250 and Sec. 1039.
4
See Nathan S. Betnun, "Tax Shelters for the Rich to
Rehabilitate Housing for the Poor" (Unpublished M.C.P.
thesis, M.I.T., 1972).
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The final set of events worthy of mention in stimulating
the growth of state housing finance agencies throughout the
country were the credit crunches of 1969-1970 and 1973-1974.
While credit was more expensive for even the HFA's during
these periods, the fact that they could tap the tax-exempt
bond market at-a time when private lenders were experiencing
an outflow of funds meant that in many cases the HFA's were
the only available source of funds. Since the 1969-70
crunch came during the infancy of most of the HFA's examined
in this dissertation and the 1973-74 credit shortage
corresponded with a Federal moratorium on housing subsidies,
these shortages have had less of an impact than they would
have had if they had occurred at a different point in time.
On the disaster from the point of view of the HFA's,
various Federal administrative agencies have floated trial
balloons which would have seriously crippled if not complete-
ly destroyed the state HFA's. The first of these threats
was the proposed rules by the Internal Revenue Service to
limit the amount of "arbitrage" profits that states or
state agencies could take. State agencies support them-
selves by borrowing funds in the tax-exempt bond market and
relending at a profit on mortgages. Regulations proposed
in June 1972, if adopted, would have limited the amount
that HFA's could have charged borrowers above their own
borrowing rates. The bulk of agency operations would have
then had to have come from state appropriations. Pressure
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from the HFA's and the Municipal Finance Officials Associa-
tion was successful in convincing the Treasury Department
to back down.
Another threat to the HFA's came with the Nixon Admin-
istration's Limitation on Artificial Losses (LAL) tax
reform proposal. This proposal would have restricted the
transfer of tax shelter benefits to those not directly
engaged in real estate operations and thereby would have
excluded all developers not receiving substantial profits
from conventional developments from benefiting from the
primary source of profit on subsidized and state-financed
developments. The effect would have been to put most
state housing finance agencies out of business. Pressure
from HFA's, developers, and others, however, succeeded in
delaying action on this proposal indefinitely.
The Federal Office of Management and Budget (0MB) posed
yet a third major threat to state housing finance agencies
when it attempted to reduce Federal revenue losses on the
exemption from taxes of state and local bonds. Section 5(c)
of its contemplated Circular A-70 would have prevented the
use of any Federal guarantees in conjunction with state
and local tax-exempt obligations. Falling under the cate-
gory of "guarantee" as defined in the circular, would have
been such indirect guarantees as Federal debt service
assistance (as with the Section 236 program) and lease
contracts (as with the Section 8 Leased Housing Program).
After a prolonged lobbying campaign which enlisted the
support of the National Governors' Conference, state HFA's
were able to overcome this threat to their existence as
well.
The final potential disaster for the state HFA's was
the Federal moratorium on all subsidized housing programs,
announced January 5, 1973, which called for the termination
of subsidy funds for all projects not having received a
letter of feasibility prior to that date. In fact, state
agencies fared relatively well under the moratorium,
despite the fact that numerous projects had to be cancelled
because of lack of funds. In May 1973 HUD made a special
allocation of Section 236 subsidy funds for 15,500 state-
1
financed dwelling units.
The role outlined by HUD for the new Section 8 leased
housing program contemplates a strong role for state HFA's.
As with the Section 236 program, state HFA's will receive
a set-aside of Section 8 funds as well as regulations which
are more flexible than those faced by private mortgagees
receiving mortgage insurance plus subsidies. At this
writing questions remained outstanding as to the feasibility
1
Housing and Development Reporter, May 5, 1973, p.A-13.
of conventionally financed or HUD-insured Section 8
developments. The initial emphasis of HUD's field offices
has been on implementing the portions of the Section 8
program pertaining to existing housing and leaving new
construction and substantial rehabilitation to the state
2
agencies.
New York State Housing Finance Agency
New York State first became involved in encouraging
the development of housing for moderate income families
with its enactment of the Limited Dividend Housing
3
Companies Law in 1926. A State Housing Board was given
the power to condemn land and regulate rents and dividends
for approved moderate income developments. Rents in these
developments were reduced further through municipal tax
abatement, but financing, as well as management, was
4
provided privately. In 1939, the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal assumed the functions of the State Housing
Board with regard to Limited Dividend housing and also began
1
Ibid., March 10, 1975, p.1041.
2
Ibid., May 5, 1975, p.1247.
3
Private Housing Finance Law, Art. 4,9, and 10.
4
Dorothy Schaffter, State Housing Agencies, p.641.
administering the newly-created state public housing
program for low income families.
The Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law gradually
became ineffective in serving even middle income families
as the cost of financing through private sources rose.
Hence, in 1955, the New York State legislature enacted the
Limited Profit Housing Companies Law, better known as
Mitchell-Lama, after its sponsors, McNeil Mitchell and
1
Alfred A. Lama. Through the use of tax-exempt bonds
backed by full faith and credit of the State of New York,
Mitchell-Lama provided the first public low interest, high
loan to value ratio mortgage funds to developers of rental
housing for middle income families. As with the earlier
Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law, the Division of
Housing and Community Renewal would regulate rents and
profits on this housing and municipalities would provide
abatements of property taxes. In two referenda held in
1955 and 1958, voters approved the issuance of a total of
2
$150 million for such housing.
1
Private Housing Finance Law, Art. 2,3,9, and 10.
2
Because these funds were raised in a significantly differ-
ent manner from that of most HFA's and because they were
expended several years before the creation of most of those
being considered, their use will not be discussed in this
thesis.
As the demand for low interest rate housing financing
grew, additional reliance on bonds backed by the "full
faith and credit" of the State became less feasible since
such large sums would have diluted the credit of the State
for its more traditional purposes and required continued
voter approvals that might not have been forthcoming. A
task force headed by Otto Nelson, Vice President of New
York Life Insurance Company, began studying the alternatives.
It suggested that a Limited Profit Housing Mortgage Corpor-
ation composed of banks and insurance companies match
state funds being provided on each mortgage on a two-for-
one basis, thus enabling state funds to go three times as
far. A fund-raising effort among banks and insurance
companies, however, produced only $60 million toward a
goal of $200 million.
In this context, the idea arose to create an indepen-
dent state agency capable of issuing bonds backed by
project revenues rather than by the "full faith and credit
of the State." State bond counsel and later U.S. Attorney
General John Mitchell suggested that the State guarantee
that the reserve fund backing the issue always be suffi-
cient to meet the following year's debt service require-
ments. Since legislatures cannot bind future legislatures
to make appropriations, such backing could only be con-
sidered a "moral obligation" of the State, but not legally
binding. This arrangement protected the credit-worthiness
of the State, avoided the necessity of future voter
approvals, and afforded potential investors some measure
of protection against defaults. On this basis, in 1960,
the New York legislature created the New York State Housing
Finance Agency, the first state agency capable of financing
1
the development of housing by private developers.
The role assigned to the New York State Housing Finance
Agency, however, in certain respects, is more limited than
that given to nearly all of the more recently created
agencies. Responsibility for working directly with housing
sponsors and approving and monitoring projects remained
with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR).
The Commissioner of DHCR is an ex-officio member of
the Board of Directors of the HFA. When James William
Gaynor held that position through most of the HFA's forma-
tive years, he served as Chairman of the HFA Board.
Charles J. Urstadt, who had been a member of Gaynor's
staff, replaced him as DHCR Commissioner in 1969, and Lee
Goodwin, who had helped draft the original HFA legislation
1
The Pennsylvania Housing Agency was actually created by
statute a year earlier in 1959. It did not have a board
of directors nor become operational until ten years later.
Even then, defective original legislation kept it from
financing more than 49 dwelling units.
and had served as an assistant director of the HFA, was
named by Governor Rockefeller to that top position at DHCR
in 1973. Paul Belica has served as executive director of
the HFA throughout most of its history.
Under Belica's leadership, the New York HFA financed a
total of 43,450 dwelling units prior to 1970, the year when
most of the other advanced HFA's were financing their first
units. All but about 1000 of these units were in New York
City. Included in this total is the 15,400 unit Coop City
development in the Bronx, at the time the largest residen-
tial development in the country, the 5900 unit Rockdale
Village in Queens, and several other developments with
more than 1000 units.
The success of the New York State Housing Finance
Agency in providing low cost funds for housing attracted
the attention of New York legislators interested in other
program areas. Gradually, the role of the NYSHFA expanded
to include the financing of state university construction
(1962), mental hygiene improvement (1963), nursing homes
(1965), health facilities (1968), youth facilities (1969),
community mental health and mental retardation facilities
(1969), voluntary hospitals (1969), and community senior
service centers (1970).
The number of housing programs financed by the NYSHFA
similarly expanded. The initial General Housing Loan
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Program provided loans of 90 percent of project cost.
As further inducement to sponsors, the Legislature created
the Nonprofit Housing Loan program, which provides mort-
gages of up to 100 percent to nonprofit sponsors, and the
Urban Rental Housing Program, which provides mortgages of
up to 95 percent to limited-profit housing companies.
Equity requirements were reduced for individual purchasers
of cooperative units under the Home Owners Purchase
Endorsement (HOPE) loan program. Under this program,
second mortgages are provided by the HFA to enable purchasers
of cooperative units to pay the 5 percent equity requirement
2
over a period of five years. The Capital Grant Program,
begun in 1964, foreshadowed the Federal Rent Supplement
Program by allowing low income families to reside in a
limited percentage of HFA-financed, middle income dwelling
units. Under the program, state funds reduce a portion of
the project mortgage, thus enabling a reduction in that
portion of monthly rent that would otherwise be allocated
to mortgage amortization.
The original statute authorized the agency to issue
$525 million in notes and bonds, all for housing. Subse-
quent amendments have increased this limit to $6.15 billion
1
New York State Housing Finance Agency, Annual Report 1969,
pp.12-13.
2
Private Housing Finance Law, Article III.
by 1973, of which $2.10 billion can go for housing.
Through November 1, 1974, the agency had financed a total
1
of 64,131 dwelling units.
Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA)
The next state to adopt a housing finance agency was
Michigan, which created the Michigan State Housing Develop-
ment Authority (MSHDA) in 1966. The legislation, although
taking many provisions from New York statutes, gave the
financing and administrative powers carried out by two
separate agencies in New York to a single entity. Drafters
of the MSHDA legislation also believed that, unlike the
New York agencies at that time, MSHDA would be able to
utilize Federal subsidies to serve low income households
2
in addition to serving those with middle incomes.
Specifically, they envisioned that MSHDA could provide
low cost construction financing for developments receiving
Federally-subsidized permanent financing under the then-
existing Section 221(d)3 and 202 programs, as well as
take advantage of new Federal programs then being discussed
in Washington. The primary support for the initial legis-
1
New York State Housing Finance Agency, Annual Report 1974,
p.11.
2
Telephone interview with Thomas W. White, author of the
MSHDA legislation.
lation came from elderly and labor groups with builders
and banking interests then being basically indifferent.
After the enactment of initial legislation certain
technical amendments were added to make the bonds more
saleable. In 1968, the Court declared the revised MSHDA
statute to be valid allowing the agency to commence opera-
1
tions that year. The first director, Robert McLain,
failed to close any projects in two years, and so was
asked to resign by the Board of Directors.
William G. Rosenberg, a 30 year-old bond attorney,
succeeded him in early 1970. Partly because of his own
youth and partly because the Michigan civil service pro-
vides reasonably high salaries for well-educated, inexperi-
enced workers but low salaries in relation to private
industry for more experienced personnel, Rosenberg
attracted an extremely young, energetic staff. By the end
of the year, 17 projects totalling 1786 dwelling units had
closed. All of these projects were HUD-insured, all were
sponsored by nonprofit corporations, and all but three were
outside the City of Detroit. The HUD mortgage insurance
allowed MSHDA to establish a track record, gain some experi-
ence, and build up some reserves without taking any risks.
1
Re: Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of Act No.346
of Public Acts of 1966, (1968) 158 N.W. 2d 416.
Unlike the Massachusetts agency, MSHDA financed the perma-
nent mortgage as well as the construction loan on its early
HUD projects. As a result, the MSHDA management staff as
well as the development staff was able to be trained on
insured projects. MSHDA did two further joint ventures
with HUD, those being Project Rehab and Operation Break-
through. In both instances HUD provided mortgage insurance
while MSHDA provided financing. The Project Rehab venture
was, in part, an attempt to placate Detroit legislators
who complained of the lack of MSHDA activity in the inner
city.
At the beginning of 1973, Governor William G. Milliken
asked Rosenberg to become the chairman of the Michigan
Public Service Commission and announced the appointment of
David L. Froh as the new MSHDA executive director. Froh
had been with the agency for two years prior to his appoint-
ment, and before that had been the coordinator of state and
Federal programs for the City of Lansing.
Further pressure on the direction of MSHDA policy
continued into the Froh years. Most outspoken was a broad
coalition of interest groups who called upon MSHDA to do
more in the way of providing housing for low income families.
A part of the coalition, notably the Michigan Committee on
Law and Housing (a public interest group from the University
of Detroit Law School that had helped draft the original
MSHDA legislation), the Archdiocese of Detroit, the
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Coordinating Council on Human Relations, the Interfaith
Action Council of Metropolitan Detroit, and the Michigan
Welfare Rights Organization, took this position for social
reasons; the business groups in the coalition, including
the Mortgage Bankers Association of Michigan, the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, and the Michigan Association of Home-
builders advocated increased low income production by MSHDA
in order that it not compete with private interests. While
Rosenberg had put off the group by agreeing to meet quarter-
ly with the Governor and legislature concerning the low
income requirement, shortly after Froh's arrival, the group
succeeded in modifying the MSHDA statute to require that
15 percent of the residents of each development have low
incomes.
The controversy, however, over the income levels that
should be served by MSHDA continued. The Michigan Office
of Program Effectiveness Review criticized MSHDA for
serving some families with incomes over $15,000 and not
2
serving enough families with incomes under $4000. Even
more controversial, however, was the alleged covering up
1
P.A. 1972, No.310, Sec.l.
2
Michigan Office of Program Effectiveness, Subsidized
Housing Program: An Assessment of Effectiveness, (Depart-
ment of Management and Budget: Lansing, October, 1973).
of the report by the Governor's Office and abolition of
1
the office making the study.
Despite these controversies and despite the Federal
moratorium on subsidized housing, MSHDA during Froh's tenure
as executive director has succeeded in implementing a number
of innovative programs devised by Rosenberg. In conjunction
with the Michigan Department of Mental Health, through
June 30, 1974, MSHDA had financed or given loan commitments
for seven non-institutionalized homes for 150 marginally
2
retarded adults throughout the state. Unlike the other
advanced HFA's, MSHDA has become involved with the produc-
tion of single family housing, having financed over 2000
3
units. All, however, have been on a HUD-insured basis.
MSHDA has continued to expand its multi-family production
on an uninsured basis. Through November 1, 1974, it had
financed nearly 14,000 multi-family units of which about
2900 were HUD insured and another 3700 were for middle
4
income families.
1
Detroit Free Press, November 16, 1973, p.3A; November 17,
1973, p.12-A; November 18, 1973, p.2-B; November 21, 1973,
p.10A; November 26, 1973, p.8-A.
2
MSHDA, Annual Report, 1974, pp.14-17.
3
Ibid., p.18.
4
Council of State Housing Agencies, State Housing Agencies:
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA)
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) grew
out of a proposal by Governor John Volpe based upon
recommendations of the Special Commission on Low Income
Housing. The Commission, created by the state legislature
in 1964, contained a mixture of civic leaders, academics,
legislators (including future Governor Michael Dukakis),
lawyers, and builders. It looked at the New York HFA as
a starting point, but envisaged an HFA in Massachusetts as
serving moderate and low income families rather than middle
income families by being used as a supplement to the Feder-
al moderate income Section 221(d) (3) program. Not only
would an HFA provide additional funds, but it could finance
housing in communities that refused to take the overt
action of creating a Workable Program which was necessary
for many types of Federal programs, including Section
221(d)(3). Also, unlike Federal moderate income programs
at that time, MHFA was seen as being able to provide
housing for a limited number of low income families in each
development. The Commission saw state subsidies through
direct appropriations and Agency profits as one means of
Roles and Accomplishments, Draft, December, 1974. "Middle
income families" means those not receiving direct subsidies
and corresponds to "moderate income" as generally used by
MSHDA.
reaching low income families and rent skewing as another.
With rent skewing, rents for most tenants would be set
higher than average for the development to enable a few
low income tenants to pay low rents.
Before the enactment of MHFA, the legislature requested
an advisory opinion from the State Supreme Judicial Court
on the constitutionality of the draft of the legislation
before it. The opinion suggested that the Court might not
approve the contemplated legislation to aid "moderate"
income families because it would unconstitutionally lend
the credit of the state to private individuals and corpora-
2
tions without serving a valid public purpose. As a result,
the legislature amended the proposed legislation to more
explicitly incorporate the findings of the Commission. The
bill actually enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature
declared that the permanent elimination of slums (a recog-
nized public purpose) could best be accomplished through
the scattering of "low" income families among higher income
families and mandated that the Agency set aside a minimum
of twenty-five percent of the dwelling units in each
development for low income families. However, the original
Massachusetts Special Commission on Low Income Housing,
Final Report (Boston: Wright and Potter Co., April, 1965),
pp.37-41.
2
Opinion of Justices, 320 Mass. 773.
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definition of low income used by the legislature was:
Those persons and families whose annual income is
less than the amount necessary to enable them to
obtain and maintain decent, safe, and sanitary
housing without the expenditure of over twenty-five
percent of such income for basic shelter rent plus
the additional cost, if any, of heat and hot water.
Broad construction of this language could define low income
families as those unable to afford the market rate housing
produced by MHFA, or the majority of the residents of the
2
state. Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
the constitutionality of the Agency in Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency v. New England Merchants National Bank of
Boston et al., 1969 A.S. 987.
While the legislation was approved in September of
1966, the Agency did not become fully operational until
after a $300,000 seed money loan was made available to
hire a staff in November of 1968 during the term of
Governor Francis Sargent. The initial director of MHFA
was David Martin, one of the architects of the initial
legislation and a former professor at both Harvard and
Yale law schools. His primary accomplishment was resolving
1
Chapter 708 of the Acts of 1966, Sec. l(d).
2
Rents on a two-bedroom apartment in the MHFA development
discussed in the case study in Chapter 4 would be $228 per
month if no direct subsidies were applied. A household
earning the median income in the state would have to pay
29 percent of its income for rent to live there.
the constitutionality question in June of 1969. Yet,
before the first loan could be closed, he fell out of
favor with the board of directors and, as a result, they
named his assistant director, William J. White, to the top
position. White's background was primarily in real estate,
having been the president of a development firm, executive
director of the local real estate brokers' institute and
multiple listing service as well as being on the board of
several "fair housing" organizations.
Probably the most significant decision made by White
in terms of shaping the character of MHFA was that the
statutory requirement of 25 percent low income residents
be fulfilled by requiring 25 percent of the residents to
have incomes low enough to qualify for public housing.
This requirement went well beyond the letter of the statute
but was consistent with its spirit and the wording of the
initial judicial opinion. Without spelling out this rule
in any handbook or rulebook, the staff refused to take any
project before the board of directors that failed to meet
this requirement. Despite reluctance from certain board
members, the board backed the staff on this requirement.
A letter from the State Attorney General provided additional
support against possible legal challenges. Finally, at
White's urging, in 1974 the Legislature amended the MHFA
Act to specify that at least 25 percent of all residents
have incomes low enough to qualify for public housing.
The initial delays in making MHFA operational
actually led to its coming into being at an opportune
moment. The credit crunch of 1969-70 and consequent high
interest rates made it impossible for certain FHA-insured
Section 221(d) (3) and 236 developments to close. The pro-
vision of below-market interest rate construction loans
by MHFA served the dual purpose of making a number of them
financially feasible and of providing MHFA with construc-
tion lending experience and income with which to build up
reserves.
The delays in the start-up of MHFA further had the
propitious effect of allowing MHFA to utilize subsidies
from the new-born Section 236 program on projects for
which it would finance the permanent mortgage on an
uninsured basis. Contrary to the expectations of the
Commission recommending the creation of MHFA, both the
Section 221(d) (3) program and in most instances, rent
skewing proved to be infeasible means of HFA participation
1
on a long-term basis. Rather, the Section 236 and the
State subsidy program in Massachusetts modeled after it
were required to provide housing for moderate income
2
families. The volume of construction starts handled by
1
Rent skewing was used as a subsidy vehicle for 101 low
income units.
2
M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec. l-13A.
MHFA increased from about 1400 dwelling units in 1970 to
over 5000 in each of the years 1971-1973. While the number
of units it produced dipped in 1974 as the result of the
Federal moratorium, state housing subsidies enabled the
Massachusetts agency to produce more subsidized units than
the other HFA's. All told, through November 1, 1974, MHFA
had produced 25,600 units. The inauguration of a new
governor, Michael Dukakis, in 1975 brought no significant
changes to MHFA's operations, at least in the first few
months.
Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA)
The legislation creating the Illinois Housing Develop-
ment Authority resulted from findings and recommendations
made by a specially created Legislative Commission on Low
Income Housing appointed by Governor Otto Kerner in 1965.
Their report, while mentioning the existence of the New
York and Michigan HFA's, suggested that the Illinois
program be "modeled upon the Massachusetts approach, with
significant additions of 'seed money' advances for planning
and development, and possible condominium and cooperative
1
ownership." Like Massachusetts, the Illinois commission
Report of the Legislative Commission on Low Income Housing,
Robert E. Mann, chairman (Chicago: April, 1967),p.48.
(Mimeographed.)
envisioned that low income families could be best served
in a mixed income setting. It proposed mixing low and
moderate income families together in the same project
using such devices as rent skewing and state-funded rent
supplements.
The initial director was Daniel P. Kearney, a corporate
attorney who later became Deputy Director of Housing Pro-
duction and Mortgage Credit at HUD and then executive
director of the Government National Mortgage Association.
Kearney put together an extremely strong staff, judging
by their later positions. Included were John McCoy, who
later became the executive director of the Pennsylvania
Housing Finance Agency; Leonard Crosby, who now serves as
director of the West Virginia Housing Development Fund;
and Ralph Brown, who went on to head the Technical
Assistance Corporation for Housing.
The initial projects completed were all uninsured,
often in suburban areas, and largely for middle income
residents. IHDA was able to introduce a modest degree of
income integration in its developments; however, income
integration has generally meant mixing one-third moderate
income families receiving Section 236 subsidies along with
two-thirds middle income families.
The other major program carried out by IHDA was its
seed money loans to nonprofit sponsors through its specially
appropriated development advance fund. With the exception
of a mortgage granted to one financially strong nonprofit
sponsor, however, all of IHDA's early permanent loans went
to limited dividend sponsors. IHDA also received an appro-
priation of $1,800,000 for the purpose of buying land. It
purchased one parcel for about $300,000 which it still
holds for future development. Rather than encounter politi-
cal opposition, it has returned the balance of the funds
to the state.
The change in governors at the start of 1973 saw
virtually a total decimation of the IHDA staff. After a
short period during which an acting executive director ran
IHDA, Irving Gerick became the new chief executive. While
Gerick had a background as the director of development for
Urban America, the bulk of his staff was extremely inexperi-
enced, particularly in comparison with the Kearny staff.
Gerick set as an agency goal the rebuilding of the
South Side of Chicago, an ambitious task to say the least.
In order to do so, Gerick has been attempting to build up
IHDA's reserves through a variety of programs including
construction loans on HUD-insured developments. One program
aimed at both building up IHDA's reserves and directing
mortgage money into inner-city areas has utilized IHDA's
loans-to-lenders power, a power possessed by none of the
other HFA's being considered in detail in this thesis but
by several other state agencies. Under this program, IHDA
makes funds available to private lenders for use as mort-
gage funds. Unlike other state agencies operating loans-to-
lenders programs, IHDA has placed locational restrictions
on where the funds can be used. It has required that all
mortgage loans made using these funds be on properties
located in contiguous zip code areas where at least 60 per-
cent of their depositors reside. Here the risk is all on
the part of the lender in that the lender must designate
other mortgages as collateral in excess of the amount of
the loan.
By November 1974, IHDA had directly financed just under
10,000 units and another 850 units through its loans to
lenders. In early 1975 Governor Daniel Walker submitted
legislation that would expand the bond limit of IHDA from
$500 million to $1.1 billion to allow the production of
about 6,000 more units in hopes that the new activity
would stimulate the economy and employment situation in
1
the state.
New Jersey Housing Finance Agency (NJHFA)
Passage of the enabling legislation for the New Jersey
Housing Finance Agency came in 1967 shortly after the
1
Housing and Development Reporter, March 24,1975,pp.ll0l-O2.
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arrival of Paul Ylvisaker to New Jersey. Ylvisaker came
with a national reputation for work in directing anti-
poverty efforts for the Ford Foundation. While the legis-
lation to create both the HFA and a Department of Community
Affairs had been formulated prior to his arrival, know-
ledge that he would become Executive Director of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs, and thereby ex-officio chairman
of the Board of Directors of the HFA, provided the final
impetus to secure passage. Support for the legislation
came primarily from blacks, church groups, and planners as
well as from developers. Unlike in other states, however,
enactment of a housing finance agency in New Jersey
required an amendment sponsored by suburban legislators
limiting HFA activities to those cities and towns that
approve a resolution of need for such housing.
Through Ylvisaker's contacts in Washington, in 1969
New Jersey was able to pioneer the use of Federal subsidies
in conjunction with state financing under the new moderate
income Section 236 program. The terms worked out between
Ylvisaker and HUD allowed state mortgagees not utilizing
HUD mortgage insurance to obtain Section 236 subsidy funds
with a minimum of HUD review. Most of the New Jersey HFA's
early projects were fully subsidized with a combination of
Section 236 for moderate income residents and additional
Section 101 Rent Supplements to accommodate low income
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residents in approximately 20 percent of the units.
In the 1969 gubernatorial election in New Jersey,
voters turned away from the social activism of Governor
Richard J. Hughes, and replaced him with Governor William
T. Cahill. One of Cahill's campaign promises was to
remove Ylvisaker from office. With his exodus, much of the
staff left as well. Those that remained saw a great change
in the goals of the HFA. Many of those interviewed com-
plained that political patronage overcame social idealism
as the modus operandi of the agency. The new chairman of
the Board, Edmund T. Hume, came to play a comparatively
weak role in the agency, as agency policy became identi-
fied in the minds of the staff as the policy of the Cahill
Administration. The new executive director, John P. Renna,
came to the HFA with the background of a developer and the
predilection to strike a deal wherever he could.
One such deal proved to be the most controversial
project attempted by any state HFA. The New Jersey HFA
agreed to finance Kawaida Towers for moderate income
families in a racially mixed area of Newark. The sponsor
of the project was the black nationalist Temple of Kawaida,
headed by the militant playwright Imamu Baraka (formerly
LeRoi Jones). The controversy arose when City Councilman
Anthony Imperiale decided to contest the development
because of who the sponsor was and its high density.
After failing to receive a court injunction to stop the
project, in November 1972 Imperiale led a band of white
militants to forcibly halt construction. As a result of
this action, construction has been held in abeyance. In
July 1973, a New Jersey court rejected the claims by
Imperiale's group that the tax abatement granted the
project by the Newark Municipal Council was invalid, that
the project would be a "breeder of crime," and that the
sponsoring group was dominated by "an outside power,"
2
i.e., Baraka. Still, construction has yet to resume fully.
The more typical projects during the Renna-Cahill
years, however, were subsidized, nonprofit developments in
urban areas of the state. Half of the projects approved
during these years were elderly; two-thirds were sponsored
by nonprofit organizations. The total production for the
New Jersey agency through November 1, 1974, was about
15,000 units.
The 1974 elections again marked a change in the
governorship and a subsequent change in the leadership of
1
New York Times, February 2, 1973, p.66 .
2
Ibid., July 11, 1973, p.85.
the HFA. The new executive director, William Johnston,
appears to share the social commitments evident in the
Ylvisaker years. In early 1975, the new governor, Brendan
T. Byrne, proposed giving the New Jersey HFA the power to
initiate the development of projects desired by local
officials.
New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC)
The New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC)
was the first state agency with finance powers to utilize
development powers as well. In addition to being able to
provide tax-exempt bond financing, UDC has been able to
initiate developments through the use of its full range of
development powers, including in certain instances the
overriding of local zoning and the taking of property by
eminent domain.
The creation of UDC was the result of the political
muscle of Governor Nelson Rockefeller. In proposing UDC
in early 1968, Rockefeller called it an "extreme measure"
that was needed to save the cities. Because of opposition
from numerous mayors and other local officials, including
Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, centering around the
1
Housing and Development Reporter, February 10, 1975, p.953 .
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issue of home rule, passage of the legislation appeared
impossible until the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King. During the afternoon of April 9, 1968, the proposal
passed in the Senate but lost in the Assembly 85 to 48,
while Rockefeller was attending King's funeral in Atlanta.
The Governor returned to impress upon individual legislators
the need to create UDC as a tribute to the slain civil
rights leader. Through persuasion, cajolement, threats,
log-rolling, and patronage, Rockefeller managed to change
1
forty votes within seven hours. Before the night ended,
the Assembly approved the legislation by a vote of 86 to 45.
One month later, Rockefeller named Edward J. Logue as
UDC's President and Chief Executive Officer. As later
revealed in his confirmation hearings as Vice-President of
the United States, Rockefeller induced Logue to take the
position by using his personal fortunes to provide Logue
2
with a gift of $31,000 and a loan of $145,000.
The extraordinary powers vested with UDC combined with
high salaries and Logue's record of accomplishment enabled
UDC to attract a staff that included several people that had
already directed agencies themselves. Among the senior
1
Samuel Kaplan, "Renewal in New York: The State Tries Its
Hand," Washington Monthly, July, 1970, p.68 .
2
Boston Globe, January 26, 1975, p.A-4.
staff were: John G. Burnett, General Counsel, who had been
Executive Vice President of Development and Resources
Corporation as well as General Counsel to the U.S. Foreign
Aid Program; Robert G. Hazen, General Manager, who had
been in charge of urban renewal in New York City; Dr. Frank
Kristoff, Director of Economics and Housing Finance and a
leading housing economist; D. David Brandon, Director of
Program Development, formerly Director of the New York State
Office of Planning Coordination; Richard H. Pine, President
of the UDC subsidiary in the Rochester area, who had been
the Director of the Rochester Urban Renewal Agency.
Despite UDC's extraordinary powers, the primary way in
which it operated, particularly at the outset, was in
partnership with local communities. Before the end of 1969,
UDC had signed memoranda of understanding with 12 cities and
towns across the state to construct developments having a
total of over 22,000 dwelling units. Most of these were
projects that private developers found unfeasible with
about half being located in urban renewal areas. In addition,
UDC has initiated two new communities, one in Amherst in
coordination with the planned creation of the State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo and one in Lysander (near Syra-
cuse) on the site of a former munitions factory, in addition
to one large housing development on Roosevelt Island (formerly
Welfare Island) in the East River off of Manhattan that it
bills as a new community.
For the most part, UDC used its zoning override and
condemnation powers sparingly and only with the consent of
local officials. The one area where UDC encountered diffi-
culties in attempting to use its powers was in Westchester
County, a primarily affluent suburban county outside of
New York City. The growth rate of jobs and a tight housing
market in the County led Westchester officials to conclude
that some 46,000 dwelling units would be needed to be built
in the County with public assistance during the decade of
the 1970's in addition to an equal number by the unaided
efforts of private developers in order to accommodate those
1
who could be expected to be employed there. A UDC proposal
to build 70 moderate income units, 20 low income units, and
10 elderly units in each of 9 towns in the County encountered
an extraordinary amount of opposition from local residents
and town officials, despite the fact that all of the
housing would have been two-story townhouses or garden
apartments, most on wooded tracts of 10 acres or more
tailored to each site. As a result, the state legislature
amended UDC's zoning override powers in towns and villages
(but not cities) so that each town would have the right to
veto the override of local zoning by UDC on one project.
1
UDC, UDC in '72, 1972 Annual Report, p.54.
More so than the governors in other states with HFA's,
Governor Rockefeller became identified with the progress of
UDC. He requested proposals for projects from mayors across
the state, announced the signing of most memoranda of under-
standing with local communities, was present for major
groundbreaking ceremonies, and defended the integrity of
the organization.
In 1973 UDC began to take a more cautious approach to
development as the result of the shaking up of UDC's Finance
Division by the Executive Vice-President and the bringing in
of a new, highly competent financial team. The result was
much improved accounting, cash flow projections, and
financial reporting, a fact that was recognized by Moody's
1
Investors Service. Nonetheless, as a result of the worsen-
ing economy and problems on UDC's earlier ventures coming
to the forefront, UDC began to experience severe financial
problems.
The first public indication of problems came in the
midst of a tight money period in September 1974, when UDC
had to pay a record 9 percent net-interest rate on the bonds
it issued. As part of the negotiating surrounding this
sale, the large New York City banks purchasing many of these
bonds urged UDC to sell a substantial part of its existing
1
Moody's Bond SurveyeSeptember 10, 1974, p. 486.
mortgage portfolio to the New York State Housing Finance
Agency and urged Governor Malcolm Wilson to commission a
study of UDC operations. Wilson responded by naming State
Budget Director Richard L. Dunham to head a task force on
UDC and by securing agreement from the UDC board to withhold
approval of all new commitments unless approved personally
by the Governor on a project-by-project basis. The Report
of the Task Force on UDC issued on December 26, 1974,
recommended that UDC, because of its difficulty in raising
funds, terminate all new projects including $400 million in
projects in its pipeline on which UDC had yet to make a
2
legally binding commitment.
The succession of newly-elected Hugh Carey to the
governorship in January brought new questions as to the
continued vitality of UDC. In one of his first acts as
governor, Carey removed Edward Logue from his position as
President and Chief Executive Officer and named the Executive
Vice-President, John Burnett, to replace him on an interim
basis. Carey also appointed a special committee to analyze
UDC's financial problems and a "Moreland Act" commission to
study all public authorities in New York State with partic-
1
Joseph P. Fried, "Urban Development Unit Curbed on New
Projects," New York Times, October 5, 1974, p.54.
2
Report of the Task Force on UDC, Richard Dunham, chairman,
Albany, 1974, p.7 . (Mimeographed.)
ular emphasis on UDC and the use of moral obligation
financing. At the same time, because of UDC's poor credit
in the financial community, Carey recommended to the Legis-
lature that the State lend UDC $178 million to enable it to
repay $100 million in maturing obligations and finance
$78 million in current operations.
On February 25, before the Legislature acted on this
request, UDC defaulted on $100 million in bond anticipation
notes (plus $4 million in accrued interest). A few days
later, it also defaulted on $30 million in bank loans. In
the wake of these defaults, UDC was forced to dismiss one-
third of its staff, including several officials at the
executive level. In an attempt to salvage UDC from bank-
ruptcy, the Legislature first created a Project Finance
Agency (PFA) and provided it with $110 million. While this
move initially failed to restore the confidence of the major
New York City commercial banks, the subsequent allocation
of these funds to repay holders of defaulted notes and the
additional appropriation of $80 million to help meet debt
service on outstanding bonds and $8 million for operating
expenses led these banks to commit $140 million in short
term loans to UDC through the PFA. In addition, the State
Motor Vehicle Insurance Security Fund made a commitment to
provide UDC with another $140 million while at this writing
the New York savings banks had expressed a strong interest
in purchasing long term UDC bonds and were investigating
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the viability of UDC's projects further.
Federal Housing Agencies
Because of the strong dependence of state HFA's on
Federal subsidies, a thorough understanding of the history
of these agencies requires a review of the history of Federal
involvement in housing. Such a review is also necessary to
understand HUD, the benchmark being used to compare the
experience of the HFA's.
The Federal government first became involved with
housing finance in response to the Great Depression. In
1932 the Federal Home Loan Bank system was created to lend
funds to mortgage lenders; in 1933 the Home Owners Loan
Corporation was created to purchase mortgages in trouble;
and, more relevant to this thesis, in 1934 the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) was created to insure mortgages
and thereby spur new residential construction. FHA insurance
enable private lenders to provide mortgages over longer
terms and with higher loan to value ratios. To protect its
investment and to stimulate the economy, the FHA required
that the housing either be new construction or up to new
standards. A set of minimum property standards were
developed to assure uniformity of FHA housing across the
country and to guard against abuses. FHA also refused to
insure homes located in declining neighborhoods. The net
result was that FHA enabled middle income homebuyers to be
able to afford new housing in the suburbs. Over the years
FHA also developed multi-family development programs. As
with its single family programs, FHA tended to be quite
conservative in its lending patterns throughout most of its
history. Early plans for FHA contemplated a degree of
supplemental state control of projects. Federal controls,
however, became so complete that additional state control
1
then seemed excessive.
Largely concurrent with the growth of FHA was the
growth of two other Federal housing agencies, the Public
Housing Administration (later to be called the Housing
Assistance Administration), created in 1937 to administer
low income public housing and the Renewal Assistance Admin-
istration, created in 1949 to administer urban renewal.
These three agencies were grouped together in a confedera-
tion as the Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1961 which
evolved into the cabinet level Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) in 1965. As members of the differ-
ent subagencies within HUD began having to work together, a
certain degree of competitiveness resulted. According to
one observer, staff from the more conservative, hard-nosed
1
Dorothy Schaffter, State Housing Agencies, p.618.
FHA seemed to have the upper hand over those from the
Renewal Assistance Administration and Housing Assistance
Administration. Jealousy also seemed to develop between
local offices and the central office in Washington. Those
in local offices came to believe that the central office
was too far removed from local problems while those in
Washington came to believe that the local offices were too
2
parochial. Administrative changes made in 1969 and 1971
took away the autonomy of the older agencies within HUD and
folded them into a single, more integrated agency organized
3
by the processes performed rather than by program. In
1970, as part of an overall reorganization of local
Federal offices to create uniform, regional boundaries for
all Federal programs, HUD added four new regional offices
to six of its then existing offices, and created 39 new
area offices which together with 34 already existing insuring
offices implement HUD mortgage insurance and subsidy programs
4
on the local level. Ten HUD area or insuring offices have
Richard T. LeGates, "Can the Federal Welfare Bureaucracies
Control Their Programs: The Case of HUD and Urban Renewal,"
The Urban Lawyer, 5 (Spring, 1970), p.23 6 .
2
Ibid.
3
Housing Development Reporter, p.07:0003-7.
4
Ibid., p.07:00007.
a jurisdiction matching those of the six state agencies
under consideration in this dissertation.
At about the time of the first reorganization came the
enactment of the 1968 Housing Act. This major piece of
social legislation was part of the legislative response to
the recent inner city riots. The preamble to the Act called
for the creation of an unprecedented 26 million dwelling
units over a ten year period, with six million of them
being for low and moderate income families. Included in the
body of the Act was the Section 236 multi-family interest
subsidy program. As noted above, a subsection of the
program provided an opportunity for state agencies to
receive a share of these funds without HUD mortgage insur-
ance. For the projects it did insure, however, HUD was
given the advantage of a Special Risk Insurance Fund. The
Act authorized to be appropriated:
Such sums as may be needed from time to time to
cover losses sustained by the fund in carrying out
the mortga e insurance provisions of sections.
235. . . .
1
The Chicago Area Office and Springfield Insuring Office
divide responsibility for Illinois; the Boston Area Office
serves all of Massachusetts; the Detroit Area Office and
Grand Rapids Insuring Office have charge of operations in
Michigan; the Newark and Camden Area Offices split New
Jersey; and the New York City and Buffalo Area Offices and
Albany Insuring Office serve New York.
2
National Housing Act of 1949, as amended, Sec. 238(b).
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The Special Risk Insurance Fund meant the abandonment of
HUD's historical conservatism in mortgage underwriting and
a shift in power to the more socially oriented segments of
the organization. Gearing up for the new production goals
coincided with the second reorganization. Rather than
relocate, many of the most highly skilled HUD personnel who
had offers outside HUD chose to take them; many more new
inexperienced personnel were taken on. The result was that
"the personnel in most local HUD offices have a very poor
1
understanding of the overall development process."
Presiding over HUD during the years of 1969-1973 was
George Romney, an appointee of President Richard Nixon.
Romney came to the job with no housing experience, having
been the chief executive at American Motors and Governor of
Michigan. The Romney years saw a high level of corruption
in HUD. Six area office directors were indicted. While
the most notorious incident occurred in Coral Gables and
involved Senator Edward Gurney, two indictments of local HUD
office directors were made in the states with active state
housing agencies. The Hempstead, New York insuring office
director and the Chicago area office director were both
indicted.
1
Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of
Federally Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Vol. 3:
Multifamily Housing (Washington, D.C.: National Center for
Housing Management, 1973), p.121 .
The end of the Romney years came with his announcement
of the moratorium on all HUD subsidized programs on January
5, 1973. During the two weeks between the leaking to the
press of the impending moratorium and the actual announce-
ment, a time of the year when HUD business normally slows
down, more projects were granted feasibility letters than
1
during all of the rest of 1972. This flurry of activity
by HUD personnel indicated a combination of developer
pressures, commitment of local personnel to the programs,
and probably most importantly a desire on the part of HUD
personnel to assure themselves jobs processing the continu-
ing pipeline.
With the announcement of the moratorium came the
appointment of James T. Lynn as the new Secretary of HUD.
Lynn, who had been a corporate attorney and an Assistant
Secretary of Commerce, had little housing experience.
During his tenure was a nine month restudy of national
housing programs. The results announced in September 1973
called for the cautious movement towards a national system
of housing allowances. In the meantime the study called for
the implementation of a revised leased housing program. The
1
Interview with John A. Jennings, Special Assistant to the
Deputy Undersecretary for Field Operations.
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Congressional enactment of a new Section 8 leased housing
program as part of the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 marked a legislative triumph for Lynn. It allows
for both the subsidization of existing and newly constructed
units and as mentioned above, it provides a substantial role
for the state agencies. Implementation of this section,
however, has been left for a new HUD Secretary, Carla Hills.
CHAPTER 3
CRITERIA FOR AGENCY SUCCESS
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Both the state HFA's and HUD exist to serve public
purposes. Legislatures have spelled out many of these
purposes in their findings as part of the statutes creating
these agencies and in statutes directing these agencies to
perform certain public purpose functions. Congress has
determined that certain goals are of such national importance
that state agencies must implement procedures formulated to
foster these goals if they want to receive Federal subsidies
for their projects. While certain state and Federal public
purposes may have been specified in enabling legislation for
public relations reasons, this thesis assumes that because a
majority of the legislative body creating each agency
approved the language in the act, the legislative intent
was that these agencies fulfill these public purposes.
In comparing the HFA's with HUD and with each other, a
broad range of legislatively determined criteria will be
used. (See Table 2 for a summary.) Each agency will be
judged by public purposes set forth by its own legislature,
or by Congress. Agencies will be judged by the goals
legislatively set for other agencies only when they have
administratively adopted these goals in an official state-
ment. This chapter will delineate these goals and to whom
they apply, while Chapter 4 will proceed to rate the per-
formance of the various HFA's and HUD in achieving them.
Table
Criteria for
Goal or Legislative Finding
General Public Purposes
A decent home for all/
Present shortage of
decent housing.
Housing within the finan-
cial means of low and mod-
erate income families.
Slum rebuilding.
Accessibility of
unemployed to jobs
Good design and
construction
Operational Measure
Volume of production
Rents/Use of
subsidies
Volume of production
in urban renewal
and poverty areas
Moderate income hous-
ing built in counties
with surplus low
skilled jobs.
Design awards/room
size/amenities/
guarantees
Agency
IL, MA, MI,
NJ, NY, UDC,
HUD
IL, MA, MI,
NJ, NY, UDC,
HUD
IL, MA, MI*,
NJ, NY, UDC,
HUD
IL, NJ, MI*,
HUD*
IL*, MA*,
MI*, NJ*,
NY*, UDC*, HUD
National Public Purposes
Racial integration
Housing for minorities
Minority employment
Environmental Protection
Equitable relocation
Housing rehabilitation
Housing for families
most in need
*Administratively-determined goal
**Goal that Congress has required HUD
Racial mixture of
each project
Percentage of minority
occupants
Proportion of minority
workers and contrac-
tors
Procedures
None
Percentage of
total units that
are rehabilitated
Percentage of units
with 3 or more bed-
rooms
to apply to state agencies.
2
Success
HUD**
HUD**
HUD**
HUD**
HUD
HUD
Table 2
(continued)
Local Public Purposes
Economic integration
Cooperative ownership
Housing for the elderly
Subsidy level mix
Proportion of owner-
ship by coops
Number of units
designed for elderly
IL,MA, MI,*
NY, UDC*
MA, MI, NY
Efficiency Measures
Efficiency in achieving
public purposes
Administrative costs
per unit/Agency fund
balances/Rate of "problem
projects"/Vacancy rates/
Subsidy costs per unit/
Processing times
*Administratively-determined goal
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GENERAL PUBLIC PURPOSES
The legislation creating each of the state housing
finance agencies being considered makes the same basic
finding, namely, that a shortage of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing exists within the financial means of low
and moderate income families. Each statute goes on to
state or imply that a primary purpose of the agency being
created is to help provide a decent home for all. Congress
made this same finding in calling upon HUD to implement the
2
Federal Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. The
primary operational measures that will be used in assessing
organizational effectiveness in alleviating these shortages
and directing production toward low and moderate income
families are volume of production under low and moderate
income programs and level of rents.
Another major goal that each agency shares by virtue
of its own legislative or administrative proclamation is
1
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303; M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec.
1-2; M.C.L.A. Sec. 125.1401; N.J.S.A. 55:14J-2; 41 N.Y. Cons.
Laws Ann., Sec. 11.
2
12 U.S.C. 1701t Sec.2.
the rebuilding of slum areas. The Limited-Profit Housing
Companies Act which applies to both the New York State HFA
and Urban Development Corporation specifically declares
"the rehabilitation or redevelopment of slum ghettos" to
1
be one of its purposes. The Illinois and Massachusetts
statutes, while not being as direct in requiring the HFA's
in these states to rebuild slums, do make the finding that
the spread of slums and blight leads to a shortage of
2
decent housing. They go on to charge the Illinois and
Massachusetts agencies with the responsibility of encouraging
private enterprise to build (and in Illinois to also
rehabilitate) housing to prevent the recurrence of slums.
The New Jersey statute, without making any explicit finding
on the presence of slums, directs that agency to give
priority to developments in urban renewal areas. The
Michigan State Housing Development Authority has administra-
tively adopted the goal of alleviating slum housing condi-
3
tions in inner-city Detroit. Similarly, administratively-
adopted criteria for evaluating Section 236 projects coming
1
41 N.Y. Cons. Laws Ann. Sec. ll-a(2).
2
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303; M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec.
1-2
3
MSHDA Annual Report, 1974, pp. 20-21 .
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directly to the HUD field offices give high priority to
developments lying within urban renewal and model cities
areas and consequently make the Congressionally determined
public purpose of rebuilding slums found in the urban renewal
and model cities statutes applicable to the Section 236
program.
All of these goals relating to the abatement of slum
conditions will be measured operationally by the extent to
which each agency has financed housing in urban renewal
areas and in inner city census tracts where over 25 percent
of the households have incomes that are below the poverty
line. The designation of a neighborhood as an urban
renewal area reflects a determination by the locality using
Federal standards that the neighborhood is "a slum area or
2
a blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating area," and that
a public commitment has been made to rebuild it in its
entirety. Poverty tracts provide a measure of where those
most in need of better housing are living. Because of the
lack of recent census data on housing deterioration and
because of the close correlation between the concentration
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Factors
for Project Evaluation and Determination of Priorities
(Section 236)," (249706-P).
2
Housing Act of 1949 Sec. 110; 42 U.S.C. 1450.
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of poverty and slums it also provides the best operational
definition of slum areas that can be applied consistently
in various metropolitan areas.
One housing-related goal that applies to several (but
not all) of the state HFA's and HUD is the locating of new
low and moderate income housing near job opportunities. The
Illinois and New Jersey agencies have this goal by virtue
of statutory findings while the Michigan SHDA and HUD have
adopted it administratively. The measurement that will be
used in assessing performance will be the ratio of unskilled
and semi-skilled jobs to workers already living in the same
city or county in which the agency has located low and
moderate income housing.
The final set of goals that each of the agencies being
considered has individually adopted is the promotion of
good design and construction. As part of its "Declaration
of National Housing Policy," Congress directed HUD to exer-
cise its powers in such a manner as will encourage and assist
"the production of housing of sound standards of design,
construction, livability, and size for adequate family
1
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303; N.J.S.A. 55:14J-2; Michi-
gan Housing Plan (as cited in Michigan Department of Manage-
ment and Budget, Subsidized Housing Program, October, 1973,
p.23); HUD, "Evaluation of Requests," (FHA Form No.3165), p.3.
life." The existence of the HUD Design Awards Program is
an administrative indication of HUD's desire for high-quality
design. While none of the statutes creating the six most
advanced state HFA's mentions any design considerations,
each of these agencies has administratively adopted the
2
same basic goals in this area as HUD. In assessing
effectiveness in achieving these aims, the number of design
awards, type of amenities, size of rooms, and construction
quality standards will be considered.
National Public Purposes
Congress has determined that certain housing-related
public purposes are of such national importance that all
agencies using Federal funds, whether they be Federal or
state agencies, must adopt procedures designed to fulfill
them. The five public purposes falling into this category
are racial integration, housing of minority families,
minority hiring, environmental protection, and equitable
relocation. HUD reviews the procedures used by each HFA in
1
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1949, Sec. 2 as amend-
ed; 42 U.S.C. 1441.
2
See Illinois Housing Development Authority, Architects'
Guide, p.17; Massachusetts HFA, Operations Handbooks for
Financing of Multi-Dwelling Housing, 1971, p.1; Michigan
S.H.D.A., Townhouse Development Process, 1970, p.ii; New
Jersey HFA, Guide for Development of Limited Dividend and
Nonprofit Housing, 1973, p.2; New York DHCR, Design Standards
for Limited Profit and Limited Dividend Projects, p.1; New
York State UDC, Annual Report 1970, p.8.
these areas. Pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, HUD requires that sponsors of all HUD-subsi-
dized projects, including those financed by state agencies,
file an Affirmative Marketing Plan for each project showing
the measures that will be taken to attract as residents
members of minority or majority groups who would otherwise
stay away. In addition, since 1972 the local HUD offices
have had to review each state HFA Section 236 project to
ensure that it adequately satisfies Criterion No.2 of HUD's
Project Selection Criteria relating to minority housing
opportunities. The stated objectives of this criterion are:
To provide minority families with opportunities for
housing in a wide range of locations.
To open up nonsegregated housing opportunities that
will contribute 1to decreasing the effects of past
discrimination.
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as the
provision of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Evalua-
tion of Requests for Priority Registration, Early Feasibili-
ty, Reservation of Contract Authority (Section 235(i), Rent
Supplement, Section 236) or Evaluation of Application for
Low Rent Public Housing" (FHA Form 3165), August,1972, p.2.
This criterion is made applicable to state HFA developments
by HUD, "Non-Insured Assisted Projects by State and Local
Government" (HUD No.4530.1), January, 1973, p.3-2.
specifying that opportunities for training, employment, and
business contracts on Section 236 and Rent Supplement
projects be made available to the greatest extent feasible
to lower income persons residing within the project area,
led HUD to require the filing of an equal employment certi-
fication for every state or Federal development using
1
Section 236 or Rent Supplement funds. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-190) necessitates that
an assessment be made of the environmental impacts of any
"major action" involving Federal funds, including state-
financed but Federally subsidized multi-family construction.
The Federal Uniform Relocation assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-646) requires
that fair and reasonable relocation payments be made, that
relocation payments be provided, and that replacement
dwellings be made available to those displaced by any
Federally-supported housing development.
Unfortunately, operable data is available from HUD and
the state agencies only with regard to racial integration
and housing of minority families and not concerning minority
hiring, environmental protection, or relocation practices.
Consequently, conclusions as to the degree to which HUD and
1
"Equal Employment Opportunity Certification" (FHA Form
2010), July, 1969.
the state agencies have fulfilled national public purposes
will be based primarily upon the extent to which they have
provided integrated housing. Since data on minority hiring
has been obtained from certain HFA's, comparisons will be
made among these state agencies on this criterion using the
percentage of minority residents in the state to standardize
the data. Environmental protection and relocation will be
discussed only in terms of the procedures used to carry out
these public purposes.
The other national public purposes enunciated by
Congress have been more vague. While HUD interpreted certain
of them as applying to the projects it subsidized directly,
it has never required similar fulfillment of them by state
agencies on Federally subsidized projects. One of these
purposes, housing rehabilitation, could just as easily be
interpreted as being a program option rather than a goal.
The only public purpose language concerning rehabilitation
related to programs utilized by the state agencies comes in
Congress' reaffirmation of the goal of the "construction or
rehabilitation" of 26 million housing units within a ten
1
year period. HUD, however, determined that rehabilitation
1
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Sec. 1601;
42 U.S.C. 1441a.
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proposals submitted directly to its field offices would
have priority in receiving Section 236 funding. While
the statutes creating the Illinois, New Jersey, and New
York agencies also mention rehabilitation as an optional
way of meeting program goals, none of these HFA's have
regarded rehabilitation as opposed to new construction as
a program goal.
The other public purpose adopted by HUD for its own
projects but, at least until the coming of the relatively
new Section 8 program, not for state agency projects, is
2
the housing of large families. While Federal (and state)
statutes never directly refer to the housing of large
families as a public purpose, the declaration of policy
found in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
(Section 2) does state that "the highest priority and
emphasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of
those families for which the national goal has not become
a reality." Because of the vagueness with which Congress
has established rehabilitation and the housing of large
families as national goals, they will only be given relatively
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Factors
for Projection Evaluation and Determination of Priorities
(Section 236)," 249706-P.
2
Ibid.
minor weight in assessing overall agency performance.
The operational measures that will be used will be the
percentage of all units financed or insured that are
rehabilitated and the percentage of units with three or
more bedrooms.
Local Public Purposes
The enabling legislation and administrative proclama-
tions of the various HFA's refer to public purposes that are
unique to the state or to a few states. While certain of
these statements of public purpose could just as easily
apply to other states as well, they will be used as criteria
by which to assess the ability of particular state agencies
to serve local needs.
A local public purpose adopted by most of the state
agencies is economic integration. This goal partially
conflicts with the goal of rebuilding slum areas in that
housing built in most low income inner city areas has
difficulty in attracting upper and middle income families.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes declare that their
agencies shall "assist in the permanent elimination of
slums by housing persons of varied economic means in the
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1
same structures and neighborhoods." Economic integration
became a goal of the New York State Housing Finance Agency
with adoption of the State Capital Grant Program enabling
2
low income families to live in middle income housing.
The New York State Urban Development Corporation and the
Michigan State Housing Development Authority adopted income
3
mixing as a goal through administrative declaration. The
New Jersey HFA and HUD are the only two organizations not
sharing this goal during the time period studied. The new
Section 8 leased housing program, however, makes economic
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303; M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec.
1-2. The Massachusetts statute uses the word "projects"
rather than "structures."
2
Priv. Hsg. Fin. Law, Art. 3, Sec. 44-a.
3
The UDC annual report in both 1969 and 1970 (p.8) states
"While our lowest income families have the greatest need for
housing, in today's market an acute need also exists for
families with moderate and middle incomes. However, even
if only low income families required assistance, it is our
view, based upon long American experience that developments
which cater exclusively to low income families are undesira-
ble. . . UDC housing, therefore, seeks to provide for a
cross-section of age groups and income levels in a diversi-
fied community." The Michigan agency commitment to income
mixing is found in State of Michigan, Office of Program
Effectiveness Review, Subsidized Housing Program, October,
1973, p.50.
integration a goal for HUD and all state agencies involved
with it. The amount of set-asides going to each HFA depends
in part upon the extent to which each agency commits itself
to and has demonstrated a past record of limiting the number
of subsidized tenants to less than 20 percent in each develop-
ment.
Another local goal that might just as easily be consid-
ered a national goal is the provision of housing for the
elderly. The Massachusetts and New York statutes refer to
the need for housing for the elderly while the Michigan law
mandates that preference be given to low and moderate income
2
elderly. The percentage of units that each of these agencies
have built for the elderly will be considered for each of
these agencies and their HUD counterparts. A more locally
specific although relatively minor goal is the provision of
3
cooperatively owned housing by the two New York agencies.
Assessments will be made of the percentage of such housing
provided by these agencies with HUD performance in New York
in this regard being used as an additional benchmark.
1
Except for developments that are all elderly, all-handi-
capped, or have less than 50 dwelling units. 24 CFR Sec.
883.104.
2
M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec. 1-2; N.Y. Cons. Laws Ann. Sec. 11;
M.C.L.A. Sec. 125.1411.
3
41 N.Y. Cons. Laws Ann. Sec. ll-a(2-a).
The enabling legislation for certain HFA's establishes
other local public purposes which will not be used as
criteria for evaluation because of measurement difficulties.
The statutes establishing the Illinois Housing Development
Authority and both the New York HFA and UDC charge these
agencies with the goal of promoting "well-planned urban
growth." Unfortunately, no generally accepted, readily
operationalizable criterion exists for measuring "well-
planned urban growth." Such criteria do exist for measuring
the extent to which the Massachusetts HFA has conformed to
its legislatively-mandated public purpose of reducing the
shortage of housing available to Vietnam War veterans and
the extent to which it and the Illinois, Michigan, and New
Jersey agencies have satisfied their common public purpose
of reducing the shortage of housing available to those
2
displaced by public action. Yet, none of these agencies
maintains data on the extent to which their housing has
served either Vietnam War veterans or displacees. While
data is available on the percentage of land area covered by
New York HFA-financed buildings to assess the extent to
1
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303; 41 N.Y. Cons. Laws Ann.
Sec. 11.
2
M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec. 1-2; Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec.
303; M.C.L.A. Sec. 125.1401; N.J.S.A. 55:14J-2.
which that agency has succeeded in alleviating the legisla-
tively-defined problem of excessive land-coverage, the
lack of comparative data from HUD or other HFA's makes the
New York HFA data meaningless by itself.
The only other statutorily defined public purposes of
the HFA's being considered are the elimination of the
periodic shortages of mortgage money by the Illinois Housing
2
Development Authority and the creation of jobs by the New
3
York HFA and UDC. In each of these instances, however, the
agencies expect to achieve these ends primarily through
means other than direct residential mortgage lending. The
Illinois agency has attempted to counter the cyclical
availability of money by making loans to lenders during
periods of credit shortages; the two New York agencies have
been creating jobs more by constructing new commercial,
industrial, and civic facilities than by building housing.
Consequently, efforts in these areas will receive only
passing reference in this dissertation.
1
41 N.Y. Cons. Laws Ann. Sec. 11.
2
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 67 Sec. 303.
3
McK. Unconsol. Sec. 6252; Private Housing Finance Law
Sec. lla(2).
Efficiency Measures
Any true measure of the success of agencies in achieving
public purpose goals, of course, must not only consider the
gross amount of goal fulfillment, but also the efficiency
with which these goals are met. With this thought in mind,
the extent to which an agency or group of agencies has
succeeded in alleviating a shortage of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing depends upon administrative and subsidy
costs per unit, processing times, and vacancy rates as well
as total number of units produced. Since attempts at slum
rebuilding or racial or economic integration that result
in developments with serious financial problems are likely
to be more detrimental than helpful to the achievement of
these public purposes, measurement will be made of signifi-
cant arrearages, foreclosure, and vacancy rates for use as
added criteria for agency success. Finally, since the
ability of an agency to continue to carry out its public
purposes and to borrow funds at favorable rates depends on
their overall financial viability, an analysis will be made
of agency financial statements.
Now that all of the criteria for agency success have
been laid out, the next section will evaluate the performance
of each of the HFA's and HUD with regard to each criterion
in turn.
CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION OF AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS
GENERAL PUBLIC PURPOSES
Volume of Low and Moderate Income Housing
The record of the state housing finance agencies (HFA's)
in comparison with that of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) in alleviating the shortages of
housing for low and moderate income families found by the
various legislatures depends on the measure used. Between
January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1973, the Illinois Housing
Development Authority (IHDA), Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency (MHFA), Michigan State Housing Development Authority
(MSHDA), New York State Housing Finance Agency, and New
York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) closed a
total of 72,810 units of housing under the Section 236
program compared with 69,090 by HUD in the same states.
When housing finance agency production under state subsidy
programs and HUD production under the Section 221(d)(3) and
235(j) programs are considered as well, state agency pro-
duction of privately owned multi-family housing for low
and moderate income families is seen to be slightly less
than that of HUD with the six HFA's having produced 74,937
dwelling units compared with 79,621 units by HUD in the
same states (see Table 3).
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Table 3
Total Number of Privately Owned New or Substantially Rehabilitated
Multifamily Dwellings by Subsidy Level By Agency on Projects Closed between
January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1973
Ill. Mass. Mich. NJ NY NY Total
HDA HFAa SHDA HFAb HFAc 
UDC
Low Incomed 124 5274a 1069 1006 920 7652 16045
Moderate Incomee 4462 7807a 6001 6718 12299 21605 58892
Middle Incomef 2196 4375 1244 1644 4367 3961 17787
Total 6782 17456 8314 9368 17586 33218 92724
Low & Moderate
Income d,e 4586 13081 7070 7724 13219 29257 74937
Low & Moderate
Per 1000
Population 0.41 2.30 0.80 1.08 0.72 1.60 1.46
----------------------------------------------------------------------
HUD Low & Mod-
erate Incomed,el5056 15121 21297 5847 23300 79621
HUD Section
2369 13571 13802 18788 5642 17287 69090
a. Massachusetts HFA figures include 720 low income, and 1306 moderate income
dwellings receiving state subsidies, and 101 unsubsidized units made
available to low income families through rent skewing.
b. The New Jersey HFA also financed 2132 dwelling units in 1968-1969 in-
cluding 207 low income, 882 moderate income, and 1043 middle income.
c. The New York HFA also financed 43450 dwelling units in 1960-1969 in-
cluding 1382 low income under the state Capital Grant program and
42068 middle income.
d. Low income is defined as rent supplement, Section 23 or 10c leased
housing or equivalent state programs. These programs are generally
added.
e. Moderate income is defined as Section 236, 221(d)3, or equivalent
state program.
f. Middle income is defined as units receiving no direct Federal or state
subsidy.
g. Includes units receiving low income subsidy on top of Section 236.
Sources: HFA Figures compiled from information provided by
individual state agencies; HUD figures compiled
from: HUD, Housing Production and Mortgage Credit,
Statistical Operations Branch, "Selected Multifamily
Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance Programs,"
(02 series) As of December 31, 1969, 1973.
Since UDC has produced 29,257 units of Section 236
housing for low and moderate income families, more than any
other state agency, the total production figures of Section
236 housing by the five state agencies that are strictly
housing finance agencies falls to 43,500 or 25,500 less than
the HUD offices in the same. Since HUD, however, controlled
the distribution of these subsidy funds, it could be seen
as having an unfair advantage over the HFA's in securing the
limited funds.
On an individual basis, aside from UDC, the New Jersey
HFA was the only HFA to produce more housing for low and
moderate income families than its HUD counterparts, while
the Illinois and Michigan agencies produced only about a
third of the volume of HUD in their respective states. The
housing finance agency to produce the most units of low and
moderate income housing in relation to the population of
their state, however, has been the Massachusetts agency.
Between 1970 and 1973, MHFA produced about 2.3 dwelling
units of low and moderate income housing per thousand
Massachusetts residents, the same ratio as the New York
HFA and UDC combined, and over twice as high a ratio as
any other state agency.
While only the statutes defining the powers of the
Massachusetts and Michigan agencies place greater emphasis
on providing housing for low as opposed to moderate income
Table 4
Low Income Occupancy of HUD-Insured
Section 236 Developments that Filed "Occupancy Reports"
As of June 30, 1973
By State
Low Income Total
Rent Supp. & Occupied Units Percentage
Leased Units in Project Low Income
Illinois 465 4,280 10.9%
Massachusetts 431 2,130 20.2%
Michigan N/A N/A N/A
New Jersey 42 13535 2.7%
New York 469 3,451 13.6%
TOTAL 1,407 11,396 12.3%
Note: Aggregate figures by state were unavailable for rent
supplement or leased housing funds allocated to just
Section 236 developments. The available data is based
upon information provided by project managers to the
Central Office. Often, particularly for projects in
Michigan, no reports were filed.
Source: Compiled from HUD "Occupancy Reports," Form 9801, on
individual projects, as of June 30, 1973.
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families, the state agencies as a group have provided
considerably more low income units than HUD as a percentage
of all low and moderate income units. Low income families
occupy 20.0 percent of the housing built for low and
moderate families by the state agencies compared with only
12.3 percent of the Section 236 developments produced by
1
HUD. (C.f. Table 3 and Table 4.) Occupancy by low income
families having incomes of about $3,000 - $5,000 has been
made possible through the use of Federal rent supplement,
Section 23 or 10(c) leased housing subsidies, or equivalent
2
state programs. The Massachusetts HFA, which by statute
must provide at least 25 percent of its units in each
development to families with incomes low enough to qualify
for public housing, clearly has the best record of providing
housing for low income families. The 5,274 units it has
produced for low income families using Federal or State
1
The low income percentage on the state agency projects was
based upon occupancy reports for units occupied as of 1974
and allocations made on projects under construction. The HUD
percentage of low income units is based upon occupancy
reports as of June 30, 1973, only. Since HUD adopted a policy
in 1973 of limiting rent supplements to no more than 10 per-
cent of the units in a single project, consideration of more
recent data would lower the overall HUD rate.
2
The Rent Supplement program is Section 101 of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965; the leasing subsidies are
part of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937; the state subsidies in-
clude the Massachusetts 707 program and New York Capital
Grant Program (Private Housing Finance Law, Article III).
Income limits for the different programs vary slightly from
each other and depend upon locality and family size.
subsidies represent 38.2 percent of all of the agency's
low and moderate production and 30.2 percent of its total
number of units.
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority has
been severely criticized for its lack of production for
1
genuinely low income families. As a consequence of this
perceived deficiency, in 1972 the Michigan legislature
adopted a measure that requires MSHDA over the course of
eacy year to provide a minimum of 15 percent of its
Federally subsidized units on a priority basis to "low
income families and persons receiving their primary incomes
from social security or state and federal public assistance
2
programs." As of September 1973, however, 18.6 percent of
the households living in MSHDA-financed multi-family dwell-
ings were receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
3.6 percent were receiving other forms of public assistance,
and 15.4 percent were receiving pension or Social Security
benefits, making a total of 37.6 percent of MSHDA multi-
3
family units.
1
See Daniel Pearlman, "State Housing Agencies and the Myth
of Low Income Housing," Clearinghouse Review, 7 (March, 1974),
649-55.
2
P.A. 1972, No.310 Sec. 1.
3
Michigan Department of Management and Budget. Subsidized
Housing Program: An Assessment of Effectiveness, October, 1973,
p.49.
Because of the fact that many welfare offices in
Michigan would provide AFDC recipients with enough income
to pay Section 236 rents, MSHDA has fulfilled its 15 percent
legislative requirement without utilizing large amounts of
Federal low income rent supplement or leased housing sub-
sidies. In fact, based upon occupancy patterns in develop-
ments that have already been fully or partially occupied,
MSHDA projects have utilized only 79 percent of their rent
1
supplement allocations. By contrast, Massachusetts HFA
projects have utilized more than 100 percent of the rent
supplement, leased housing, and state low income subsidies
2
originally allocated to it. The lack of utilization of
Federal funds by MSHDA rather than its lack of serving low
income families would thus appear to be the more valid
criticism against it as it appears to constitute violation
of a companion provision to the 15 percent requirement which
requires MSHDA to make the "full use" of available Federal
1
It has been assumed that utilization of rent supplement
funds in partially tenanted developments will follow the
same pattern of rent supplement utilization as has already
been set for that development. The utilization figure is
based upon a mimeographed sheet prepared by MSHDA entitled,
"Rent Supplement as of November 1974 for MSHDA Developments
That Had Initially Closed by 12/31/74." (n.d.)
2
Based upon an examination of "MHFA Semi-Annual Occupancy
Report(s)" submitted on each project in January and
February, 1974.
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subsidy programs possible "consistent with sound fiscal
management and good housing development planning."
The state agency that has done the poorest job in
serving low income families has been the Illinois Housing
Development Authority. As of June 1974, a total of 167
units in three developments that had achieved over 90
percent occupancy had received rent supplement allocations.
Only 60 of these units had been occupied by rent supplement
2
tenants. Even assuming that all of the funds for the 64
rent supplement units allocated to other IHDA projects that
had started construction prior to 1974 become fully utilized
by low income tenants, total low income occupancy will
amount to only 2.7 percent of IHDA's low and moderate income
production and 1.8 percent of its total production.
The difference between the number of units state
agencies have produced for low and moderate income families
and their total production, of course, consists of housing
produced for middle income families. Such housing is
intended to serve the social purposes of stimulating overall
housing production and in certain projects of providing a
mixture of income levels. The only subsidy that the HFA's
1
P.A. 1972, No.310, Sec. 2.
2
Letter to the author by Frank S. Glickman, IHDA Research
and Planning Director, June 18, 1974.
pass on to these units is the below market financing they
receive through the issuance of tax-exempt securities. In
total between 1970 and 1973, the six state agencies under
consideration financed a total of 17,787 dwelling units for
middle income families, an amount equal to 19.2 percent of
their total production. Prior to 1970, however, the New
York HFA financed an additional 42,000 middle income units
and the New Jersey HFA financed 1000 such units.
State agency production of middle income multi-family
housing, particularly since 1970, has been small in compari-
son with that of HUD. HUD's production of middle income
multi-family housing under its Section 207, 220, 221(d)4,
231, 233, and 234 programs in the states of Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York between
1970 and 1972 amounted to about 70,000 dwelling units or
1
over five times as many as the six state agencies.
Rent Levels
The other aspect of overcoming the shortage of decent
housing alluded to by the National Housing Act of 1968 and
the statutes creating the various housing finance agencies
1
HUD Statistical Yearbook 1970, Table 168; 1971, Table 170;
1972, Table 161; 1973, Table 177.
is providing the housing at a rent level that low and
moderate income families can afford. While the use of
subsidies is one way of making housing affordable, the
other aspect of reducing housing costs is providing housing
at lower rents with the same subsidy level. In this regard,
the data received by HUD on rents charged to families
moving into two-bedroom, Section 236 subsidized units in
1973 and 1974 shows a statistically insignificant difference
between HUD developments and state HFA developments (see
Table 5).
Slum Rebuilding
The public purpose of rebuilding slums is the most
risky goal pursued by the state housing finance agencies and
HUD. Private lenders generally have red-lined these areas
because they believe that making loans on properties located
1
there is too risky. Two operational definitions of slum
areas have been used: those census tracts where in 1970 over
25 percent of the households had incomes that lie below the
poverty line and those tracts that are completely surrounded
1
See Nathan S. Betnun, "The Role of Savings and Loan Associa-
tions in Low-Income Areas of Oakland," (unpublished honors
thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1968), and Tee
Taggart, "Red-Lining: How the Bankers Starve the Cities to
Feed the Suburbs," Planning, 40 (December, 1974), pp.14-1 6 .
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Table 5
Gross Rent for Two-Bedroom Units
For Families In Section 236 Developments for Admissions
1973 1974
Mean N Mean N
Massachusetts
MHFA 164 255 170 175
HUD 170 380 170 1036
Michigan -Grand
Rapids Area
MSHDA 145 56 147 140
HUD 152 392 149 443
New York - Albany
Area
UDC 150 169 155 110
HUD 149 166 153 334
Source: Compiled from HUD Division of Housing Management,
Computer Print-Out of the Gross Rents by Project,
R43IACA 15. The data from this source was limited
to no more than two state agency projects within
the jurisdiction of each of the other HUD area
offices in the states considered in this study.
by tracts with such a high incidence of poverty and those
neighborhoods that have been declared to be urban renewal
areas (including neighborhood development program areas).
The poverty census tract definition of slum areas consists
primarily of just the neighborhoods that are traditionally
1
regarded as slums. The urban renewal area definition of
slum areas represents neighborhoods that have met certain
objective criteria for determining blight as well as those
inner city areas where new housing will do the most good in
terms of eliminating slums since a public commitment has
been made to rebuild the entire neighborhood. The urban
The sections of the New York City area that fall within the
poverty tract definition of slums are most of Harlem, East
Harlem, the Lower East Side, South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant,
Williamsburg, Bushwick, and East New York, along with
scattered tracts in such places as South Brooklyn, Coney
Island, Arverne, Jamaica, Long Beach, and Yonkers. Included
in the Chicago area are most of the West Side and much of
the South and Near North Sides, as well as part of Waukegan.
The poverty census tracts in the Detroit area are primarily
bounded by the arc formed by Grand Boulevard around downtown
Detroit, as well as certain tracts just outside this arc, and
in parts of Hamtramck, Highland Park, and Pontiac. The
poverty tracts in the Boston area are concentrated in Roxbury,
North-Dorchester, and the South End, but also are found in
small parts of Mattapan, Jamaica Plain, South Boston, East
Boston, Charlestown, Cambridge, Lynn, and Salem. The North-
east New Jersey poverty areas include large portions of
Newark and parts of Jersey City, Paterson, Passaic, Elizabeth,
Hoboken, and Union City.
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renewal definition of slum areas is also appropriate,
because as mentioned previously, the legislation creating
the New Jersey HFA makes slum rebuilding an agency goal by
simply directing the agency to give priority to development
proposals in urban renewal areas. While large amounts of
urban renewal funding have gone toward restoring downtown
commercial areas, the low and moderate income housing built
in urban renewal areas has generally represented genuine
slum rebuilding. The urban renewal sites outside of concen-
trated areas of poverty selected by the HFA's for construc-
tion while being somewhat less risky than the worst areas
still involve a fair amount of risk.
Overall, the state housing finance agencies have pro-
duced almost exactly the same percentage of Section 236
housing in inner city "slum" areas as HUD. As seen in
Table 6, of the housing subsidized by Section 236, located
1
The sites selected by UDC in this category have been located
in the Coney Island, Arverne, and Flatbush sections of New
York City, as well as on E. 102nd St. just outside of Harlem
and in deteriorating sections of Yonkers. The Illinois
agency has built in the Kenwood and Hyde Park sections of
Chicago while the Michigan agency has built in the Jefferson-
Chalmers and Lafayette Park sections of Detroit. The Massa-
chusetts HFA's urban renewal, non-poverty area housing has
gone in the better sections of Roxbury and the South End as
well as in the Fenway. The corresponding areas where the
New Jersey HFA has located developments have included the
downtown and Clinton Hill sections of Newark and blighted
portions of East Orange, Union City, and Paterson.
Table 6
Section 236 Construction Starts in Urban Renewal or Poverty Sections of Major Metropolitan Areas (a) by Agency,
Projects Closed January 1, 1970-December 31, 1973
HUD Units Units Units Total State Units Units Units Total
Area in in in Units HFA in in in Units
Office Povert Urban Urban in Pov- Urban Urban in
Tracts Renewal Renewal Metro erty Renewal Renewal Metro
Areas or Pov- Areaa Tractsb Area or Pov- Area a
erty Areas erty Areas
Chicago 3768 1360 4174 10599 Ill. HFA 0 1093 1093 2579
35.6% 12.8% 39.4% 0% 42.4% 42.4%
Boston 1571 1499 1905
27.1% 25.9% 32.9%
Detroit 1632 1901 3128
14.0% 16.3% 26.8%
Newark 382 693 958
18.9% 33.4% 47.3%
New York 5864 2928 7113
53.1% 26.5% 64.4%
5787 Mass. HFA 1472
31.6%
11660 Mich. SHDAc 0
0%
NJ HFA
11038d NY HFA
NY UDC
Total 13,217 8381
32.1% 20.4%
17,278
42.0%
4 1 1 5 7d Total
1175
19.5%
200
2.1%
5883
8730
21.5%
a. Chicago, Boston, and Detroit SMSA's and New York/Northeastern New Jersey Standard Consolidated Area.
b. Census tracts which in 1970 had more than 25% of households with incomes below the poverty line
and tracts totally surrounded by tracts with that incidence of poverty.
c. Mich. SHDA figures are for uninsured loans only. The agency also financed 1, 382 units of insured Sec.
236 housing in the Detroit area, of which 215 units are in poverty tracts and another 169 units are in
urban renewal areas.
d. Total excludes 68 units in New Jersey and 84 units in New York where address was unknown.
Sources: Poverty tracts based on mapping of all projects; HUD urban renewal figures compiled from HUD
"Selected Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance Programs," as of December 31, 1973.
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9.0%
164
-9.3%
1193
19.8%
200
2.1%
7641
47.4%
10709
26.3%
1858
39.9%
164
9.3%
2165
36.0%
200
2.1%
11232
69.7%
16712
41%
4655
1761
6017
9517
16124
40653
2073d
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in the New York City, Chicago, Detroit, and Boston metro-
politan areas, 41.1 percent of the state agency housing and
42.0 percent of the HUD housing has been located in urban
renewal areas or in poverty tracts. The HFA's have provided
a significantly higher percentage of housing in urban renew-
al areas, while HUD has provided significantly more housing
in census tracts with a high incidence of poverty. The
majority of the units financed by all HFA's in both poverty
and urban renewal areas, however, have resulted from the
efforts of a single agency, the New York State Urban Devel-
opment Corporation. UDC has located 69.7 percent of its
New York City area Section 236 units in these neighborhoods.
Aside from UDC the state agencies as a group have pro-
vided only 22 percent of its housing in "slum areas," a
considerably lower percentage than HUD. Two HFA's have
performed slightly better than their HUD counterparts, one
slightly worse, and the other two demonstrably worse. The
Massachusetts HFA and the Illinois HFA were the two HFA's
other than UDC to do better. MHFA, which located 39.9
percent of its metropolitan Boston Section 236 units in such
areas (compared with only 32.9 for HUD's Boston area office)
has behaved more like most of the local HUD offices than
like the other state agencies in that it has located most of
its inner city developments outside of urban renewal areas.
The Illinois Housing Development Authority, on the other
hand, has placed 42.4 percent of its Chicago area Section 236
103
units in urban renewal areas, all of which are outside of
poverty census tracts. The New Jersey HFA placed about 19
percent of its Northeastern New Jersey moderate income units
in urban renewal areas (where it must give priority) and
about 19 percent in poverty areas with few going in neigh-
borhoods meeting both criteria. Neither the New York HFA
nor the Michigan State Housing Development Authority have
financed more than 200 units of uninsured Section 236
housing in either urban renewal or poverty neighborhoods in
the major metropolitan area of their respective states.
The New York Agency, however, has financed over 1000 units
of middle income, Mitchell-Lama housing (27.6 percent of
such units) since 1970 in these areas of greater New York
City while the Michigan agency has financed 384 units of
HUD-insured Section 236 housing (12 percent of its total)
and 114 units of uninsured middle income housing in "slum"
areas of Detroit.
Accessibility
Three state HFA's, Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey,
each have the goal of providing low and moderate income
housing near low and moderate income jobs. Not only does
the close proximity of jobs to residence make commuting
easier, but also aids a displaced worker in finding a new
job. The success of these agencies in meeting this goal for
projects they financed in metropolitan areas was tested in a
104
somewhat gross manner without producing any significant
differences from the success achieved by HUD in these
states or the success that would result from a random
scattering of projects throughout the state.
The procedure was to assign a value to each development
based upon the ratio of low and moderate income jobs in the
local area to low and moderate income residents in that
same area, presumably competing for those same jobs based
1
upon census statistics. Low and moderate income jobs were
defined to be all of those jobs falling into occupational
classifications having below average earnings, including
laborers, farm workers, service workers, operatives,
clerical and kindred workers, but excluding managers and
administrators (except farm), sales workers, craftsmen,
professional, technical, and kindred workers. The local
area was defined as the city where the project was located
or the county in the case of projects located outside of
cities or the cluster of adjoining cities or counties in
the case of projects located on a border. The value assigned
to each development varied from 1 to 5 with those areas with
1
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Journey to Work, Table 2.
"Characteristics of Workers by Residence and Place of Work
for Standard Metropolitan Areas of 250,000 or More: 1970."
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"substantially more" low and moderate income jobs to low
and moderate income residents (a ratio 1.25 or higher)
receiving a score of 5; those with job to resident ratio of
between 1.10 and 1.25 receiving a score of 4; those with a
ratio of between 0.9 and 1.1 receiving a score of 2; and
those areas with "substantially fewer" jobs than residents
(a ratio of .75 or lower) receiving a score of 1. A weight
was assigned to each development based upon the dwelling
units available for low and moderate income non-elderly
families.
As shown in Table 7, the projects of the Illinois and
Michigan HFA's have a higher average job to resident ratio
than their HUD counterparts and the New Jersey Agency a
lower one. As stated above, however, these differences are
1
statistically insignificant. Consequently, at least on the
basis of the measures used, no definitive statement can be
made about the relative ability of the state housing finance
agencies as compared with HUD in providing housing near jobs.
1
In some metropolitan areas such as Paterson, N.J., the
number of low and moderate income jobs have moved out of
the central city faster than have low and moderate income
residents, while other center cities, such as Lansing, have
a surplus of low and moderate income jobs to residents.
Table 7
Scoring of Projects Financed by Various Agencies
Based Upon Ratio of Low and Moderate Income Jobs
To Low and Moderate Income Residents
Mean Job:
Agency Resident Score
Number of
SD Developments
Considered
Number of
Low and Moderate
Income Units
1 Significance
Difference of Difference
Illinois
Housing
Development
Authority
HUD - Illinois
Michigan State
Housing Develop-
ment Authority
HUD - Michigan
New Jersey
Housing Finance
Agency
HUD - New Jersey
1Positive difference indicates HFA has higher mean job
SEE TEXT FOR EXPLANATION
: resident score
29
102
53
2.95
2.86
3.24
2.86
3.07
3.33
4,517
13,762
0.22
0.47
1.09
1.22
0.91
1.09
0.09
5,293
20,151
8,813
5,939
< .20.38
-0.26
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DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
Significant differences, however, were found with
regard to quality of design, level of amenities, size of
rooms, and to a lesser extent, quality of construction. In
each case the HFA's had the better record. As might be
expected, however, the provision of these consumer benefits
has led to higher average costs for HFA-financed buildings.
Design Quality
The superiority of design of the developments financed
by the state agencies is seen through two methods: a survey
conducted of residents of developments in Massachusetts and
the number of design awards won by each agency. The resi-
dent survey was done as part of a general social audit of
Massachusetts HFA by an outside research team. It found
that 55 percent of the residents of 16 MHFA developments
(n = 197) thought that their development was well designed
or fairly well designed (as opposed to poorly designed or
no opinion) compared with only 39 percent of the residents
of the same economic levels living in HUD housing in the
1
William Ryan, et al., All in Together: An Evaluation of
Mixed-Income Multi-Family Housing (Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency: Boston, 1974), p.2 29 .
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same communities (n = 125). This difference was found to
be statistically significant.
Likewise, on the basis of the awards criterion, the
state agencies have done better than HUD. Here, as with
certain other criteria, the inclusion of UDC changes the
overall balance somewhat. While the other state agencies
have won slightly more awards than their HUD counterparts,
UDC has clearly excelled in financing well-designed develop-
ments.
In 1974, the American Institute of Architects (AIA)
gave a citation to UDC as an organization for its contribu-
tion to good design. Eight of its residential developments
1
have won a total of eleven design awards. Its Twin Parks
1
Twin Parks Northwest in the Bronx, designed by Prentice and
Chan, Olhausen, and Sea Park East in Coney Island, designed
by Hoberman and Wasserman, won the Bard Award; Schomburg
Plaza in Harlem, designed by Castro-Blanco, Piscioneri &
Feder and Gruzen & Partners, won the N.Y. Society of Archi-
tects Award for Excellence in Design; and Twin Parks South-
west, also in the Bronx, designed by Giovanni Pasanella won
a Design Award from the New York Chapter of AIA. Grasslands
Medical Center Housing in Valhalla, designed by Pokorny and
Pertz, won design awards from the New York State Association
of Architects and the American Plywood Association; Centre-
ville Court in North Syracuse won a House and Home Design
Award for the firm Schleicher and Soper; Ocean Village in
Queens brought Carl Koch & Associates the 1974 Annual Award
of the Concrete Industry Board.
109
Northeast in the Bronx, designed by Richard Meier and
Associates, won a national AIA Honor Award in 1974 as well
as the Bard Award of the City Club of New York for Merit
and Civic Architecture in Urban Design and an Award for
Excellence in Design by the New York Society of Architects
in 1973. Two other UDC developments have won the Bard
Award while still others have won design awards from the
New York Society of Architects, the New York Chapter of AIA,
the New York State Association of Architects, the American
Plywood Association, the Concrete Industry Board, and House
and Home magazine. The list of architects who have designed
developments for UDC reads like a "Who's Who in Architecture."
It includes Paul Rudolph; Sert, Jackson and Associates;
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill; Venturi and Rauch; and Philip
Johnson & John Burgee.
A few of UDC's projects, however, have been poorly
designed. An architect hired by UDC scored two projects as
being "badly planned from almost every point of view, such
as livability, economy, and use of site." His comments on
certain other projects, including one award winner, were that
aesthetic considerations led to excessive costs. Still, UDC
projects have generally been extremely well-designed, far
better than those of HUD.
1
Report of Task Force on UDC, Richard L. Dunham (chairman),
pp.D.S. 4-D.S. 5.
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In Massachusetts, both MHFA and the Boston area office
of HUD have had several of their projects win design awards.
Three of MHFA's residential developments received commenda-
tion for excellence in design from the Boston Society of
Architects, while one received an honorable mention from
1
the New England Regional Conference of AIA. House and Home
magazine featured Queen Anne's Gate in Weymouth in its
April, 1973 issue in an article on excellence in site
2
planning. It made particular note of the way in which the
development preserved the natural topography and provided
each resident with a view of the woods. Another MHFA develop-
ment won an Architectural Record "Apartment of the Year
3
Award." It should be pointed out, however, that the second
1
Infill Housing, designed and developed by Housing Innova-
tions, Inc., won commendation by the Boston Society of Archi-
tects in 1973, while Taurus Apartments (designed by Richard
H. Walwood Architect Inc.) and Cleaves Court Apartments
(designed by Bastille Neily and George Stephen) won in 1974.
All three developments are located in Roxbury. Hill Homes
Model Cities Housing, designed by Stull Associates, Inc.,
was cited by the New England Regional Conference in 1974.
2
Designed by Claude Miguel Associates.
3
The honors went to Pietro Belluschi and Jung-Brannen
Associates, Inc., the design architects, in association
with The Office of Samuel Paul, Architect.
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phase of this development which did not receive an award,
was insured by HUD and architecturally is virtually indis-
tinguishable from the MHFA section. Also, another Section
236 development insured by the Boston area office of HUD,
Village Park, in Amherst, Massachusetts, received an Honor
Award in 1972 from the New England Regional Conference of
AIA as well as a HUD Honor Award of Merit for aesthetic
distinction in nonprofit sponsored housing jointly from the
Nonprofit Housing Center, Inc., the American Institute of
1
Planners, and the American Institute of Architects. Two
of its other Section 236 projects have received commenda-
tion from the Boston Society of Architects while another
won a First Honor Award from the New England Regional
2
Conference of AIA.
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority has
won more awards for its design procedures than for the
design of its developments. The American Society of Land-
scape Architects gave MSHDA an award for its Townhouse
Development Process which sets forth a process and standards
to be followed by designers of all aspects of MSHDA develop-
1
The architect was Stull Associates, Inc.
2
The Boston Society of Architects Award winners were First
Lowell Rehabiliation,designed by the Boston Architectural
Team (1973) and the Leventhal House in Brighton, designed
by Sert, Jackson and Associates (1974). The New England
Regional Conference winner was Plumley Village East in
Worcester, designed by Benjamin Thompson & Assoc. (1974).
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ments. The firm of Beckett Jackson Raeder, Inc., which
prepared the guidelines, serves as a consultant to MSHDA
in reviewing all architectural submissions. MSHDA also
won a HUD award for the management approach to design it
used on its Edgewood Village development in East Lansing.
It involved collaboration with a nonprofit sponsor, the
private sector, various governmental bodies, and the
broader community. The one MSHDA-financed development
that won an award for the substance of its design, New
Horizons in Kalamazoo, was an Operation Breakthrough
development for which MSHDA only provided a construction
loan, while HUD insured the privately-financed permanent
mortgage. The award was for "superior large area planning,"
1
and was given by HUD itself.
Two other state agencies have financed award-winning
developments. The Illinois Housing Development Authority's
Harper Square development won the Chicago Beautiful award
and the New Jersey HFA's Kingsbury Towers in Trenton won an
award from the New Jersey Chapter of AIA. Based upon a
review of all the architectural competitions known to the
author, Lake Village East in Chicago, which won an honor
2
award from the Chicago chapter of AIA in 1974, was the only
1
Designed by the Perkins and Will Partnership.
2
Designed by Harry Weese and Associates.
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other Section 236 development processed through a HUD
office in the states being considered to have won an award.
Amenity Level
The level of amenities which most of the HFA's provide
in their developments far exceeds the level that HUD pro-
vides. HUD-insured dwelling units generally provide
ranges and refrigerators, occasionally include garbage
disposals, and only rarely provide carpeting, air condition-
ers or air conditioner sleeves, or swimming pools. Occupancy
reports from 107 HUD-insured Section 236 developments in
the states of Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York showed the following distribution of amenities with
1
only slight deviation among states:
Refrigerators 98%
Ranges 97%
Garbage Disposals 17%
Carpeting 7%
Air Conditioners 7%
Air Conditioner Sleeves 4%
Swimming Pools 1%
Other Luxuries 0%
The level of amenities provided by the HFA's for low
and moderate income residents, particularly by the Massa-
chusetts, Illinois, and Michigan agencies, far exceeds that
1
Taken from HUD Form 9801, "Occupancy Report-Multifamily
HUD-Insured and Section 202 Housing, as of June 30, 1973,"
prepared by individual project managers.
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in HUD developments. Part of the reason for this differ-
ence is the fact that these three agencies have a number
of developments which mix low and moderate income families
with tenants paying market level rents. Standard in these
developments and available to low and moderate income as
well as middle income families are such features as air
conditioning, garbage disposals, carpeting or other floor
covering, balconies on high rise, swimming pools, and
community centers which often have day care facilities. In
addition, some developments have tennis or squash courts,
sauna baths, bicycling trails, shopping arcades, or roof
top gardens. While each of these agencies provides fewer
amenities in their fully subsidized developments, several
MHFA Section 236 developments have swimming pools, day care
centers, and other "luxury" amenities. Also, nearly all
MSHDA developments and several MHFA developments are
barrier-free for handicapped persons. In fact, each of the
six HFA's generally have provided more amenities in their
fully subsidized developments than has HUD, particularly in
the way of community facilities, although few can be con-
sidered "luxury" developments.
Room Size
Room size requirements in HFA-financed housing are
greater than in HUD-insured developments. As Table 8 shows,
Table 8
Minimum Room Size Requirements
(In Feet)
Illinois Hsg. Dev't. Auth.
Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Ag.
Michigan State Hsg. Dev't. Auth.
New Jersey HFA
New York HFA/DHCR
New York UDC
U.S. Department of HUD
Liv. Rm./ Kitchen st BR 2nd BR Total min. 
Reported Reported
Din. Area regs. for 
Min. BR Avg. Size Avg. Size
major rooms Dimension Low Rise High Rise
260 60 130 100 550 9'4" 1028 994
10'
240
250
245
210
260
80 130
60 150
74 150
60 138
60 120
110
130
130
120
560
590
599
528
80 520
9'
10'
10'
9'4"
909
**
**
932
1101
800
1118
880
1169
800
*No Standard
**Not Reported
Sources: IHDA, Architects Guide, February, 1973, p. 33; Interview with J.O. Chike Enwonwu, MHFA Design
and Technical Officer; MSHDA, Townhouse Development Guide, 1970, p. 41; New Jersey HFA "Minimum
Design Standards," no date, p. 7; New York DHCR Design Standards and Procedures for Limited
Profit and Limited Dividend Housing Projects, p.~15; UDC, Architects Guide for UDC Projects, 1972,
Bulletin #2, p.2; FHA Minimum Property Standards, 197, p. ; Reported average sizes for HFA's taken
from responses to UDC questionnaire, March 1973; HUD average size taken from HUD Statistical Year-
book, 1972, p. .
115 a
nearly every room size standard promulgated by the HFA's
equals or exceeds that of HUD with bedroom sizes being
particularly larger. All too frequently, minimum standards
are also the maximum that architects use. For this reason,
MHFA has refused to write any clearly defined standards.
Even the one clear standard that it has cited at several
public gatherings, namely that the smallest dimension in all
of its bedrooms be at least 10 feet, is flexible. Several
of the dwelling units in one MHFA development have no clear-
ly defined bedrooms at all.
Given the general adherence to minimum room size
standards at most agencies, however, the higher minimum
standards of most of the HFA's are translated into larger
actual room sizes. Additional evidence on this point comes
from reports by the individual agencies on the average
gross residential floor area in their dwellings. While the
extent of bias in the figures from individual state agencies
is unknown, the fact that they consistently exceed the HUD
mean indicates that the HFA's as a group are implementing
their higher standards.
1
The state figures were taken from responses to a UDC
questionnaire prepared in a hurry for public relations.
Certain other statistical information found in the responses,
particularly regarding processing times, was found to be
inaccurate.
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Construction Quality
The available evidence on the quality of construction
of HFA housing compared with HUD housing shows relatively
small differences, although contractors on developments of
several HFA's are required to provide significantly longer
guarantees. The social audit of MHFA-financed housing found
based upon resident interviews, that while construction
quality was highly correlated with resident satisfaction,
no significant difference was found in the perceived
quality of construction of their building between residents
of MHFA housing and residents of HUD housing, with both
1
groups being generally satisfied.
The Boston Urban Observatory, however, found signifi-
cant construction problems in moderate income HUD develop-
ments in Boston. Its report stated:
Managers and sponsors frequently pointed out
construction defects, and in several developments,
these constituted major problems. Widespread
deficiencies included leaks in roofs, windows and
doors, allowing rain, snow, insects, and rodents
to enter (the leaks were especially common in
pre-cast concrete buildings), stairways separating
from buildings, crumbling bricks, faulty heating
systems, and incompleted finish work.2
An audit by the U.S. Comptroller General of HUD-insured
Section 236 projects in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles,
1
William Ryan, et al., op. cit., p.231.
2
Boston Urban Observatory, Subsidized Multi-Family Housing
in the Boston Metropolitan Area (Boston Urban Observatory:
Boston, 1973), p.51.
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and New York City areas found that "the quality of housing
was good and most housing defects were minor, such as loose
bathroom fixtures, small roof leaks, and loose floor tiles."
Of the 40 projects and 517 dwelling units it examined, it
found serious problems in one development, that being in a
New York area project where improperly installed air condi-
tioning ducts made serious water leakage and drafts in
apartments possible.
The Dunham Task Force on the New York State Urban
Development Corporation examined 10 of the 50 developments
UDC had completed at the time, including most of the
developments suffering from financial problems. It found
one development with construction problems that were severe
enough to cause many tenants to move out and minor problems
such as sagging closet shelves, leaking roofs, and rusty
2
water. It found, however, that the severe problems and
most of the minor problems had been corrected.
Thus, overall, the two reports found little difference
between the construction on UDC projects as opposed to HUD
projects.
1
Comptroller General of the United States, Opportunities to
Improve Effectiveness and Reduce Costs of Rental Assistance
Housing Programs (GAO: Washington, 1973), B-17163, p.36.
2
Report of Task Force on UDC, Richard L. Dunham, chairman,
Albany, December, 1974, pp.D.l.19-34. (Mimeographed.)
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Little difference between the HFA's and HUD also exists
with regard to the stringency of construction quality
standards. The indicator used to make this determination
was noise transmission requirements. Certainly, well-
constructed buildings hamper the transmission of most noise
from apartment to apartment and room to room. Unlike most
other standards of construction quality, sound transmission
ratings provide an objective quality measure.
As seen in Table 9, HUD requirements for sound reduc-
tion are about the same as those of the state agencies. The
Illinois and Massachusetts agencies have explicitly adopted
the HUD minimum property standards in this area.
The one indicator of construction quality where the
HFA's clearly surpass HUD is the guarantees required from
contractors on construction components. While HUD simply
requires the one year warranty standard in most multi-family
construction contracts, several of the state agencies require
extended guarantees on several critical elements (see Table
10). For example, the two New York agencies require long-
term guarantees for waterproofing, roofing, refrigeration,
and plaster bonding agents. Such guarantees not only
require the contractor to absorb any costs related to any
replacements that may be required, but also provides him
with a strong incentive to do the job in a manner that will
endure.
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Table 9
Sound Transmission Class (S.T.C.) Requirements
by Agency for Sound Reduction
Between Apartments Within Apartments
Wall-Wall/
Floor-Ceil-
ing
Degree of
Background Noise Low High
Illinois HDA
Mass. HFA
Mich. SHDA
New Jersey HFA
New York DHCR
New York UDC
HUD
Bedroom-
Other
Rooms
Low Hi
50 45 45 40
50 45 45 40
NI NI NI NI
40* 40* 40* 40*
45 45 45 45
NI NI NI NI
50 45 45 40
Bathroom-
Living
Room
Bedroom-
Other
Rooms
Low High Low High
NR NR 45 40
NR NR 45 40
NI NI NI NI
NR NR NR
45 45 NR
NR
NR
NI NI NI NI
NR NR 45 40
NR = No requirement NI = No information
* Requirement expressed in terms of a sound reduction of at
least 40 decibels at an average frequency of 256-1040 decibels,
which is a more performance oriented (and thereby likely to
be a slighily higher) standard than an S.T.C. rating.
Sources: IHDA, Architect's Guide, p.6; Interview with J.O.
Chike Enwonwu, MHFA Chief of Architecture; New Jersey
HFA, "Minimum Design Standards," p.5; New York DHCR
Design Standards for Limited Profit and Limited Divi-
dend Projects, p.52; HiUD, Minimum Proert Standards-
Multifami1HIousl i (FTUA #2600), 1971, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 .
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Table 10
Required Contractor Guarantees by Agency
HUD Ill. Mass. Mich. NJ NY
HDA MHFA SHDA HFA DHCR.
General
Waterproofing:
Integral
Spandral
Roofing:
Built-up
Asphalt Shingle
Sheet Metal
Steel Windows
Caulking
Plaster Bonding
Agent
Plastic Piping
Bi-Fold Doors
Refrigeration
Water Heater
NR No Requirement
a 20 year bondable roofing
b With insurance
1 1 1 1
10
NR
NR NR NR NR NR 5
NR 10 NB NR NR NR NR
NR NR NR NR NR 2
b _b
NR NR NR NR NR 5
5 5 NR NR NR NR NR
NR NR NR NR NR 2 NR
NR NR NR NR NR 5 5
NR 5 NR NR NR NR NR
required
HUD, "Construction Contract" (FHA Form 2442);
IHDA; Architect':s Guide, 1973, pp. 34-43; Interview with
J.O.C. Enwonwu, MH=A Chief of Architecture; MSHDA, "General Conditions
for the Contract;" N.J. HFA, "Construction Contract Terms."
New York DHCR, "The General Conditions of the Contract
for the Construction of Buildings"
AB-3 (3-70), p. 10.
1 1
NY
UDC
1
3
Sources:
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Project Costs
The higher standards found in HFA developments, in
terms of amenities, room size, construction quality, and
design, have resulted in as high or higher total development
costs than on HUD projects, despite lower financing charges.
Every state housing finance agency showed higher total
development costs per unit than did each of the local HUD
offices in its respective state for developments within the
same substate areas. (See Table 11.) The statistical
significance of the differences, however, vary. The
most significant differences occur in New York, particularly
in the New York City area, where development costs generally
exceed HUD limits and HUD has been able to build only a
relatively small number of units. Here, the cost of new
construction financed by both UDC and the New York HFA have
1
exceeded that of HUD by over $11,000 per unit (p = .001).
1
The finding that UDC and the New York HFA have had virtually
identical average total costs within New York City contra-
dicts the "Report of the Task Force on UDC" (Volume 2,
pp.D.S.7 - D.S.ll) which claimed that UDC's construction
costs were $9,500 per unit higher. The discrepancy is
reconciled by the fact that this study includes the Starrett
City project and several other projects which the UDC Task
Force omitted. The Starrett City project contains 5888
dwelling units, half of the total number of units in projects
closed by the New York HFA/DHCR during the years 1970-1973.
Total development costs on the project are $55,000 per unit.
If this project is left out, total development costs per unit
of the New York HFA/DHCR projects within the New York City
area are only $30,900, slightly less than the $31,600 HUD
costs.
Table 11
Average Cost Per Dwelling Unit by Agency
By Local Area Jan 1, 1970 - Dec. 31, 1973
Mean
HUD Field Office
Chicago
Springfield
Boston
Grand Rapids
Detroit
Camden
Newark
Buffalo
Albany
NYC
$19,564
18,134
24,669
17,754
20,096
16,913
25,335
22,647
20,690
N
SD (Units)
2,630
2, 599
4,119
1,723
2,731
1,872
8,664
2,852
2,281
9,105
2,240
12, 256
4,206
13,809
3,070
1,203
2,050
3,019
27,899 10,865 17,012
(Projects)
State HFA
55 IHDA Chicago
25 IHDA Spring-
field
67
44
103
27
13
12
21
773
MHFA
MSHDA Grand
Rapids
MSHDA Detroit
NJHFA Camden
NJHFA Newark
NYHFA Buffalo
NYHFA Albany
NYHFA NYC
UDC Buffalo
UDC Albany
UDC NYC
Mean
22,688
19,158
25, 321
19,921
20,319
25,496
26,485
26,654
27,203
42,966
26,095
25,861
43,323
N
SD (Units)
3,316
1,349
6,906
2,112
2,100
3,884
4,392
8,027
4,720
12,616
3,427
3,041
7,825
N
(Projects)
3,643
1,066
15,265
3,524
3,921
2, 504
7, 530
1,801
3,417
11,790
7,916
4,834
20,768
Source: HUD, Selected Multifamily Status Reports, as of December 31, 1973;
New York State UDC, "Report of Actual Construction Starts," July, 1974.
State HFA's annual reports;
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Within the jurisdiction of HUD's Albany insuring office,
UDC's and DHCR's costs per unit exceed those of HUD by
$5,171 (p = .001), and $6,513 (p = .001), respectively;
within the Buffalo area, UDC and DHCR exceed HUD's costs by
$3,448 and $4,007. The New Jersey HFA has had costs that
exceed those of HUD's Camden Insuring Office by $8,600
(p = .001) but are only $1,150 more than those of the Newark
area office, a statistically insignificant difference given
the number of projects and variability of average costs.
Comparisons between the two state HFA's in the Midwest
with their HUD counterparts regarding costs yield mixed
results. Illinois Housing Development Authority had signifi-
cantly higher costs in the Chicago area ($3,123 higher,
p = .005), but only insignificantly higher costs in the
Springfield area. The Michigan State Housing Development
Authority had significantly higher costs than HUD's Grand
Rapids Insuring Office ($2,167 higher, p = .001), but
virtually identical costs to the Detroit Area Office.
The only state agency to do as well as their HUD
counterpart throughout the state was the Massachusetts HFA.
Its average cost for new construction was computed to be
$652 per unit higher, a statistically insignificant differ-
ence.
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NATIONAL PUBLIC PURPOSES
The four primary national concerns on which HUD
monitors the performance of the state housing finance
agencies are: racial integration of developments, the
provision of housing for minorities, equal opportunities
for employment for minority construction workers and
minority-controlled businesses, and protection of the
environment. While comparative data is only available for
the first of these, each will be discussed in turn.
Racial Integration and Minority Housing
Each of the state housing finance agencies and local
HUD offices providing information have produced housing
that has a far greater degree of racial integration than is
generally found in conventionally financed housing. The
state agencies as a group have created somewhat more highly
integrated living environments than HUD, while HUD appears
to have provided housing for a slightly higher percentage
of minority families. These differences, however, are
relatively minor. As seen in Table 12, 90.1 percent of the
state agency units are contained in integrated developments
compared with 84.0 percent of the HUD units; 66.8 percent
of the state agency units compared with 63.6 percent of the
HUD units are in developments with more than "token integra-
Table 12
Percentage of Minority Occupants
In State Housing Finance Agency Projects and HUD Section 236 Projects
State HFA's
Ill.
HDA
Mass.
HFA
Mich.
SHDA
NY
UDC
Total
Mnrty.
21.9%
589
15.1%
725
15.6%
308
41.8%
4526
HFA TOTAL 30.3%
6148
HUD
Ill. 53.0%
HUD 2313
Mass.
HUD
NJ
HUD
NY
HUD
HUD TOTAL
21.0%
447
51.3%
855
47.2%
1545
45.1%
5160
All
White
1-5% 6-15% 16-25% 26-50% 50-74% 75-84% 85-94% 95-99%
Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty. Mnrty.
7.2% 39.5%
194 1062
7.9%
379
42.2%
2029
11.3% 27.0%
224 534
7.3%
786
6.8%
1389
1.3%
58
16.0%
340
10.1%
1094
26.5%
1274
34.5%
681
15.3%
1653
33.3%
895
6.1%
295
11.4%
226
All
Mnrty.
20.0%
538
8.0% 3.7%
386 180
6.2%
122
6.9%
136
0.2%
9
2.7%
7.6% 24.5% 12.4%
824 2656 1344
1.1%
54
10.9%
1178
2.7%
130
6.8%
738
1.4%
68
5.1%
551
Total
Units
2689
4804
1976
10825
19.0% 23.0% 11.0% 16.0% 10.8% 3.1% 6.1% 4.3% 3.1%
3851 4670 2240 3164 2198 62 1232 868 619 20294
8.1%
353
25.1%
535
7.0% 14.9%
117 248
13.7%
450
17.7% 10.0% 14.5%
771 438 633
17.2% 20.2% 9.0%
366 430 192
7.6%
126
10.7%
350
20.5%
341
8.7%
284
8.1%
353
0.7%
15
11.0%
184
21.7% 17.4%
711 568
4.5% 13.9% 14.1% 10.1% 16.4% 9.8%
515 1586 1613 1152 1877 1120
3.7% 14.4%
161 627
3.3% 7.0%
71 150
8.6% 7.4%
143 123
1.6% 5.4%
54 176
3.8% 9.4%
429 1076
2.1%
90
20.2%
880 4364
1.5%
31 2130
17.6%
293
11.2%
365
5.5%
92
9.6%
315
6.5% 11.5%
748 1318
~1667
3273
11434
HUD "Occupancy Report" for individual projects, Form 9801, June 30, 1973. IHDA, "Resident Profile:
Integration Comparison," 1974. Mass. HFA, "Semi-Annual Occupancy Report" for individual projects,
January, 1974. Mich. SHDA, "Monthly Development Status Report," July, 1973. UDC, "Resident
Characteristics of Projects More than 25% Occupied," December 8, 1974
Sources:
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tion," i.e., with at least 5 percent minority and at least
5 percent white occupants. Overall, 30.3 percent of the
residents in state agency developments have been members of
minority groups, compared with 45.1 percent of the residents
of HUD Section 236 developments. This difference, however,
is inflated by the fact that many of the state agency
developments, particularly in Illinois and Massachusetts,
have a large number of middle income units that are occupied
primarily by white families.
The best record for integration belongs to the Illinois
Housing Development Authority (IHDA). All of their develop-
ments contain a mixture of races, with nearly all of them
having a substantially higher percentage of minority occu-
pancy than the community as a whole. Only 7.2 percent of
their residents live in developments which have what could
be considered "token" integration (less than 5 percent of a
single race). By contrast, some 21.5 percent of those
living in HUD-insured developments in Illinois live in a
totally segregated development, and an additional 10.2
percent live in developments having only "token" integration.
Because of the fact that it, unlike its HUD counterparts,
has constructed no developments that are completely or
predominantly occupied by minority families, IHDA has served
a far lower percentage of such families.
1
IHDA, "IHDA Resident Profile: Integration Comparison," 1974.
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The New York State Urban Development Corporation has
had a record of racial integration that is quite similar to
that of its counterpart local HUD offices. UDC has had a
slightly higher percentage of units than HUD in racially
segregated developments (12.4 versus 9.6 percent) but a
lower percentage in developments with only "token" integra-
tion (16.9 compared with 24.9 percent). HUD has served a
slightly higher percentage of minority families (47.2 to
41.8 percent).
In Massachusetts, the only other state with comparable
figures for both the state agency and the local HUD offices,
judgment as to which agency has performed better is a matter
of interpretation. Only 9.3 of the residents in the Massa-
chusetts HFA's developments lived in segregated housing
(7.9 percent in all-white ones and 1.4 percent in all-
minority ones) compared with 17.5 percent of the residents
in the Massachusetts HUD developments (16.0 percent in all-
white ones, and 1.5 percent in all-minority ones).
Integration in state developments in Massachusetts, however,
has more frequently been of a "token" nature (44.9 percent
versus 25.1 percent for HUD developments) while integration
in HUD developments in Massachusetts has more frequently
been of what some have called an "imbalanced" nature (11
percent compared with 5 percent for the state developments)
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1
having over 50 percent minority residents. Consequently,
HUD has served a somewhat higher percentage of minority
families overall (21.0 versus 15.1 percent).
Minority representation has been virtually identical
in the HUD-insured and Massachusetts HFA-financed sections
of the case-study project discussed later in this chapter.
Both sections have a minority representation of 10 percent,
while the remainder of the neighborhood has virtually no
minority representation. MFHA efforts, however, appear to
have been crucial to the integration of both sections. In
the rent-up of the MHFA section, the management agent found
that the recruitment of minority families appeared to be
proceeding "too successfully" and was fearful that the
development would no longer be able to attract non-minority
families. At MHFA's insistence, the development opened with
the inclusion of all the minority applicants as residents.
Six months later, the HUD section opened with the same
racial composition. Both sections maintain large waiting
lists after two years of occupancy.
1
The recently repealed Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act
used the term "imbalanced."
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Equal Employment Opportunity
With regard to the two equal employment goals,
developers and contractors on both HUD-insured and state
HFA-financed projects were required to complete forms
attesting to their intention to employ workers and businesses
in a non-discriminatory manner as well as to comply with
1
local Hometown Plans for hiring minority workers.
Beginning in 1972 with the implementation of HUD's Project
Selection Criteria, those HUD-insured projects judged to
have superior potential for creating minority employment
and business opportunities were, other criteria being equal,
2
to be given priority funding.
An evaluation of the differential success of HUD and
the state HFA's in achieving equal employment opportunities
can be made only through an examination of data relating to
the number of jobs and volume of business which minority
workers received on projects regulated by each agency. A
related criterion not explicitly mandated by enabling legis-
lation but indicative of agency concern in this area is the
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Assurance
of Compliance with Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964" (HUD Form 41901); "Equal Employment Opportunity Certi-
fication (HUD Form 2010), July, 1969.
2
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Evalua-
tion of Requests" (FHA Form No. 3165), criterion 7.
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percentage of minority persons employed by the agency
itself. While several state HFA's provided the desired
information, requests to the HUD Central Office and
several area offices produced no comparable information on
HUD-insured projects and HUD personnel. The information
available on the state-financed projects (Table 13) shows
a strong performance by the state agencies.
The agency which has been the most successful in
securing minority employment in its projects and on its
staff in relation to the minority population of the state,
at least on the basis of available information, is the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). While Massa-
chusetts has a non-white population of only 3.7 percent,
18 percent of the workers on MHFA projects, 9 percent of
its contracting firms, 14 percent of its total staff, and
20 percent of its professional staff have been minorities.
The Illinois Housing Development Authority and the New York
State Urban Development Corporation have provided employment
to slightly higher percentages of minority members in certain
of these categories, although Illinois and New York each
contain a considerably higher percentage of minority
residents. The one state agency providing minority employ-
ment information which failed to provide significantly
greater opportunities for minorities than their composition
in the state was the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal.
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Table 13
Minority Employment by State Agency
Minority residents as a % .
of total population of state
Minority % of construction workers
on project
Number of such minority workers
Total number of such workers
Contracts let to minority firms
as % of all contracts
Estimated amount of project
construction (millions)
Contracts let to minority firms
(millions)
Total number of agency staff
Number of minorities on staff
Number of minorities as total
% of total staff
Number of minority professionals
as % of total professional staff
Date
Mass.
HFA
3.7%
18.0%
5540
30887
9.0%
$282
$25
50
7
20%
3/73
New York New York Illinois Michigan
New York
DHCR
13.2%
12.3%
1299.3
(man days)
9954.8
(man days)
N/A
$396
N/A
368
60
4th quat.
1972
New York
UDC
13.2%
22.4%
1078
4809
7.0%
$911
$64
501
126
25.2%
17.0%
Illinois
HDA
13.6%
25.0%
164
661
N/A
$42
N/A
54
14
26%
15%
Michigan
SHDA
12.8%
16.4%
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
156
41
26%
37%
2/28/73 11/72 fiscal
(job figs.) 1974
1/73
(staff figs.)
Source: New York State Urban Development Corporation survey of state agencies,
March, 1973; Michigan State Housing Development Authority, Annual
Report, 1974, p. 9.
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Environmental Protection
Another national concern which has become a goal for
housing agencies in the building of public purpose housing
is environmental protection. The extent to which the HFA's
and HUD have caused their developments to be built in a
manner consistent with protecting the environment can only
really be determined through an inspection of each develop-
ment. Such an undertaking would clearly be beyond the
scope of this thesis. What has been considered is the
approach taken by the various agencies. All state-financed
developments receiving HUD subsidy funds have had to
undergo as many as four types of environmental reviews:
1)review by their own office; 2)review by the state or
city environmental protection agencies; 3) A-95 review; and
4) review by HUD.
The prevailing attitude of state HFA's with regard to
environmental protection is to try to find a way to make
projects environmentally compatible rather than to reject
them for being environmentally unsound or to ignore
environmental considerations. William J. White, executive
director of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,
stated before a New York Law Journal seminar that housing
by its nature should be exempt from environmental control.
Nonetheless, his agency does compel developers to take
substantive steps to protect the environment. For example,
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site plans for MHFA developments must be prepared in a
manner so as to preserve the maximum number of trees.
Where residue from parking lots might pollute nearby
streams, MHFA has required oil and gas traps.
State and local environmental agencies are only
beginning to become active with regard to housing. Massa-
chusetts and New York are the only states studied with
environmental agencies that formally examine HFA develop-
ments. Neither state agency has disapproved an HFA
financed development as yet, although the New York City
Planning Commission, which acts in lieu of the State in
New York City, did require the redesign of a proposed
Division of Housing and Community Renewal development to
reduce the impact of shadows.
Descriptions of all state and Federal multi-family
housing developments having 100 units or more must be
circulated for comment among a clearinghouse composed of
all affected local, state, Federal, and metropolitan
agencies in the area pursuant to Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-95. While negative feedback on HFA
developments has been rare, it has on occasion led to the
rejection of developments. One development which the
Michigan State Housing Development Authority planned to
finance was denied local zoning as the result of negative
comments made during the A-95 review process. The HUD
Environmental Clearance Worksheet, first appearing in draft
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in 1972, asks for the developer to 1) broadly assess the
beneficial and adverse physical, social, and aesthetic
environmental impact of the project, 2) identify any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
project be implemented, 3) outline principal alternatives
to the proposed project, 4) determine the relationship
between the proposed use of the environment and the main-
tenance of long-run productivity with reference to the
commitment of irreversible or irretrievable resources, and
5) identify all known or potential opposition groups and
their views. If the project appears to have a significant
impact on the environment, then HUD can require a full
environmental impact statement. The intent of the entire
procedure is more to bring to the surface potential
environmental hazards than to provide standards with which
to select projects. Thus, HUD objections to HFA develop-
ments on the grounds that they would adversely impact the
environment have been rare. Even then, the HFA's have been
able to convince HUD to reverse itself.
More common has been HUD's rejection of a proposed
site because of the adverse effect it would have on its
tenants. Specifically, HUD has rejected proposed sites for
both HFA and HUD projects on the grounds that they would be
too noisy. Sound level meter readings and other noise
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measurements are needed to justify project approval. In
these instances as well, the HFA's generally have succeeded
in having HUD approve the development either through the
provision of additional noise attenuation materials or air
conditioning. The other HUD environmental standard is
contained in Project Selection Criterion number 5. The
objectives of this criterion are:
- To provide an attractive and well-planned physical
environment;
- To prevent any adverse impact on the environment
resulting from construction of the proposed housing;
- To avoid site locations whose environmental condi-
tions would be detrimental to the success of an
otherwise sound project.
As with on all of the other Project Selection Criteria,
HUD rates each of its own projects as superior, adequate,
or poor; as with on all but criteria number two, HFA's
must certify to HUD that each of their projects score an
"adequate" rating on this criterion. Projects fail on this
ground if they:
1) embody poor land use planning or poor architectural
treatment; or
2) be subject to serious environmental conditions
which cannot be corrected; or
HUD Circular 1390.2 pursuant to the Noise Control Act
of 1972, P.L. 92-574; 86 Stat. 1234.
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3) will substantially or unreasonably disrupt the
environment or ecologically valuable or unique
natural areas. 1
Relocation
The final area of such national concern that HUD has
imposed requirements on the states is relocation. The
Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1972 requires that all persons
displaced by public action receive compensation in an
amount equal to their moving expenses plus up to $15,000
for a displaced homeowner or up to $4,000 over four years
for renters. Homeowners and tenants both receive payments
based upon the cost of relocating to a decent, safe, and
sanitary home in a neighborhood generally desirable in
terms of public services, commercial facilities, and
accessibility to the head of the family's place of employ-
ment. The HUD Handbook for state HFA's receiving HUD funds
makes clear that these requirements apply to state-financed
developments, as well as to HUD-insured developments with
private financing.
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Evalua-
tion of Requests" (FHA Form No. 3165).
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Few state-financed or HUD-insured developments involve
relocation except in urban renewal areas. Relocation
benefits for those displaced from homes in urban renewal
areas come from urban renewal funds; benefits for those
displaced outside of urban renewal areas must come from
project mortgages. Since the addition of large relocation
allowances to project mortgages will usually make the project
infeasible, the few non-urban renewal area state-financed or
HUD-insured housing developments involving relocation
appear to have rarely conformed to the Federal Uniform
Relocation Act. The Michigan State Housing Development
Authority has simply provided for the payment of moving
expenses. The Massachusetts HFA provides tenants displaced
from buildings to be rehabilitated with the first right of
refusal on the same apartment once rehabilitation is
completed. The agency also requires that the developer
submit a relocation plan showing that all displacees will
receive decent, safe, and sanitary replacement housing.
Rehabilitation and the Housing of Large Families
As discussed in the previous chapter, HUD administra-
tively adopted two risky goals for itself, property
rehabilitation and the housing of large families, as the
result of vague legislation language. The state agencies
have neither adopted them as their own through administrative
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proclamation nor have been required to accept them through
HUD requirements. Consequently, as might be expected, HUD
has both produced a higher percentage of rehabilitated units
and has housed a higher percentage of large families. While
the differences have been slight with regard to the housing
of large families, they have been great with regard to
rehabilitation.
The risk inherent in rehabilitation stems partially
from the fact that the process frequently occurs in older,
declining neighborhoods and partially from the impossibility
of estimating its cost until workmen have removed walls and
ceilings to expose the degree to which systems need replace-
ment. Its social value results from the fact that it
better preserves the existing character of a neighborhood
and it generally costs less than new construction; however
it fails to provide as great an uplift to the neighborhood
and has a shorter useful life.
Quite apart from these competing claims, as Table 14
clearly shows, HUD has assumed the risks of rehabilitation
far more frequently than have the HFA's, with 18.4 percent
of HUD's Section 236 units having been rehabilitated
compared with only 5.4 percent of the HFA's. The only
state agency to come close to matching its local HUD counter-
part in terms of the percentage or number of rehabilitated
units has been the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
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Table 14
Percentage of State Agency Units and HUD
Section 236 Units Rehabilitated - Construction
Beginning Between January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1973
Total Number
Rehabilitation
Units
Total Number
Units
Rehabilitation
Percentage
Illinois Hsg. Dev't. Auth.
HUD Illinois
Massachusetts HFA
HUD Massachusetts
Michigan State Hst. Dev't. Auth.
HUD Michigan
New Jersey HFA
HUD New Jersey
New York HFA/DHCR
New York UDC
HUD New York
All HFA's (6 agencies)
All HUD's (5 States)
0
2, 417
2,194
2, 509
71
2,136
703
1,666
1,1463
569
4, 456
5,000
13, 184
6,782
13,762
17,459
14,210
6,553
20,151
10,269
5,939
17,936
33,037
17,421
92,036
71,483
0
17.6%
12.6%
17.7%
1.1%
10.6%
6.8%
28.1%
8.2%
1.7%
25.6%
5.4%
18.4%
Sources: State HFA Annual Reports and Internal Documents; HUD, Selected Multi-
Family Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance Programs, as of December 31,
1973, RR 02 Series.
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which has included 2194 (12.6 percent) rehabilitated units
in its total production. MHFA has avoided one major risk
often attendant to rehabilitation, that of uncertainty as
to the scope of the required work,by requiring that all of
the rehabilitation it financed be of a gut nature such that
all of the non-structural portions of the building be
replaced. Still, the incidence of significant arrearages
has been over twice as great on MHFA's rehabilitated
projects as on its new ones.
The provision of housing for large families involves
the risk that the children will destroy the property as
well as a greater risk that the community will reject the
development. Because of these risks, private developers
using conventional financing have often neglected the needs
of large families. As Table 15 shows, 21.1 percent of
HUD's Section 236 units have three or more bedrooms
compared with 18.7 percent of the HFA's. HUD units have
had an average of 1.89 bedrooms versus 1.66 for those of
the state agencies. Since all of the agencies being con-
sidered have similar policies to limit the number of bed-
rooms allowed to a family of a given size, the fact that
HUD has provided a slightly larger share of dwelling units
with multiple bedrooms means that they have provided
housing for a slightly higher proportion of children than
have the HFA's. The agency that has produced the highest
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Table 15
Number of Bedrooms Per
Section 236 Dwelling Unit by.Agency
Mean # of
Bedrooms
Illinois Housing Development Authority
HUD - Illinois
Massachusetts HFA
HUD - Massachusetts
Michigan State Hsg. Devt. Auth.
HUD - Michigan
New Jersey HFA
HUD - New Jersey
New York HFA/DHCR
New York UDC
HUD - New York
All HFA's (6 agencies)
All HUD (4 states)
2.00
1.93
1.72
1.70
1.80
N/A
1.39
1.95
1.47
1.72
1.95
1.66
1.89
Percentage
of Units
With 3 or
More Bed-
Rooms
27.4%
26.9%
14.5%
18.5%
22.3%
N/A
13.7%
22.3%
16.6%
20.5%
25.8%
18.7%
21.1%
Sources: HUD figures based upon HUD Form 9801, "Occupancy Report: Multi-
family HUD/Insured and Section 202 Housing as of June 30, 1973"
for each project. State figures based upon aggregate information
supplied by each agency in New York State Urban Development Cor-
poration survey of state HFA's, March, 1973.
Number of
Units in
Sample
2,433
4,653
12,586
3,270
11,000
0
7,199
1,966
14., 117
30,434
4,035
77,769
15,801
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percentage of children-oriented units, even higher than
any HUD office, however, has been the Illinois Housing
Development Authority which provided three bedrooms or more
in over 27 percent of its Section 236 units.
LOCAL PUBLIC PURPOSES
State agency statutes and administrative proclamations
have identified certain local public purposes. Among these
are the mixing of socioeconomic groups within the same
development, the provision.of elderly housing, and the
promotion of cooperative ownership. While HUD shared none
of these goals in its implementation of the Section 236
program, it has adopted each of them in other programs.
As will be seen through an examination of each of them
individually, the HFA's possessing these goals have generally
done a better job than HUD in fulfilling them.
Income Mixing
While only two state agencies have had extensive
experience in mixing low income families with middle income
families, the state housing finance agencies have clearly
produced far more units with varying types of income mix-
tures than HUD or any other financing vehicle. While the
Massachusetts HFA has had the most experience in providing
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housing for a broad range of income levels within the same
building, the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal was the first to accomplish this goal.
Its Capital Grant Program, which was begun in 1964, has
provided housing for 1,382 low income families in HFA-
financed middle income developments. Funding cutbacks,
however, have limited the number of Capital Grant tenants
living in developments constructed after 1970 to only 134.
The Capital Grant Program operates in a manner similar to
the Federal leased housing program, in that the State
leases the apartment from the owner and subleases it to the
tenant. The Capital Grant goes to the State HFA to reduce
debt service. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal
has selected tenants for the program who are "the cream of
the poor, the most middle class of the lower class, the
ones with the least distance between themselves and the
1
middle-income group." Generally, Capital Grant tenants
have comprised less than 20 percent of all residents of
each development. Despite its success with the State
program in terms of uplifting low income families from slum
housing and absorbing them into middle income developments
1
Fred Powledge, New York State's Capital Grant Program,
Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc.,
1969, p.24 .
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1
without resentment from other residents, DHCR has used the
Federal subsidies available to it for the purpose of housing
low income families in a middle income setting in only one
development.
The agency that has clearly been the most active in
promoting mixed income housing over a broad range of income
levels has been the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.
By the end of 1973, MHFA had financed over 10,000 dwelling
units in developments containing both a minimum of 25 percent
of residents with incomes sufficiently low to qualify for
public housing ($3,000 - $5,000) and a minimum of 25 percent
of middle class residents with incomes sufficiently high to
afford market rents ($10,000 - $25,000). A social audit of
sixteen of MHFA's early developments conducted by a team of
independent social scientists found that:
Broad income mix "works" in these MHFA developments,
producing higher levels of satisfaction at all
levels -- market, moderate income, and low income,
principally because these developments are superior
in design, construction and management. . . .
Income mix as such does not seem to be an important
determinant of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.2
1
Ibid.
2
William Ryan et al., All in Together: An Evaluation of
Mixed-Income Multi-Family Housing, MHFA, January 24, 1974,
p.24. Some but not all of the developments in this study
had elderly households making up the low income population.
The conclusions of the study team appear to hold true for
the developments in the sample with younger families equally
as well. MHFA's more recent developments have relatively
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Just as important from the present standpoint is that this
finding contradicts all of the conventional wisdom con-
cerning the impact of income mixing. Two years prior to
the publication of the MHFA Social Audit, the Social Science
Panel of the Advisory Committee to HUD reported:
There is no evidence from field studies that socio-
economic mixing is feasible. The trend in the
movements of urban population is toward increasing
separation of socioeconomic categories.1
Still, MHFA was able to make it work, despite the risks in
going against this wisdom.
The other state agencies and HUD have only been able
to achieve income mixing over a relatively narrow range of
income levels, except in a few scattered projects. HUD has
been providing Rent Supplements to low income families to
enable them to comprise approximately 12.7 percent of the
residents in each of its Section 236 moderate income
developments. (See Table 4.) Certain of the state agencies
including the Michigan State Housing Development Authority,
the New York Urban Development Corporation, and the New
few elderly households. The mean number of bedrooms per
occupied low income unit in projects with a three level
mixture was 1.5 compared with a mean of 1.6 for middle
income units in the same projects. (Based upon "MHFA Semi-
Annual Occupancy Report" for each project, January 1974.)
1
Advisory Committee to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Social Science Panel (Amos H. Hawley, Chairman),
Freedom of Choice in Housing: Opportunities and Constraints
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy of Engineering, 1972), p.36 .
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Jersey Housing Finance Agency, have followed similar
practices. (See Table 16.) MSHDA's experience in housing
families receiving low income rent supplements in the same
development as those receiving no direct subsidy has been
limited to the housing of only one low income family. UDC
has provided homes for 152 low income families in 5 of its
otherwise middle and moderate income developments. The
proportion of low income residents in each of these develop-
ments with a three level mix, however, has generally been
only about five percent. In a few other projects, both
MSHDA and UDC have mixed just moderate and middle income
residents in suburban areas without low income residents.
This form of mixing has characterized the majority of
developments financed by the Illinois Housing Development
Authority. While it does require a limited amount of risk
and does provide benefits to some moderate income families,
this form of economic integration does little to address
the real problem referred to by the Illinois Legislature
in creating IHDA when it declared one of its purposes to be
to encourage the building of housing which will "help
prevent the recurrence of slum conditions and assist in
their permanent elimination by housing persons of varied
economic means within the same structure and neighborhoods."
1
L. 1967, p. 1 9 3 1 .
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Table 16
Total Number of Dwelling Units with Varying Income Level Mixtures by Agency on
Projects Closed January 1, 1970-December 31, 1973
Ill. Mass. Mich. NJ NY- NY
HDA HFA SHDA2 HFA 3 - HFA 4  UDC
Single Level
1
100% Low Income 0 451 0 0 0 993
100% Moderate 1 1762 0 1552 2089 7582 264
100% Middle 1 0 0 184 1641 4214 1929
Two Levels
1-10% Low: 90-99% Mod. 120 0 816 1585 3533 9043
11-24% Low: 76-89% Mod. 390 0 3069 3580 1402 4382
25-33% Low: 67-75% Mod. 0 4629 549 203 188 5607
34-50% Low: 50-66% Mod. 0 1868 703 270 120 7671
51-99% Low: 1-49% Mod. 0 307 0 0 242 75
1-49% Mod: 50-99% Middle 2452 0 1242 0 0 0
51-99% Mod.: 1-49% Middle 1736 0 0 0 0 178
Three Levels
25-40% Low: 0-68% Mod.:
17-24% Middle 0 184 0 0 0 0
25-40% Low: 0-50% Mod.:
25-50% Middle 0 10017 0 0 0 0
1-20% Low: 0-75% Mod.:
25-95% Middle 322 0 200 0 305 3076
Total Dwelling Units 6782 17456 8314 9368 17586 33218
Number of Low Income Households
in Developments with 3 level mix 64 2521 1 0 30 152
1. Low income as used here means households receiving rent supplements
Section 23 leased housing or equivalent state subsidies, and thereby
having an income of under about $5000; moderate income means house-
holds subsidized by Section 236 or equivalent state program without
further direct subsidy thereby having an income of about $5,000 -
$10,000; middle income means households receiving no direct subsidy
and thereby having an income in excess of about $10,000.
2. Michigan total includes 2240 units insured by HUD but permanently
financed by MSHDA. Included are 571 units in all moderate develop-
ments and 283 lows and 1386 moderates in developments with two level
mix.
3. Prior to 1970, the New Jersey HFA closed projects having a total of
2132 dwelling units of which 1043 were in all middle income develop-
ments and the remainder were in developments with a two level mix
and were divided 207 as low income and 882 moderate.
4. Prior to 1970 the New York HFA closed one 303 unit, all moderate in-
come projects and 43,450 units of primarily middle income housing
containing 1382 low income Capital Grant recipients constituting no
more than 20 percent of any single project.
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One of IHDA's most recently completed developments, Jackson
Park Terrace in Chicago, does provide a three level mix.
Despite the fact that sufficient Section 236 and rent
supplement funding had been allocated to allow the entire
development to be rented to low and moderate income
families, over 25 percent of the tenants will be paying
market level rents. Through this mechanism IHDA has
achieved economic integration without incurring the risk
that the market level units will experience rent-up
difficulties.
Elderly Housing
The four state agencies whose enabling legislation
has cited the need for housing for the elderly have clearly
outperformed their counterpart HUD area offices in this
regard. A total of 33.8 percent of all the housing
financed by the New York HFA in 1970-73 and 19.0 percent
of that financed by the New York UDC was specially
designed for elderly occupancy compared with only 10.1
percent of the Section 236 housing insured by HUD in the
same state. (See Table 17.) Similarly, the Michigan state
agency outproduced its HUD counterparts in this regard
(27.7 to 16.6 percent), while the Massachusetts HFA
produced a higher percentage of housing for the elderly than
HUD in that state (15.7 percent compared with 12.4 percent).
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Table 17
Number of Elderly Dwelling Units
With Construction Beginning
1970 - 1973 by Agency
Total Number
of Elderly
Units*
Total Number
of Units*
Elderly
Percentage
Illinois Hsg. Dev't. Auth.
HUD - Illinois
Massachusetts HFA
HUD - Massachusetts
Michigan St. Hsg. Dev't Auth.
HUD - Michigan
New Jersey HFA
HUD - New Jersey
New York HFA/DHCR
New York UDC
HUD - New York
All HFA's (6 Agencies)
All HUD (5 states)
747
2,173
2,733
1,762
1,817
3,354
4,185
613
6,063
6,290
1,751
21,835
9,653
6,782
13,762
17,459
14,210
6,553
20,151
10,269
5,939
17,936
33,037
17,421
92,036
71,483
11.0%
15.8%
15.7%
12.4%
27.7%
16.6%
40.8%
10.3%
33.8%
19.0%
10.1%
23.7%
13.5%
*HUD unit counts include Section 236 units only
Sources: Information provided to author by individual state
agencies and HUD RR: 02, Multifamily Status Reports,
as of December 31, 1969, and as of December 31,1973.
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Including those state agencies that do not have the pro-
duction of elderly housing as a legislatively-determined
goal, the state HFA's have devoted 23.7 percent of their
total production to the elderly compared with 13.5 percent
of HUD's Section 236 totals in the same states. Because of
the relatively low risks associated with elderly housing,
however, this record has not been difficult to achieve.
Cooperative Ownership
The other local public purpose being used as a criterion
for agency success, cooperative ownership, is undoubtedly
the least important. It was also the one local public
purpose that HUD satisfied to as high a degree as the state
agencies. The one piece of state agency legislation that
mentions it is the New York Private Housing Finance Law
which makes the goal applicable to both the HFA and UDC.
The volume of cooperative housing financed by the New
York State Housing Finance Agency has not been appreciably
different from that insured by HUD in the same state,
although UDC has provided only a handful of such units.
Since the start of its operations in 1960, the New York HFA
has financed 33,717 units of cooperative housing, including
1
the 15,000 unit Coop-City development. Of the total, only
1
Compiled from New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal, Statistical Summary of Programs, pp.71-121.
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454 units were financed between 1970 and 1973 and none
received Section 236 subsidies. By comparison, HUD has
insured 31,935 units of Section 213 middle income coopera-
tive housing all before 1970 and an additional 1027 units
of Section 236 moderate income cooperatively-owned housing
1
after 1970. Only 378 of UDC's 33,000 total units have
cooperative ownership.
FINANCIAL SOLVENCY
As has been seen thus far the state agencies have
generally fulfilled their public purposes as least as well
as the state agencies. Where their relative effectiveness
is most clear, however, is regarding their financial
solvency. This difference in performance will be seen in
three ways: by comparing their balance sheets, by comparing
their percentage of projects with significant arrearages,
and by comparing their rate of vacancies.
Analysis of Financial Statements
The relative success of most of the state housing
finance agencies compared with HUD in dealing with risk
1
1971 HUD Statistical Yearbook, Table 175, and HUD,
Selected Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance
Programs, 02 Series, December 31, 1973.
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becomes apparent by examining their financial statements.
Unlike the Section 236 component of HUD's balance sheet,
each of the state HFA's has a surplus of assets over
liabilities and with the exception of the New York State
Urban Development Corporation, each still has a surplus
after deducting state appropriations and reserves for
projected losses. Nationwide, HUD's Special Risk
Insurance Fund, of which the Section 236 program is a part,
showed a deficit of over $660 million on June 30, 1974.
(See Table 18.) While most of these losses were concen-
trated in HUD's Section 235 and 223(e) single-family
programs, the Section 236 component showed a loss of $105
million. The primary reason for this deficit is the
large anticipated loss on foreclosed properties and
mortgage notes acquired in lieu of foreclosure. Nationally,
HUD income on Section 236 mortgage loans has exceeded
salaries and operating expenses by about $20 million. HUD,
however, has had to satisfy claims from mortgagees holding
delinquent mortgages totaling $ 234 million. While HUD now
holds the mortgage on or owns these properties, based on
past experience it anticipates that it will be able to sell
them for only about $109million, thereby losing $125 million.
1
HUD Office of Finance and Accounting, Financial Statements,
June 30, 1974, pp.116, 121.
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Table 18
Special Risk Insurance Fund
Statement of Income and Expenses and
Changes in Insurance Reserves and
August 1, 1968 to June 30, 1973 and
(in 1000's)
Borrowings
June 30, 1974
Income
Fees
Insurance Premiums
Other Income
Total Fund
1973
$ 53,498
141,812
2,411
1974
$ 57,552
213,054
1,640
Section 236 Component
1973 1974
$ 49,148
53,255
0
$ 52,997
83,821
3
197,721 272,246 102,403 136,821
Salaries & expenses
Interest on
borrowings
Loss on acquired
securities
Other expenses
Total
Income or loss (-)
Provision for valua-
tion allowance for
estimated future
losses on acquired
property & notes
Insurance reserve or
deficit (-)
Net borrowings from
U.S. Treasury
120,233 183,755
40,828 100,764
91,968 220,843
8,615 9,852
261,644 515,214
62,404
5,572
-1
98,976
16,034
1,982
67,977 116,992
-63,923 -242,968 34,426 19,829
-289,873 -448,402 - 65,101 -125,387
-353,796 -661,370
810,000 1,155,000
- 30,674 -105,558
70, 220* 184,338*
Total Reserves &
Borrowings $456,204 $493,630 $ 39,550* $ 78,780*
*Section 236 component of net borrowings from U.S. Treasury based upon
proportion of section 236 deficits to total fund deficits
Source: HUD Office of Finance and Accounting, Financial Statements,
1973, pp. 114-115 and 1974, pp. 115-116.
Total
Expense
154
The loss that would be attributable to projects insured
by HUD in the states with active housing finance agencies
would be greater than their proportional share of all
Section 236 mortgage insurance written by HUD. While the
HUD offices in the states of Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, and New York had insured a combined
1
total of 18 percent of all Section 236 units, their
projects represented 28 percent of all assignments and
2
foreclosures. Only New York had a lower rate than the
national average. Assuming that the HUD offices in the
five states with advanced HFA's have had income from fees
and insurance premiums and expenses from salaries and
operations in proportion to the number of Section 236 units
they have produced and will incur losses on acquired
securities and related borrowings in relation to the number
of units acquired by assignment or foreclosure, then they
would have had an aggregate insurance deficit for their
Section 236 operations of about $13 million in 1973 ($33
million in 1974).
While Congress had authorized the appropriation of
whatever funds are necessary to meet deficits in the Special
1
HUD, Selected Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage
Insurance Programs, (0-2 Series), December 31, 1973.
Ibid., June 30, 1974.
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Risk Insurance Fund, HUD, thus far, has met its obligations
by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. As of June 30, 1973,
it had borrowed a total of $810 million to meet past and
future insurance claims, of which approximately $70 million
could be considered the share required by the Section 236
program. Undoubtedly, these large borrowings plus the
strong likelihood that they would never be fully repaid
except through direct appropriations were in part responsi-
ble for the suspension and virtual termination of all the
programs constituting the Fund.
As seen by their positive fund balance in Table 19,
each of the HFA's have assets in excess of their liabilities.
In arriving at these balances, accountants for each of the
HFA's have deducted reserves for potential loan losses and
have included losses on seed money loans and direct
development activities in addition to mortgage lending.
While the New York State Urban Development Corporation has
required state grants to keep it in the black, the positive
balance income generated by other HFA's allows a combined
balance sheet for all of the state agencies examined at the
close of their individual 1974 fiscal years to show a
substantial surplus exclusive of state aid.
UDC's balance sheet, as of October 31, 1974, the close
of its fiscal year, showed a positive fund balance of
Table 19
Fund Balances, State Appropriations, and Project Losses
(All dollar figures in 1000's)
Illinois Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey New York New York
HDA HFA SHDA HFAa HFAb UDC
Total Notes and Bonds Out-
standing at end of FY 1974 $202,150 $485,070 $308,431 $297,384 $1,496,402 $1,147,835
Fund balances at end of
FY 1974c 9,056 7,777 12,960 8,673 27,455 787
Fund balance available for
Mortgage Programs 8,694 7,777 6,815 8,673 27,455 787
Balance over Outstanding
Notes and Bonds 4.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.9% 1.8% 0.1%
Total Net State Appropria-
tions & Imputed Interest d
Through End of FY 1974 6,190 0 7,797 718 15,000 27,606
Fund Balances Net of
Appropriations 2,504 7,777 5,163 7,955 12,455 -26,819
Cumulative Project Losses
Included in Fund Balances 572 t 0 0 1,353 0 11,000
Project Loss Reserves Included
in Fund Balances 300e 2,400 2,267 3,999 0 25,850
a New Jersey figures are all FY 1973.
b Includes General Housing, Non-Profit, and Urban Rental Housing programs only.
c Excludes Capital Reserve Fund balances created with bond proceeds.
d Total state appropriations to New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal for administrative
expenses related to limited profit housing programs has been about $22,000,000 from 1961-1973 with interest
imputed at 5% per year. The $15,000,000 represents the amount going toward HFA housing rather than DHCR
housing financed with State Loan funds.
e Housing Development Loan (seed money) losses.
f $167,000 in Housing Development Loan (seed money) losses.
Source: 1974 Annual Reports from each agency.
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$787,000. To enable UDC to have this balance required
regular fund appropriations from the State totalling
$27.6 million, as well as interest-free first instance
2
advances of $55 million. The state-designated purposes
for the regular fund appropriations were: $7,310,000 for
start-up; $11,189,000 for risky and non-revenue producing
projects; $6,300,000 for operating expenses to maintain a
pipeline of projects during the Federal moratorium on
housing subsidies; and $2,807,000 for reimbursement for
costs incurred on projects UDC had to abandon in Westchester
County and elsewhere as the result of limitations placed
3
on the use of its zoning override power. (See Table 20.)
While only the last category clearly allocates UDC's
regular fund appropriations to functions performed in its
role as a developer rather than in the residential mortgage
lender role it shares with the other state HFA's, the major
1
S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., "Consolidated Statements of Assets,
Liabilities, and Fund Balance," in UDC Annual Report, 1974.
In its cover letter transmitting these statements (dated
January 30, 1975), however, the accountant refused to give
an opinion on them. It cited uncertainties related primarily
to UDC's ability to obtain financing to complete its on-going
projects and resultant non-recoverability of deferred costs
(p.65).
2
Ibid. 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1974. By May 1975, it had
provided another $200 million to be lent to UDC through the
newly created Project Finance Agency.
3
Ibid.
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Table 20
New York State Urban Development Corporation
Loss Reserves and Provisions for Loss at October 31, 1974
Mortgage
Loans_
Abandoned Commercial
Developments Leases_ Total
Loss Reserves
Cumulative Loss
Total
$18,150,000 $ 5,650,000 $2,050,000
0 10,300,000 700,000
$18,150,000 $15,950,000 $2,750,000
$25,850,000
11,000,000
$36,850,000
Source: S.D. Leidsdorf & Co. "Consolidated Statements of Assets, Liabil-
ities, and Fund Balances," in UDC Annual Report, 1970-1974.
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portion of UDC's need for such appropriations has resulted
from losses incurred in its role as a developer or as a
commercial mortgage lender. As seen in Table 20, through
October 31, 1974, cumulative losses and loss reserves on
projects abandoned or likely to be abandoned by UDC because
of their infeasibility or social undesirability totaled
$15,950,000. Losses and reserves on commercial projects,
as the result of the bankruptcy of the lessee or other
problems, have amounted to $2,550,000. Together, these
two categories have represented a majority of all of UDC's
losses.
To protect itself against possible losses sustained
in its residential mortgage lending role, UDC has provided
a reserve fund of $18,150,000. While all of these moneys
were still being held in reserve at the close of UDC's
1974 fiscal year, UDC projected that its 62 occupied or
partially-occupied projects would suffer a combined total
of $3,250,000 in initial deficits in excess of the working
1
capital provided in their respective mortgages. Through
staggered rent increases over the first few years of
occupancy, UDC expected to make each of its developments
self-sustaining. The first round of these increases in
1974 was successful in that despite the increases, occupancy
percentages in the problem developments continued to increase
1
Ibid., p.78.
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1
through all of 1974.
UDC's potentially most severe problem, however, is its
Roosevelt Island development in the East River off Manhattan.
UDC expects to finance $350 million of the development's
total projected $400 million cost, and has allocated $6
million as a reserve for potential losses. UDC's account-
ants cautioned, however:
A worsening of the general economic conditions or
other factors may alter marketing plans from those
inherent in the projections made by the Corporation.
The projections are based on the assumption that
there will be rent up periods of from twelve to
eighteen months at an average monthly rental or
carrying charge ranging from $115 to $150 per
room. . . . Because of all of the foregoing, the
Corporation is unable to evaluate the adequacy of
this reserve, and may continue to be unable to do
so until after the projects have reached substantial
occupancy.2
UDC's provision of $8.9 million in reserve for mortgage
losses in addition to its projected losses, however,
indicates a reasonably conservative accounting standard.
The agency that is able to show the highest ratio of
available fund balances to outstanding debt is the Illinois
Housing Development Authority. Much of its reserves,
however, have resulted from state appropriations. The
1
See Report of the Task Force on UDC, p.D.l.35. Also, c.f.
UDC, "Management Status Report" as of September 30, 1974,
and as of December 31, 1974.
2
S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., op. cit., p.76.
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State of Illinois provided IHDA with over $5 million in
appropriations for its Housing Development Revolving Fund,
the primary purpose of which was to provide seed money
loans to nonprofit sponsors. IHDA, however, has been able
to utilize this fund to pay staff salaries and, beginning
in 1974, co-mingle it with what had been its "Mortgage
2
Loan Funds." Nonetheless, despite having to provide for
$872,000 in losses on seed money loans, IHDA was able to
generate a surplus of over $2,500,000 in its own behalf.
The Massachusetts HFA has been even more successful
in producing profits on its own behalf. Without having
received any administrative appropriation from the State,
except for a $400,000 start-up loan which it repaid ahead
of its date of maturity, MHFA has been able to generate a
fund balance of $7,777,000. In addition, it has provided
a "contingency reserve for potential loan losses" of
$1,300,000 (which it actually lists as a fund balance) and
an allowance for potential construction loan losses of
$1,350,000.
1
In addition, IHDA received $1,945,000 to purchase land
(most of which it returned to the State); $646,000 for
grants to community groups; and $800,000 with which it
established a reserve on a particular project.
2
See Arthur Andersen & Co., "Statement of Assets and
Liabilities," in IHDA Annual Report, 1973 and 1974.
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Another state agency to have done well financially is
the Michigan State Housing Development Authority. While
over half of MSHDA's available fund balance has resulted
from state appropriations, MSHDA has produced a surplus of
about $5 million through operations alone. In addition, it
has systematically set aside a reserve of $2.1 million for
mortgage losses and another $167,000 for seed money loans.
The New York State Housing Finance Agency has elected
to reduce mortgage balances and fees rather than to build
up extremely large reserves. While its over $27 million
in reserves are extensive, they represent only 1.8 percent
of the agency's $1.5 billion outstanding in housing bonds
and bond anticipation notes issued over a period of 12
years, and represent only a fraction of what they might
have been had the agency had profit-making as its primary
goal. Between 1970 and 1974, the New York HFA distributed
to housing program mortgagors a total of $52.8 million
1
from earnings on investments. Since these distributions
1
Ernst & Ernst, "Financial Statements and Statistical
Material," New York HFA, Annual Report, 1970, 1971, 1972,
1973, 1974. This use of agency profits to subsidize projects
is similar to certain of the many creative suggestions made
by Peter R. Morris in his book, State Housing Finance
Agencies (D.C. Heath: Lexington, Mass., 1974) for agencies
to create their own subsidies. Rather than use surpluses
in particular projects to reduce rents for all tenants in
the same development, Morris would have these profits go
toward helping tenants who are most in need of assistance,
regardless of in which project they live.
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were applied to just the $628 million in mortgage loans
written during the period, they represented the equivalent
of an 8.4 percent reduction in the amount of these mortgages.
In addition, the New York HFA charges the lowest fees
of any of the HFA's. It requires 0.3 percent of the mort-
gage at closing compared with between 1.0 and 6.0 percent
for the others. (See Table 21.) Its 0.3 percent annual
fee over the life of the mortgage, even when added to the
$4.20 per room supervisory fee collected by the New York
State Division of Housing (the equivalent of about another
0.07 percent of the mortgage), is less than all but one of
the other HFA's. A major reason why the New York HFA and
DHCR have been able to charge such low fees and still make
such large distributions to mortgagors has been the
operating subsidies that DHCR has received from the State.
During the years of 1961 through 1974, the State paid for
about $15,000,000 (including imputed interest) worth of
1
services by DHCR on HFA-financed developments.
Financially, the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency was
one of the strongest HFA's in 1973 (with 1974 figures as
yet unavailable). Its available fund balances of $8.6
million constituted 2.92 percent of its then outstanding
1
See Table 25, footnote C.
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Table 21
Agency Fees
At or Pre-
Initial
Closing
Construction
Loan/Year
Illinois
HDA
Massachusetts
HFA
Michigan
SHDA
New Jersey
HFA
New York
DHCR/HFA
New York
UDC
HUD
a. Includes 2
fee.
2.50%
0.30%
6.00%
4.55% a
0.50%
0.30%
0.50%
0.50%
0.25%
0.30% +
$4.20/room
1.00% +
$6.00/room
0.50%
percent financing fee and 1.75 percent FNMA/GNMA
Sources: IHDA, Developer's Handbook; MHFA,"Operation Handbook;" MSHDA,
Townhouse Development Process Manual; New Jersey HFA, Guide for
Development of Limited Dividend and Nonprofit Housing; New
York HFA, Interview with Edward Bopp; New York UDC, "Schedule
A;" HUD, Form 2013.
Annual
1.50%
1.00% +
$500
0.50%
3.50%
0.50%
0.50%
0.50%
0.50%
0.50%
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notes and bonds. Only a small part of the New Jersey
agency's favorable balance has resulted from state support,
with $442,000 coming from grants by the State Department of
Community Affairs for administering its seed money fund and
$296,000 coming from interest received on deposits of
Housing Assistance Bond proceeds. A total of $128,000 of
this interest went to aid sponsors in meeting debt service
1
payments.
The other substantial loss incurred by the New Jersey
HFA came as the result of its having to terminate one of
its unsubsidized mortgages and was absorbed by reserves
created from its profits. In the rent-up of one of its
early developments, the Madison House in Atlantic City,
the New Jersey HFA realized that continued operation of
the project would result in further deficiencies in meeting
debt service requirements. This 189 dwelling unit rehabili-
tation development for the elderly had been saddled with
the cost of special services, comparable to those found in
nursing homes, which had to be met by rents. Rather than
provide the development with a permanent mortgage as it had
previously committed itself to do, the New Jersey HFA
1
New Jersey HFA, 1973 Annual Report, p.26. See p. 202
infra. for a discussion of the New Jersey Housing Assistance
Bond program.
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accepted a $1,225,000 loss on the construction advances it
had made and the sponsor received a far lower mortgage
1
elsewhere.
Problem Projects
The state HFA's, while having a number of "problem"
projects, have had far fewer than HUD and their problems
have been generally less severe. The data for reaching
this conclusion is a listing obtained from each state
agency of every development in arrears in meeting current
or past due debt service payments by more than 90 days and
a listing of all HUD Section 236 projects with equivalent
arrearages as shown by defaults, modifications, assignments,
and foreclosures. Default on a HUD project simply means
that the mortgagee has reported that the project is
delinquent in meeting debt service payments. Apparently,
however, not all projects that have missed debt service
payments are listed as defaults. The Boston Urban Observa-
tory found in its study of subsidized, HUD-insured,
multi-family housing in the Boston area that:
1
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Financial Statements in
New Jersey HFA, Annual Report, 1972, p.24 .
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While half of the developments in the study
sample showed mortgage default, assignment, or
foreclosure, detailed cash flow analysis
indicated that three-fourths of the projects
were losing from $60 - $300 per unit per year.
Only three developments (out of 36 in the sample)
had positive cash flow.1
Still, only those HUD projects that have reported being in
default for over 90 days will be counted as being a
"problem" project.
The next phase for a "problem" project in the HUD
system is assignment. When the mortgagee decides that the
project is hopelessly in arrears, it submits an insurance
claim to HUD and assigns all rights as mortgagee to HUD as
well. Virtually all projects in assignment can safely be
assumed to have been in arrears by at least 90 days.
Foreclosure occurs when HUD takes full title to the
2
property and can then sell it on the open market. Once
foreclosure occurs, the developer loses all of his ownership
interest in the project and all subsidy payments are
terminated. While HUD had decided to foreclose on all
mortgage notes it had received through assignment, the
hardships that loss of subsidies would impose upon tenants
1
Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p.165. Since their
study sample focused primarily on core area projects financed
largely under the Section 221(d)3 program, their data regard-
ing defaults, assignments, and foreclosures differs from
that of the same area office under the Section 236 program
as a whole.
2
HUD Financial Statement, as of June 30, 1974, assumes that
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has led Congress to successfully pressure HUD to refrain,
at least temporarily, from proceeding to foreclose on most
1
of these assigned properties.
The only other category of potential "problem" projects
are those that have undergone a mortgage modification.
Projects receiving such modifications have been allowed to
defer making up old arrearages until some distant future
date, provided they continue to meet current debt service
requirements.
One adjustment that has to be made in comparing the
data on HUD "problem" projects with that on HFA projects
relates to the time period over which the loans have been
outstanding. At least over the first few years, the longer
that a project is in occupancy, the greater the likelihood
it will experience problems. Since HUD, with its on-going
organization, was able to begin implementing the Section 236
program at an earlier date than most of the state housing
finance agencies, data on those HUD projects that began
construction prior to June 1970 were ignored despite the
fact that they had an extremely high rate of problems,
HUD can recover about 60 percent of its investment through
such a sale (p.115).
1
Housing and Development Reporter, May 10, 1975, p. 1038.
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while all of the uninsured HFA Section 236 developments
that had reached initial occupancy were included. Because
of differences in the accessibility of data from various
agencies at the time the data was being collected, the HUD
data is as of January 31, 1975 while the HFA data is as of
either February 28 or March 31, 1975. The result of all
of these differences in dates is that the average period
over which both the HFA and HUD mortgages being compared
have been outstanding is virtually identical.
As seen in Table 22 the state HFA's have had signifi-
cant problems on only 5 percent of their Section 236 units
compared with HUD which has had problems on 21 percent.
While UDC appears to have had a significantly lower inci-
dence of problem projects than its HUD counterparts (13
percent to 20 percent), the exclusion of UDC reduces the
HFA rate of problems to an insignificant one percent.
While most of UDC's problem projects fall into that
category because they were currently behind in meeting debt
service requirements, certain of their projects fall into
that category because of projected future deficits. Rather
than set initial rents at a level that will pay all expenses,
UDC has adopted a policy of providing a working capital fund
of about three percent on each project to artificially lower
rents during the initial period of occupancy. The problem,
however, is that as the working capital is depleted, rents
have to increase to meet on-going expenses. On certain
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Table 22
Section 236 Dwelling Units in "Problem Projects" by Agency
Defaults
Arrear-
Date of ages Over
Data a 3 mos.
Modif i-
cations
3 mos.
Total
Assign- "Prob-
ments lems"
Total
236
Units
"Problems"
as % of
Total
HFA's
Ill. HDA
Mass. HFA
Mich SHDA
NJ HFA
NY HFA
NY UDC
Total
HUD
Illinois
Mass.
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
1-75
1-75
1-75
1-75
1-75
Total
2717 0 0 2,717 55,900 5%
821 310 553 1,684 10,200 16%
1205 1040 557 2,802 12,200 23%
1386 700 1,042 3,128 13,200 24%
49 430 334 .813 3,700 22%
1386 835 460 2,612 12,800 20%
4,778 3315 2,946 11,039 52,100 21%
a. HUD figures exclude projects that began construction prior to June 1970
while HFA figures include all Sec. 236 projects.
b. Projects that reached initial occupancy prior to date data collected.
c. Excludes arrearages and modifications on HUD insured units where HUD
has ultimate responsibility.
d. Excludes 523 units receiving subsidies to help meet debt service.
e. Projected arrearages (see note f) and unit count apply to projects with
initial occupancy prior to December 1974.
f. Includes projected arrearages upon depletion of working capital on 439
units not currently in default.
Sources: Telephone interviews with state HFA financial officers; infor-
mation obtained from HUD Office of Management Information Field
Support and HUD Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance
Programs, (02 Series), June 30, 1974.
2-75
2-75
3-75
3-75
2-75
3-75e
0
588
1 1 0 c
Od
0
2019f
0
588
110
0
0
2,019
4,200
10,400
7,300
7,400
11,500
15,100
0
6%
1%
0
0
13%
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developments UDC anticipates that it will be unable to raise
rents sufficiently to cover operating expenses by the time
the working capital is depleted. Consequently, while UDC
has allocated reserves for this purpose, certain developments
are listed in Table 22 as being "problems" because of anti-
cipated shortfalls. While UDC has scheduled rent increases
on virtually all of its projects at about the rate of
inflation, if this schedule cannot be implemented, then
UDC's rate of problem projects will increase. Still,
given the fact that UDC has produced the highest percentage
of projects in risky inner city poverty or urban renewal
areas of any agency, its rate of problem projects, particu-
larly in comparison with HUD, has been low.
Vacancy Rates
An analysis of vacancy rates again supports the propo-
sition that most of the state agencies have produced
developments that are more financially sound than those of
HUD. The conclusion can be drawn despite the fact that
vacancy information was obtained for every HFA development
but for only selected HUD developments. Information was
available on only those HUD developments whose managers
submitted an "Occupancy Report" (Form 9801) to the local
HUD office and subsequently to the HUD central office.
Since a highly disproportionate number of HUD projects in
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financial difficulty as seen by later defaults, assignments,
and foreclosures failed to report occupancy figures, the
HUD figures presented in Table 23 present a picture of HUD
occupancy patterns that undoubtedly have been underestimated.
Nonetheless, vacancy rates on HFA developments are at least
two percentage points lower than those of HUD in eight of
the eleven area offices where comparisons are possible.
The Massachusetts HFA, largely because of vacancies
scattered in a number of its mixed developments, has a
vacancy rate that is no lower than that reported to HUD
(although still a modest 2.7 percent). The New York State
UDC is the one state agency to show a significantly higher
rate than HUD in any area office. While having a lower
rate than HUD in the New York City area and only a slightly
higher rate in the Albany area, UDC has encountered severe
vacancy problems in the Buffalo area where its overall
vacancy rate was 21.4 percent compared with 6.2 percent for
projects reporting information to HUD.
EFFICIENCY MEASURES
Processing Time
An examination of the time taken by the HFA's and HUD
to process applications based upon dates provided for the
submission of the initial application by the sponsor and
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Table 23
Vacancy Rates by Agency
HUD-Insured Section 236 Developments
And All HFABFinanced Developments
HFA
Mean
Vacancy
Rate*
SD N Mean
Vacancy
Rate
HUD
ilinois
Chicago
Springfield
Massachusetts
Boston
Michigan
Detroit
Grand Rapids
New Jersey
Newark
Camden
.022 .039 _44
..2W .029 4
.027
.044
.086
.041 37 .026
.032 .024
.043 .040
.003 .010 15
.000 .000 1
.045 18
.065 15
.046 12
N/A
N/A
.013 .032 7
.020 .030 15
New York-DHCR
New York City
Albany
Buffalo
New York-UDC
New York City
Albany
Buffalo
.008
.026
.000
.029
.068
.214
.021
.059
.000
.024
.043
.215
12
6
3
14
15
7
.046
.057
.060
.046
.057
.060
.163
.095
.062
.163
.095
.062
17
8
4
17
8
4
*Includes projects that achieved 95 percent occupancy or have
been substantially completed for at least one year.
Source: Occupancy reports by individual agencies, mid-1973 for HUD, late
1973 and 1974 for HFA's.
SD N
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date of initial closing yields mixed results. Overall,
as seen in Table 24, no significant difference was found
in the amount of time taken by the state agencies compared
with the time taken by HUD. One state agency, the Massa-
chusetts HFA, which processed applications in an average
of 12.8 months, was found to be faster than its HUD
counterpart to a highly significant degree. Another state
agency, the New York Division of Housing and Community
Renewal, with an average processing time of 32.0 months,
1
This finding contradicts a widely circulated myth that
the state agencies invariably operate more expeditiously
than their HUD counterparts. This myth began as a result
of HFA responses to a questionnaire circulated by UDC in
March, 1973, asking each agency how long it took to process
applications as well as, if possible, comparable figures for
HUD. Given the short amount of time the HFA's had to
prepare the questionnaire and the public relations use to
which it was to be put, rather than calculate the actual
time, each agency made an estimate of their own processing
time, all of which were low. The one HFA to estimate HUD
processing time, overestimated it. HUD, in its own restudy
of national housing during the moratorium, Housing in the
Seventies (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp.5-13, also claimed
that the state agencies were significantly faster than
HUD. While it cited a report prepared for it by Booz,
Allen, and Hamilton, the figures it used were taken from
the UDC survey. The report of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton,
"Comparative Analysis of Federal and Nonfederal Government
Housing Program Procedural and Managerial Implementation"
(Washington, mimeographed), pp.III(l)-III( 3 ), actually
found no significant difference in processing time.
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Table 24
Comparison of Average Processing Time in Months
For HFA's and HUD From Date of Initial Application
To Date of Initial Closing
Mean SD Difference1 Significance
of Difference
Illinois
IHDA
HUD
Massachusetts
MHFA
HUD
Michigan
MSHDA
HUD
New Jersey
NJHFA
HUD
New York
DHCR
HUD
UDC 2
15.2 5.5
13.8 5.7
12.8 7.6
21.7 10.7
15.1 6.6
16.0 8.5
20.2 10.0
15.9 7.0
32.0 14.2
17.2 8.2
16. 5 N/A
1. Positive numbers indicate HFA's processing time shorter than HUD's.
2. UDC mean based upon information provided by Irving Coloff, UDC
Director of Construction, based upon UDC survey which found the
average time between awarding of architectural contract and start
of construction being 15-18 months.
Sources: Compiled from dates of individual projects provided by each
agency and HUD, except as noted in footnote 2, above.
-1.4 > .500
112
8.9
0.9
-4.3
-14.7
0.7
< .001
> .500
.094
< .001
> .500
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was found to be slower than the HUD offices in the same
state by an extremely significant margin. None of the
other HFA's had average processing times that were signifi-
cantly different from those of HUD in the same state, with
all ranging from 15.1 to 20.2 months.
Administrative Cost Efficiency
On the whole, the state HFA's have had higher admin-
istrative costs per unit and per project on all of their
multi-family developments than has HUD on its Section 236
and other Special Risk Insurance Fund multi-family develop-
ments, although great variations have occurred among
individual HFA's. While Table 25 shows the state agency as
having costs per unit and per project during the project
development period that are on the order of twice that of
HUD, this average includes the costs incurred by UDC.
Unlike HUD and to a far greater extent than the other HFA's,
UDC generally performs functions normally done by a private
developer. Consequently, UDC's administrative costs during
this phase have been far greater than those of the other
agencies. Leaving UDC aside, however, state agency costs
during the development stage have been about the same as
those of HUD, being slightly lower on a per unit basis ($348
versus $369) and slightly higher on a per project basis
($64,500 versus $44,500).
Table 25A
Administrative Costs by Agency by Stage for Fiscal Year 1973
Project Development Period Project Operating Period
Projs. Units $a nt
Clsd.b Closedb Invlvdc
Cost/
Project
Percent
Cost/ Occ. Occpd. Staff
Unit Prois. Units Invivdc
Cost/ Cost/
Project Unit
State HFA's
Ill. HDA
Mass. HFA
Mich. SHDA
NJ HFA
NY HFA/DHCR
NY UDC
6/30
6/30
6/30
10/31
10/31
10/31
HFA Total
$ 1,264,000
1,211,000
2,327,000e
1,312,000f
2,300,0009
10,215,000
$18,629,000
11
36
19
14
15
40
3,160
6,742
2,300
2,663
2,750
10,140
61%
68%
63%
85%
80%
95%
135 27,755 85%
$ 70,100 $244
22,900 122
76,700 635
79,700 419
122,700 669
242,600 957
$117,700 $573
7
48
28
22
64
23
192
1,308
6,111
3,923
5,017
54,669
5,558
39%
32%
37%
15%
20%
5%
76,586 15%
$45,100
8,600
31,100
8,900
7,200
22,200
$242
63
222
39
8
92
$14,200 $ 36
HUD Office
Chicago 6/30
Springfield 6/30
Illinois 6/30
Boston
Mass.
Detroit
Grand Rapids
Michigan
Newark
Camden
New Jersey
NY City
Albany
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
6/30
Buffalo 6/30
New York 6/30
HUD Total
789,000 20
206,000 6
995,000 26
1,540,000
1,540,000
499,000 18
414,000 11
913,000 29
2,377
410
2,787
83%
85%
83%
22 3,004 88%
22 3,004 88%
2,508
1,071
3,579
736,000 8 498
384,000 8 1,053
1,130,000 16 1,551
1,331,000
68,000
436,000
1,835,000
$ 6,413,000
90%
82%
87%
76%
78%
77%
2,238 80%
776 54%
6 1,014
27 4,028
90%
81%
120 14,949 83%
$ 32,700 $276
29,200 427
31,800 296
61,600 451
61,600 451
25,000 179
30,900 317
27,400 222
69,900 1123
37,400 284
54,400 561
66,600 476
7,300 47
65,400 387
55,000 369
$ 44,500 $357
40
21
61
36
36
5,887
1,488
7,375
17%
15%
17%
5,412 12%
5,412 12%
97 10,824 10%
30
127
17
56
73
38
11
4
53
350
3,138 18%
13,962 13%
873 24%
1,803 22%
2,676 23%
4,306
1,313
631
6,250
35,675
20%
46%
10%
19%
16%
$ 3,400
1,500
2,800
$ 23
21
23
5,100 34
5,100 34
500 5
2,500 24
900 9
10,400 202
1,500 47
3,600 97
7,000 62
2,800 24
10,900 69
6,600 56
$ 3,100 $ 30
(Please see following page for footnotes)
Fiscal
Year
Closing
General
Admin.
Expensesa
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Footnotes to Table 25A
a. Includes salaries, benefits, fees, and other overhead
(except office rent) attributable to multi-family
programs. See Table B for computation of HUD figures.
b. Includes permanent, seed, and construction loans -- HUD
projects are multi-family under the Special Risk Insur-
ance Fund including primarily Section 236 but also
Section 223(e), 223, and 235(i).
c. HFA staff allocations between stages based upon an
examination of organization charts with processing and
construction personnel allocated to development period
and marketing and management personnel allocated to*
project operation period. HUD allocations based upon
time sheets as stated in HUD.
d. Projects in occupancy by the middle of the fiscal year.
e. Excludes single-family costs based upon percentage of
staff involved per organization chart.
f. Excludes expenses for all programs other than limited
profit housing by analysis of organizational chart.
g. Total operating expenses including deferred expenses
equal $12,777,000. Of this amount about $1,000,000
represents office rent and about $1,562,000 (13 percent)
represents costs attributable to commercial projects
based upon an analysis of a listing of UDC personnel
by division.
Table 25B
Calculation of Manyears for Hud Local Offices
For Functions Comparable to Those Performed by State Housing Finance Agencies
A Hsg. Prod. & Mort. Credit-
Spec. Risk Insur. Fund* Projects
B Hsg. Prod. & Mort. Credit-
Rent Supplements
C Hsg. Mgt.-Spec. Risk Insur.
Fund* Projects
D Hsg. Mgt.-Rent Supplements
E Total Comparable Direct
Functions (A+B+C+D)
F Non-Related Functions
G Overhead-Local Office**
H Total Local Office (E+F+G)
I Overhead-Regional Office
(@ 13.9% of H)***
J Overhead-Central Office
(@32.1% of H)***
K Total Attributed Manyears
(H+I+J)
L Total Overhead (G+I+J)
M Percent of Comparable Functions
to all Functions E/ (E+F) /
N Overhead Attributed to Compar-
able Functions (L x M)
0 Total Comparable Manyears (E+N)
Boston Camden Newark NY City Buffalo Albany
52.2 11.0 22.3 36.4 14.3
0.9 0.1 0.4
5.0 1.1 5.5
2.3 2.0 2.0
60.4
192.6
15.1
14.2
116.9
6.5
30.2
215.5
11.5
0.7
6.2
3.3
46.6
184.8
19.3
0.9
Grand
Detroit Rapids
Spring-
Chicago field
1.4 19.3 13.1 25.2 7.1
0.0 0.8 0.7
1.4 0.8 0.9 2.4
0.3 0.4 1.3 0.7
16.9
113.2
8.4
2.6
47.6
0.0
22.3
446.4
17.7
16.9
66.7
0.7
0.7 0.0
3.6 1.4
1.5 0.1
31.0
301.1
18.7
8.6
49.4
1.2
268.1 137.6 257.2 250.7 138.5 50.2 486.4 84.3 350.8 59.2
37.3 19.1 35.7 34.8 19.3
86.1 44.2 82.6 80.5 44.5
391.5 200.9 375.5 366.0 202.3
7.0 67.6 11.7 48.8 8.2
16.1 156.1 27.1 112.6 19.0
73.3 710.1 123.1 512.2 86.4
138.5 69.8 129.8 134.6 72.2 23.1 241.4 39.5 180.1 28.4
23.9 10.8 12.3 20.1 13.0
33.1 7.5 16.0 27.1 9.4
93.5 21.7 46.2 73.7 26.3
5.2 4.8 20.1
1.2 11.6
9.3 14.8
7.9 16.7 4.2
3.8 33.9 24.8 47.7 12.8
*Includes Sections 236, 223 (e), 233, and 235 (j)
**Includes research, equal opportunity, and general counsel
***Based upon national ratios
Source: HUD
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The state agency to have the lowest administrative
costs during the development period, even lower than those
of HUD in any state considered, was the Massachusetts HFA.
Its costs were $122 per unit and $22,900 per project closed.
MHFA's low costs were consistent with its having the
fastest processing time. Also consistent was the fact that
New York DHCR/HFA had the slowest processing time, and,
aside from UDC, the highest administrative costs both per
unit and per project. The other HFA's had development
period expenses per project that were slightly above
average on a per project basis although the Illinois agency's
costs per unit were appreciably below average and those of
the Michigan agency were appreciably above average.
During the project operation period, the state agencies
on the whole had considerably higher costs per project than
HUD ($14,200 versus $3,100), but only slightly higher costs
per unit ($36 versus $30). The reason the HFA's have done
so much better on a per unit basis, however, is the extra-
ordinarily large size of some of the projects under the
control of New York DHCR, including the 15,000 unit Coop
City development. Since many of DHCR's developments, par-
ticularly their older ones, are unsubsidized and well
seasoned, they have required relatively little attention.
Leaving DHCR aside, the remaining HFA's have shown consider-
ably higher administrative costs than HUD during both a per
project basis ($18,200 versus $3,100) and a per unit basis
181
($106 versus $30). The Illinois and Michigan agencies have
clearly had the highest costs during the project operation
period, on both a per unit and per project basis, with UDC
having had moderately high costs. The New Jersey and
Massachusetts HFA's have had the lowest costs during this
period among the state agencies (except DHCR), although
1
their costs have been higher than those for HUD.
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY
In assessing the overall effectiveness of the approach
taken by the state housing finance agencies and HUD, certain
differences in the approach and final product can be
ascertained through a case study of a multi-phase develop-
ment actually financed in part with Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency funds and in part with HUD insurance. In
this particular case, the developer applied to HUD for
mortgage insurance and 236 subsidy funds for a proposed
400 dwelling unit project on a single parcel of land it had
under option. When it became apparent that HUD was reluc-
tant to commit sufficient 236 funds to the whole project,
1
The New Jersey HFA has had lower costs than its HUD counter-
parts on a per unit basis, but not per project basis. Even
its per unit costs, however, have been higher than those of
HUD in the five states combined.
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the developer applied to MHFA. Since MHFA was also limited
as to the amount of 236 funds it could commit, the developer
decided to break the project up into two and process with
each agency simultaneously on each portion. The situation
affords an ideal experimental situation where all of the
independent variables have been controlled with exception
of the agency processing the application. Both projects
have the same developer, contractors, architect, manager,
and virtually the same site and timing. All differences
in outcome can reasonably be attributed to differences
between agencies.
From the outside of the buildings, the two sections
appear to be part of the same development with both sections
being architecturally indistinguishable. The MHFA-financed
section does contain a swimming pool, wading pool, and
three small community buildings. These facilities are
available to HUD tenants at a small charge. On the inside
the two developments are similar -- both have electric
ranges, refrigerators, disposals, exhaust fans, and air
conditioning sleeves. However, the state-financed develop-
ment has carpeting but the Federal one does not.
Clearly, the basic similarities between the two sections
show that the range of architectural quality of the dwellings
financed by the two agencies is overlapping. The greater
amount of amenities provided by MHFA represents a real
difference in what that agency and certain other state
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agencies consider to be worthy of inclusion rather than
"extravagant."
A clear difference between the two agencies can be seen
in looking at the length of processing time. While the
developer first submitted an application to HUD five months
before it submitted it to MHFA, initial closing and the
start of construction on the HUD section occurred seven
months after the state section. In all, processing took
sixteen months on the HUD project but only four months on
the state project. Construction on both the HUD and MHFA
sections took seventeen months from start to initial occu-
pancy. The MHFA section proceeded more expeditiously
despite the fact that it contained 288 dwellings compared
with 114 for the HUD project.
The most interesting basis for comparing the two
sections is on the basis of costs. Table 26 give a break-
down of total and per unit developmental and annual costs
for the two sections. For all categories of developmental
costs, except land, the HUD section cost more per unit.
About half of the 11 percent difference in total construc-
tion cost can be attributed to the fact that the HUD units
are on an average somewhat larger in floor area. Yet, even
on a square foot basis, the construction of the HUD section
cost six percent more than the state agency section. As
stated before, the units are otherwise identical with the
exception that the state units contain carpeting, a swimming
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Table 26
Comparative Costs of Project Developed in Part
Through the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
and in Part Through U. S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development
Total Costs Per Unit Costs
MHFA
Development Costs
Construction
Architecture
Interest During Construction
Taxes and Insurance
Legal (including title & recording)
Agency Fees
Builders and Sponsors Profit
Land
Total Replacement Cost
Mortgage Amount
Annual Costs
Full Debt Service
236 Subsidy
Net Debt Service
Operating Expenses
Real Estate Taxes @ 20%
Vacancy Allowance
Return on Equity
Monthly Rent
2 Bedroom
3 Bedroom
Annual Subsidy Costs
$4., 66Oooo
207,000
176,000
35,000
27,000
56,000
552,000
4.09,000
6,122,000
5,510,000
417,100
-249,300
167,800
214, 400
104.,100
24j,700
36,700
547,700
$2,062,000
102,000
136,000
33,000
26,000
144,000
250,000
137,000
2,890,000
2,600,000
242,000
-162,800
79,200
84.,100
44.,600
11,700
17, 300
236,900
$16,180 $18,090
720
610
120
90
190
1,920
1,420
21,250
890
1,190
290
230
1,260
2,190
1,200
25,340
19,130 22,810
870
580
740
360
90
130
1,900
2,123
1,428
695
737
391
103
152
2,078
156.11 169.12
175.11 194.92
Sec. 236 Subsidy
Interest on Bond @ 5.68%
HUD MHFA HUD
249,300
150,200
394., 500
162,800
162,800
870
521
1, 391 1,)428
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pool, a wading pool, and community buildings. The developer/
contractor was clearly able to make a higher rate of profit
on the construction of the HUD section than on the MHFA
section.
From the point of view of the tenants, the state agency
gave those living in the state section more amenities and a
somewhat lower cost. The higher architectural costs on the
HUD section largely reflect the higher construction costs
on which the architectural costs are based. Differences
in taxes, insurance premiums, legal fees, and land costs
as shown in the mortgage application largely reflect
differences in what the two agencies would allow for these
items despite the fact that they actually cost the same
per unit on each section. The state agency generally
allows higher land costs than HUD because it prefers
better sites. However, in this case the developer took
advantage of MHFA's willingness to pay slightly higher
land prices to divide up the parcel in such a manner that
more of the land price would be attributable to the state
section. Differences in the builders and sponsors profit
are wholly attributable to differences in other costs. At
both agencies profit was computed at 10 percent of all
non-land costs.
The two items on which state agency developments are
consistently lower than on HUD projects are interest during
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construction and agency fees. In this case the interest
during construction was $1,190 per unit for the HUD section
compared with $610 for the state section. The primary
reason for this variation is the difference in the interest
rate on the construction loan. Interest rates on state
agency bond anticipation notes which are used to generate
construction loan funds is particularly low. Buyers of
these notes are attracted by the short term. Unlike the
savings in interest on permanent financing, which is
balanced by a correspondingly lower interest subsidy,
savings on construction loan financing is passed on to
Section 236 tenants. The savings in this case represent
$1.50 per unit per month.
The difference in agency fees, which is over $1,000
per unit, results largely from the multiplicity of actors
involved on the HUD project, each of whom receives a fee.
HUD received a combined fee of 1.8 percent for mortgage
insurance, examination, and inspection; the construction
lender received a financing fee of 2 percent; FNMA/GNMA
received a 1.75 percent fee for absorbing the permanent
loan at a slightly below market interest rate. By
contrast, MHFA received a fee of only about 1 percent for
inspecting the site, processing the application, making
the construction loan, holding the permanent loan, and
self-insuring both of these loans. Since MHFA performs
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its functions on a self-supporting basis, its relative
efficiency is readily apparent.
The other basis for comparing the two sections is in
terms of subsidy costs. While the MHFA-financed section
bears the inefficiency to the U.S. Treasury of raising
funds through the tax-exempt bond market, the larger direct
subsidy costs required on the HUD section more than offset
the forgone tax revenues. As seen in Table 26, based upon
an assumed average tax bracket of 48 percent for investors
buying MHFA's bonds and based upon the actual 5.68 percent
interest rate the investors received from MHFA on this
particular bond issue, the amount of tax revenues forgone
by the U.S. Treasury on the project amount to $521 per
unit per year. The amount of Section 236 subsidies
required to reduce the interest rate down to one percent
equalled $1,428 per unit on the HUD portion. This differ-
ence is attributable to a combination of HUD's higher mort-
gage amount and its higher interest rate. The total annual
subsidy per unit has thus actually been slightly lower on
the MHFA section. This lower subsidy cost has been seen
to have occurred despite the fact that the rents on the
MHFA section are lower than those on the HUD section and
that the MHFA section has more amenities.
If this same development were built under the Section
8 program, which provides a subsidy based upon the income
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level of the tenant, assuming each had tenants with the
same average income, both sections would have had the same
rents but the HUD section would have required an additional
subsidy of about $150 per unit per year to realize these
same rents. If rather than selling tax-exempt bonds, MHFA
would have received the 33 1/3 percent direct subsidy
provided in Section 802 of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, the cost of its section to the
U.S. Treasury would drop by $158 per unit. Rather than
losing $521 in forgone revenues, the Treasury would have
had to pay out only $363. Thus, despite the inefficiency
in the mechanism used by the HFA's to finance their
developments, MHFA's own efficiency was able to provide
better housing at a lower cost to the tenant and govern-
ment. The newly enacted subsidy mechanisms will only
increase their relative efficiency.
Chapter Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the HFA's
have been generally more effective than HUD in that they
have done about as well as HUD in fulfilling the public
purposes they share with HUD, while being more effective
in maintaining fiscal solvency. The HFA's and HUD were
seen to have done equally well in terms of the volume of
housing they produced for moderate income families and
locating that housing in slum areas and close to jobs.
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While the HFA's performed somewhat better at providing
racially integrated housing, HUD housed more minority
families. The HFA's have clearly provided better designed,
larger, and more luxurious housing, although often at a
higher cost per unit. Still, this housing has had
equally low rents and has more frequently been available
to genuinely low income families. In the case study the
rents and project costs were actually lower on the HFA-
financed section.
While the HFA's were seen to have performed better than
HUD with regard to such local public purposes as providing
mixed income and elderly housing, they have performed less
satisfactorily with regard to such non-statutory national
goals as property rehabilitation and to a lesser extent
the housing of large families.
In terms of financial solvency, the HFA's were found
to have had a better record at meeting their own operating
budgets and in avoiding problem projects and high vacancies.
The findings with regard to financial solvency were seen to
have been far stronger when UDC is excluded. The remaining
HFA's, however, have produced a lower overall total number
of moderate income units than their HUD counterparts and
a lower percentage in inner city "slum" areas.
The next six chapters will discuss reasons for the
observed variations in effectiveness.
CHAPTER 5
ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK
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Part of the reason for the differences seen in the
relative effectiveness of the state housing finance agencies
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development is
their respective roles in the public purpose housing
development process. The basic role played by the HFA's is
that of a mortgagee, while the basic role played by HUD
is that of an insurer of mortgages. As a mortgagee, the
HFA's provide their own funds to projects, while as an
insurer, HUD insures the funds advanced by others. As will
be seen in the next chapter, the ability of the HFA's to
obtain loanable funds through the tax-exempt securities
markets provides them with both special opportunities and
constraints.
Despite differences in their basic roles, both the
HFA's and HUD must assume full ultimate risk should a
project fail. The HFA's must either provide their own
funds to keep the project afloat or foreclose on the mort-
gage and sell it for whatever the market will bring. Should
mortgage payments continually be missed on a HUD-insured
development, HUD would have to take over the mortgage and
reimburse the mortgagee for loss. Unlike most private
mortgage insurers, HUD agrees to provide reimbursements up
to the full amount of the mortgage.
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HFA-financed or HUD-insured developments can fail to
meet their debt service requirements for a number of
reasons. As in conventionally financed developments, a
high vacancy rate, non-payment of rent by tenants, low
rent levels in relation to expenses, the inability to raise
rents because of low tenant incomes, or mismanagement can
all lead to problems. Many of the public purpose goals of
the state agencies and HUD magnify agency risks. Slum area
rebuilding, racial integration, income mixing, rehabilita-
tion, and the housing of low income and large families are
all goals that can increase risks. Consequently, on
conventional developments private lenders and developers
generally avoid developments that would serve these goals.
While the subsidies provided in public purpose developments
to reduce rents might appear to lower the risk of high
vacancies, the income limitations, at least in the Section
236 program, restrict the available market and require a
1
rent-to-income ratio of at least 25 percent.
In terms of managing risks, as will be seen in this
chapter, more important than the basic role of the HFA's
1
The new Section 8 program, however, sets the rent-income
ratio at 15 to 25 percent, depending upon family size,
and maintains it at that percentage even if subsidies have
to be increased to meet rising expenses.
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and HUD is the way in which they each play their role. Both
mortgagees and insurers can utilize the same techniques for
controlling risks, although the mortgagee role has made it
easier for the HFA's to become actively involved in projects
and thereby control the underlying factors creating risk.
The role that has made a difference in terms of ability
to manage risk is the developer role played by the New York
State Urban Development Corporation in addition to its role
as a mortgagee. Prior to the start of construction UDC
assumes all of the risks normally taken by a private developer.
Because of the large required investment and uncertainties
related to establishing the ultimate feasibility of a
development, these risks are generally high. By providing
loans on unfeasible or high risk projects, a mortgagee
can reduce the risk of abandoned projects for the developer.
While the twin roles of mortgagee and development initiator
played by UDC need not make a difference in the way in which
it plays its role as a mortgage lender, as will be seen, on
occasion, particularly during its early years, UDC has made
mortgage loans on risky projects to preserve its investment
made in its role as a developer.
Still, the HFA's as a group, have effectively managed
the risks of public purpose development lending. As seen
in Chapter 4, they have fulfilled the risky public purpose
to about the same extent as HUD while sustaining fewer
losses in their role as a mortgagee on uninsured loans
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compared with HUD in its role as a mortgage insurer. In
particular they have performed as well as HUD in rebuilding
slum areas, better in providing low income, economically
mixed, and racially integrated housing, but not as well in
promoting rehabilitation and housing for minorities and to
a lesser degree large families. Leaving aside UDC because
of its unique role as a developer, the remaining HFA's, as
a group, have taken less risks with regard to slum rebuilding
and roughly equivalent risks with regard to the other public
purposes, but have had far greater success in maintaining
the financial solvency of their developments and operations.
The primary reason for the success of the HFA's in
controlling risk rests in the techniques for risk manage-
ment they have adopted. While their public purpose goals
have kept them from using all of the same techniques as
private mortgagees, their techniques have largely been a
function of their mortgagee role. Generally, lenders,
insurers, and developers use five basic means of managing
risks, although each actor finds certain means better suited
to its role than others. The five means are:
1) Avoiding risky situations;
2) Establishing reserves to meet losses;
3) Spreading the risk over a large number of developments;
4) Passing the risk along to someone else; and
5) Controlling the underlying factors which create the
risk through active involvement.
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Each of the methods of managing risk will be discussed in
turn with the greatest attention focused on the method of
active involvement, the method most fully developed by the
HFA's.
AVOIDING RISKY SITUATIONS
The avoidance of risky situations is the method of
managing risk most frequently used by private mortgagees
and insurers. Rather than absorb the risks of lending in
inner city areas, for example, private lenders will redline
these areas and refuse to lend in them. The legislatively-
mandated public purpose goals of the HFA's and HUD, however,
limit the degree to which they can avoid risky situations
and be successful. Still, certain HFA's have practiced
risk avoidance. Rather than satisfy their public purpose
of rebuilding slum areas by building in the riskiest areas
having the highest concentrations of poverty, the HFA's
have more frequently built in somewhat less risky urban
renewal areas where a public commitment has been made to
rebuild the neighborhood in its entirety. Certain HFA's
have even avoided urban renewal areas. As was also seen
in Chapter 4, the HFA's have generally avoided the risk of
rehabilitation, at times the risk of housing minorities, and
to a slightly greater extent than HUD, the risk of housing
large families.
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To a much greater extent than HUD, however, the HFA's
have taken on the risk of housing genuinely low income
families and largely,but not entirely through the efforts
of the Massachusetts agency,have assumed the previously
unheard of risk of providing housing to a substantial
number of low income families in a predominantly middle
income setting.
One other risk that many of the HFA's have avoided is
that of working with incompetent, inexperienced, and
underfinanced developers. As will be seen later in this
chapter, the HFA's appear to have developed better pro-
1
cedures for eliminating incompetent developers. As seen
in Table 27, with the exception of New Jersey, compared
with their HUD counterparts, each of the state agencies
has provided mortgages to a lower percentage of nonprofit
sponsors, most of whom are inexperienced and underfinanced.
A primary reason generally given for preferring nonprofit
sponsors is that they tend to tackle the more difficult
projects, particularly in terms of location and number of
2
bedrooms. Yet, the two state agencies that have utilized
1
See p. 217 and p.222,infra.
2
See Langley C. Keyes, "The Role of Nonprofit Sponsors in
the Production of Housing," in U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Banking and Currency, Papers Submitted to Sub-
committee on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and
Developing a Suitable Living Environment (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, June 1971), pp.1 59-183 .
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Table 27
Number of Dwelling Units by Profit
Orientation of Sponsor by Agency on
Projects Closed between January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1973
State Housing Finance Agencies
Profit Non- Profit Non-
Motivated Profit Motivated Profit
Illinois HDA 91.3% 8.7% Illinois 56.8% 43.2%
61.91 591 7811 5951
Massachusetts HFA 97.7% 2.3% Massachusetts 74.1% 25.9%
17049 410 11062 3868
ichigan State 82.1% 17.9% Michigan 60.6% 39.4%
5379 1174 12205 7946
New Jersey 41.4% 58.6% New Jersey 67.1% 32.9%
4756 6744 3988 1951
New York 58.5% 41.5% New York 48.2% 51.8%
OHCR-HFA
10797 7674 8485 9115
ew York 99.1% 0.9%
JDC
32737 300
otal 82.0% 18.0% Total 60.2% 39.8%
All HUD
1(6 Agencies) 76909 16893 (5 States) 43551 28831
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a substantial proportion of nonprofit sponsors, the New
Jersey HFA (58.6 percent) and the New York HFA (41.5 per-
cent), were seen in Table 15 to have financed the lowest
percentage of units with three or more bedrooms and in
Table 6 to have provided an average or below average
percentage of units in slum areas.
The other reason for preferring nonprofits is that
they better provide community input. The two state
agencies that have worked with the fewest number of non-
profit organizations, however, have found alternative
means of providing community input into their developments.
The New York State UDC sets up a community advisory board
for each of its developments to serve as a vehicle for
community input. The Massachusetts HFA has worked with
several community organizations that have formed limited
partnerships rather than remain as nonprofit entities so
that they are able to channel tax shelter proceeds into
their projects. Two other state agencies which have also
provided mortgage funding for only a relatively small
percentage of nonprofit groups, the Illinois Housing
Development Authority and Michigan State Housing Develop-
ment Authority, have provided considerable assistance to
nonprofits in other ways. Both operate seed money funds
from which they lend money to nonprofit sponsors to enable
them to pay the cost of such development expenses incurred
prior to construction as land acquisition and certain
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architectural fees. While seed money loans are inherently
more risky than permanent mortgage loans, the Illinois and
Michigan agencies make these loans using funds that were
specially appropriated by their legislatures for this
purpose. When the same nonprofit sponsors seek permanent
financing, however, which would have to come from funds
that must be repaid to bondholders, the Illinois and
Michigan agencies have generally directed them to HUD.
ESTABLISHING RESERVES
The establishment of reserves to meet losses is a
technique of risk management practiced in various ways.
In one respect, the public purpose goals of the HFA's and
HUD limit their ability to establish reserves. Without
mortgage insurance, private lenders generally will provide
a mortgage of no more than 70 to 80 percent of the value
of the completed development. The 20 to 30 percent equity
requirement on the part of the borrower represents a margin
of protection for the lender. To preserve its equity
investment, the mortgagor will make every effort to meet
the debt service payments. Should the lender have to
1
Lenders generally include an allowance for the developer's
profit in their evaluation, thus allowing the cash equity
requirement to be somewhat less than 20-30 percent.
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foreclose on the mortgage, it would need to resell the
property for only 70 to 80 percent of its original replace-
ment cost to recoup its investment. State agencies and
HUD, however, generally provide mortgage loans of 90 per-
cent of replacement cost to limited dividend developers
1
and of 100 percent to nonprofit sponsors. They received
the power to do so in order to attract developers and
sponsors and to reduce the monthly cost to consumers
(since the added debt service is less than would be the
additional return on equity). The lower equity reduces
their margin of safety.
The state agencies and HUD are able, however, to take
advantage of certain other reserves. Each has established
reserves based upon the fees it collects from mortgagors
for the services it renders. These reserves have taken the
form of both the creation of specific funds to meet poten-
tial mortgage losses and the accumulation of general fund
balances that might be allocated for that purpose.
The New York State Urban Development Corporation, New
York State Housing Finance Agency, and Michigan State Housing
1
Developers of limited dividend projects receive a Builders
and Sponsors Profit and Risk Allowance equal to 10 percent
of all costs other than land out of mortgage proceeds on
HUD projects, thus reducing their cash equity to at times
as low as 1 percent. The state agencies generally make
similar allowances. The New Jersey and both of the New York
agencies provide 95 percent mortgages.
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Development Authority have each included reserve funds in
their mortgage calculations. The two New York agencies
establish working capital reserves equal to about three
percent of the mortgage. UDC uses this allocation more as
a means to reduce rents during the initial years of project
operation than as a reserve. In calculating the amount of
rent charged at the outset of project operation, UDC
assumes that most of the working capital fund and net
interest earned on it will be available to help meet debt
service requirements during the initial years of occupancy.
Because the amount of the Section 236 subsidy has depended
upon the amount of the mortgage, the addition of working
capital funds to project mortgages has increased the amount
of subsidy. Still, the amount of working capital included
in the mortgage must be repaid. While MSHDA and the New
York HFA budget their projects to repay this added debt
service over the life of the loan, UDC budgets its projects
so that rents will eventually have to be increased to allow
all expenses to be met from rents.
State appropriations have enabled the Illinois Housing
Development Authority to make a grant of over $800,000 to
1
See p.207 infra for discussion of MSHDA Development Cost
Escrow Reserve.
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one sponsor to use as a reserve fund. The Woodlawn Community
Development Corporation received this grant to use in
connection with its IHDA-financed Jackson Park Terrace
development located in a model cities/urban renewal area
of Chicago, at the edge of a census tract with more than a
quarter of the households having incomes below the poverty
line. Both the Corporation and the Authority must concur
on any expenditures of these proceeds. Through the end of
1974, none of these funds had been drawn down. Still, had
it not been for the availability of these funds, undoubtedly
IHDA would have refrained from making the mortgage invest-
ment.
The New Jersey HFA has been able to use that state's
Housing Assistance Bond fund as reserves. In 1968 the New
Jersey electorate created this fund when it approved the
issuance of $12.5 million in State general obligation bonds
for the purpose of facilitating the construction of
socially desirable but economically marginally-feasible
developments. Projects assisted must be located in inner
city areas or have a high bedroom count. Two mechanisms
have been used to assist these developments, grants and
second mortgages. A total of $1.5 million in Housing
1
New Jersey voters defeated a similar issue in November, 1974.
203
Assistance Bond funds were placed in a special reserve
account backing an early HFA moral obligation bond issue.
A total of $107,000 per year in interest earned on funds in
this account has been used to assist project sponsors in
meeting debt service payments.
The remaining $11 million of Housing Assistance Bond
proceeds have gone toward facilitating marginally feasible
developments through the provision of second mortgage loans
on a 40-year, non-interest bearing basis to nonprofit
sponsors or a 5-6-year, low interest basis to limited
dividend sponsors payable out of the return on equity.
While these loans have gone to HFA-financed developments,
two privately financed projects received a total of $400,000
during the early years of the Housing Assistance Bond pro-
gram. One of the HFA projects receiving assistance from
the program was the Madison House. The $125,000 interest-
free second mortgage it received was absorbed as a loss to
the Housing Assistance Bond program upon termination of
the senior mortgage commitment, thereby reducing the loss
occuring to the Agency's general operations accounts.
Should all other risk management techniques fail, each
agency presumably can fall back on legislative commitments
to replenish reserves. Congress has promised HUD to fund
all losses in its Special Risk Insurance Fund while each of
the state legislatures with advanced HFA's have promised to
restore deficiencies in reserve funds required to meet debt
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service on HFA bonds in the coming year. Since legislatures
cannot bind future legislatures to make appropriations,
these commitments are only "moral commitments." Rather than
call upon Congress to honor its explicit commitment, HUD
has been meeting deficits in its Special Risk Insurance
Fund by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. Through June 30,
1974, a total of $185 million in borrowings could be
1
attributed to losses in its Section 236 program. While
no state agency has had to call upon its state legislature
to make up deficiencies in its reserve fund, UDC did
receive a loan of about $200 million from its legislature
in the wake of its note defaults.
Another type of reserve fund required by HUD and all
of the state agencies with one exception is a security
deposit made by tenants at the time they move in to guard
against breakage or nonpayment of rent. The New Jersey HFA
has the strongest requirement in this regard. As advertised
in its 1973 annual report as one of many policies the agency
has adopted to secure the timely payment by the agency to
bondholders, it demands a one month security deposit from
senior citizens and a one and one-half months deposit from
1
See Table 18 supra, p.153.
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1
all other tenants. Each of the other agencies having such
a requirement specifies a one month deposit. The New York
DHCR, in commenting on a proposed but later rescinded HUD
rule forbidding security deposits, stated, "Where there are
no security deposits, vandalism increases, moveouts without
notice increase, and there are no funds to repair the
2
vandalism."
The experience of the Massachusetts HFA, the one
agency to forbid security deposits, however, has been
contrary to that in New York. Despite a large number of
prior objections from managers, MHFA first instituted the
policy on a trial basis for a one year period. During
that year, MHFA received not a single complaint, and so
extended it indefinitely.
SPREADING OF RISK
The spreading of risk over a large number of develop-
ments, the principle behind all insurance, is the primary
technique of risk management relied upon by HUD. HUD's
New Jersey HFA, Annual Report, 1973, p.6 .
2
Housing and Development Reporter, December 12, 1974, p.743.
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national jurisdiction presumably has allowed it to spread
its risks over a large enough number of developments to
achieve actuarial soundness. Yet, as seen by the large
deficit in HUD's Special Risk Insurance Fund, the spreading
of risk is an ineffective technique if used by itself.
It can only succeed if used in conjunction with large
reserves or techniques to limit risks.
SHIFTING RISK TO OTHER PARTIES
The risk management technique of passing the risk
along to another party is perhaps the most common of all
in the development process. Sophisticated developers
are constantly shifting risks to other actors. They take
options rather than initially purchasing land outright;
they hire architects, lawyers, and engineers who will work
on a speculative basis; they purchase liability insurance
to avoid lawsuits. HUD's role as a mortgage insurer, in
fact, is based on the premise that mortgagees will only
provide funds for certain mortgages if they can shift the
risk. Consequently, HUD has taken the view that with
regard to risk, the buck stops here."
Part of the success of the state agencies in managing
risk, however, has resulted from their being able to pass
some of it back to the developer. Unlike HUD, most of the
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HFA's realized that the primary source of profit for
developers was from the sale to equity investors of the
rights to the tax shelter benefits from the depreciation
1
generated by their projects. Some have found that by
restructuring the manner in which the developer receives
these benefits, they can increase the financial security
of the development.
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority has
taken the most sophisticated approach to altering developer
incentives in such a manner as to shift more of the risk
for unsuccessful projects onto the developer.
MSHDA's operating assurance policy, which took effect
in September 1972, requires that developers guarantee that
rents will remain level for the first three years that the
2
development is in operation. To the extent of any
increases in utility costs or real estate taxes, MSHDA
does make an exception and approve a rent increase. During
the second three years of operation, the developer must
1
Sale of these benefits generally provides investors with
an amount equal to 12-18% of the mortgage, Nathan S. Betnun,
"Tax Shelters for the Rich to Rehabilitate Housing for the
Poor" (Unpublished M.C.P. thesis, M.I.T., 1972).
2
MSHDA, "Explanation of Authority Program to Provide
Operating Assurances Under Its Limited Dividend Housing
Program," 1972, unpublished memo.
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continue to be responsible for meeting any operational
deficits. Security for meeting these obligations comes
from a Letter of Credit equal to 2 percent of the mort-
gage posted by the developer during the first three years
and by deferred capital contributions by the equity
investors over the first six years. While the total risk
borne by the developer as a result of these requirements
equals five percent of the mortgage in the first year, it
reduces to zero in equal increments over the six year period.
Operating assurance for years seven through twenty
comes from a Development Cost Escrow contained in the
mortgage. This Escrow, which equals approximately eight
percent of the mortgage in Section 236 developments and
three percent in unsubsidized developments, can be used
to meet operating deficits, pay for capital improvements,
or fund social or physical amenities, whichever is most
pressing at the time. Rather than have the tenants pay
for this Escrow fund through increased rents, the equity
investors must agree to accept a reduction in the budgeted
allowable cash dividend from six percent down to three
1
percent.
1
Michigan State Housing Development Authority, "Explanation
of Authority Program to Provide Operating Assurances Under
Its Limited Dividend Housing Program," 1972. (Mimeographed.)
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Despite all of the guarantees that the developer and
investors must make, the entire operating assurance
package works to their net benefit as well as to the
benefit of MSHDA and the tenants. The greater security
provided to the development protects the investors against
their most severe risk, that of recapture of depreciation
by the Internal Revenue Service in the event of foreclosure.
The extended pay-in period by the investors allows them to
retain their cash for a longer period, and the increased
mortgage provided by the Development Cost Escrow allows
them to take greater depreciation deductions. As the
result of these benefits, the investors should be willing
to increase the amount of capital they contribute to the
developer by more than enough to compensate him in most
circumstances for making the assurances required by MSHDA.
The New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal requires developers to provide a guarantee related
to marketability. For all unsubsidized developments, the
developer must provide a cash escrow or unconditional
letter of credit in an amount equivalent to the loss that
1
See letter from Lybrand, Ross Bros., and Montgomery to
Mr. William G. Rosenberg, Executive Director of MSHDA,
September 20, 1972.
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would result from a 50 percent vacancy rate over a two
year period. Once the project has been successfully
rented, as has occurred in all of DHCR's developments,
the developer receives his money back. DHCR, however,
makes no similar demands on sponsors of subsidized housing.
Another state agency to alter developer incentives in
such a manner as to force developers to assume more risks
should they create non-viable projects is the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency. To assure that the developer has
assets available to bail out a project in financial trouble
during construction and rent-up (generally the most risky
phase), MHFA requires that the capital contributions made
by the investors, rather than be taken by the developer
immediately as profit, be left available for use in the
project to meet unexpected expenses until such time as
MHFA has issued its Certificate of Approval and Acceptance
of the completed project. Another requirement that MHFA
imposes regarding the sale of tax shelter interests by
developers is the prohibition of using the management fee
2
as collateral for payment of cash dividends. In addition
to receiving a share of the tax shelter benefits generated
1
MHFA, "Requirements for Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency Mortgagors Which are Limited Partnerships," no date.
The only exception to this rule is for expenses in connection
with the sale of partnership shares.
2
Ibid.
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from the project, investors also receive a proportionate
share of the cash dividends. While cash dividends consti-
tute only a small fraction of the full return going to the
investors, developers customarily have subordinated the
management fee to guarantee their payment. The result has
often been insufficient funds available to pay for compe-
tent management and additional pressure by management to
raise rents. What the MHFA prohibition of this practice
does is to assure the availability of an adequate manage-
ment budget, particularly when management services are
required to shore up a troubled project, as well as to
require the developer to either use his own resources to
make assurances regarding the adequacy of cash dividends
or to accept a slightly lower price from investors.
MHFA has also shifted risk to developers by requiring
them to provide some form of guarantee regarding increases
in property taxes. Property taxes normally constitute the
cost component most likely to increase and trigger an
increase in rents which tenants will be unable to afford.
MHFA thus requires that the developer secure an agreement
with the local assessors office that tax assessments be
based upon a percentage of gross rents. Since the majority
of the remaining components of rent consists of a fixed
debt service charge, a tax formula of this type makes rent
increases less volatile. Where such an agreement cannot
be reached with the local assessor, MHFA will generally
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require the developer to provide an escrow account as a
guarantee against the need for a rent increase based upon
large tax increases. Since the major risk faced by the
investors is from a foreclosure in the early years of the
project, imposition of this and any other requirement
adding to the security of the project makes it a more
secure investment and presumably would increase the amount
they would be willing to invest.
Still another way that MHFA has shifted risk to
developers and managers has been by requiring them to
provide tenants with leases specifying landlord responsi-
bilities that go beyond customary practices. Unlike the
standard lease used by HUD and the other HFA's which uses
fine print and legal language, like "default of a covenant,"
"subordinate to a lien," and "possession of the demised
premises," to spell out rights (nearly all of which accrue
to the landlord) and responsibilities (nearly all of which
accrue to the tenant), the "MHFA Model Occupancy Agreement"
uses layman's language to balance the rights and responsi-
bilities of both landlord and tenants. In particular, it
requires the management to maintain the building and
grounds in good condition, and to make necessary repairs
within 72 hours or face abatement of rent by MHFA. It
also prohibits rent increases more than once a year or
within twelve months of the initial occupancy of an indi-
HUD, "Model Form of Lease," FHA Form 3133.
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vidual tenant, but allows the management to secure an
eviction order for nonpayment of rent without a hearing.
A hearing before an impartial hearing officer, however, must
be granted upon request to tenants being evicted for other
reasons.
While MHFA, in part, regards this shifting of rights
to tenants as satisfying a social purpose, its primary
reason for requiring it is because of the protection it
provides for its own position. Because of the provisions
contained in the lease, the tenants have a strong incentive
to complain to the management about maintenance problems
without the fear of retaliatory eviction or rent increases.
The management has a strong incentive to act on these
problems quickly. To the extent that such action maintains
the quality of the development and its desirability as a
place to live, it protects MHFA's mortgage investment.
While the New York State Urban Development Corporation
is able to shift certain risks normally assumed by mortgagees
to a private developer after constructin begins, prior to
that time UDC, itself, assumes all of the risks normally
absorbed by the developer. In its normal course of business,
UDC first becomes involved with a project following a
request by a municipality for assistance or at UDC's own
initiative. Rather than rely upon a private developer to
absorb the risk and cost of obtaining control of a suitable
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site, drawing the initial plans, preparing a market
analysis, and doing all of the other various tasks normally
performed by the developer prior to the start of construction,
UDC performs these functions itself. Not until just before
construction begins does UDC select a private developer
to build the project and convey ownership to a limited
partnership consisting of the developer as the general
partner and private investors interested in tax shelter
benefits as the limited partners. UDC transfers the risk
of incompletion of construction to the developer by nego-
tiating the sale of the limited partnership interests to
the investors parceling out the developer's fee to him in
proportion to the requisitions made by the construction
contractor. In the event of construction problems, the
2
developer receives no further fees.
DEALING WITH RISK THROUGH ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT
The primary means of controlling risk used by the
state housing finance agencies, however, has been to hand-
1
See Figure 1, p.326,infra.
2
UDC, "Developement Letter" (UDC-DL 1, 12/71).
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craft each project by actively participating in the
development process. The HFA's have been able to do so in
part because their role as a mortgagee, unlike the mortgage
insurer role played by HUD, provides them with a direct
relationship to project activities. While HUD also exerts
controls over projects, even more control than do many
private mortgagees on conventional projects, it does so in
a detached, broad-scale manner, primarily through passive
regulation and often through the intermediary of a mort-
gagee or mortgage banker. Its aim in most instances is
simply to increase the fulfillment of public purposes
rather than to reduce project risks to enable the achieve-
ment of these purposes. One HFA, in characterizing its
own role in the development process as compared with that
of HUD, could have just as easily been describing the role
played by all of the advanced state housing finance agencies
when it said:
MSHDA (The Michigan State Housing Development
Authority) can differentiate itself from FHA
(HUD) in one word -- involvement. MSHDA actively
involves itself in design, in marketing, in the
choice of sites, and the development team selection.
FHA is primarily a reactor to other people's
thoughts and ideas. MSHDA attempts to lead, direct,
and become a co-participant in development, while
recognizing the necessary and valuable skills
possessed 1by the private sector of the housing
industry.
1
Michigan State Housing Development Authority, Response to
UDC questionnaire, March 1973, Sec. IV, Part XIV.
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The experience that state housing finance agencies
have gained from being intimately involved in a larger
number of developments of a similar type than any individual
developer allows them to reduce normal development risks
by anticipating and avoiding problems that might otherwise
occur. Many HFA's become involved in the development
process also for the purpose of ensuring that the develop-
ments they finance better serve the public purpose goals
of the agency. These public purpose goals, however, often
add to the riskiness of the venture. What the HFA's hope
is that their own involvement will either reduce the normal
development risks unrelated to public purposes to such a
degree that the additional risks related to public purposes
can be safely absorbed, or will ensure that the public
purposes will be met in such a manner so as not to
appreciably add to the risks being absorbed by the project.
This section will consider through examples how state
agency participation has been able to reduce normal develop-
ment risks and increase satisfaction of public purposes.
Each stage of the development process will be discussed in
sequence.
HFA Involvement in Site and Developer Selection
Certain HFA's have succeeded in achieving program
goals or reducing risks by actively soliciting proposals
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from developers. William J. White, Executive Director of
the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, found that his
most important role when he first assumed his position was
"hustling business" for the agency. His success in doing
so in part explains why MHFA was seen to have produced the
highest volume of housing per capita of any state agency.
After MHFA became better established White continued
seeking new business, but in a more focused manner. When
the Agency determined that a strong need existed for new
low and moderate income housing on Cape Cod, White phoned
several developers and told them that the Agency would be
eager to fund projects on sites located in that portion of
the state. The result was that several developers took
options on land and MHFA funded construction on six sites.
Similar efforts produced housing in the Lawrence and Lowell
metropolitan areas.
Not only has the "hustling of business" done by MHFA
of late been directed toward specified areas of the state,
but it has also been directed toward specified types of
developers -- those that have demonstrated competence in
building quality housing. While MHFA has provided mortgage
loans to a number of inner city community groups who have
acquired sophisticated technical assistance, a majority of
the developers working with MHFA have been experienced and
financially strong development firms. White has personally
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inspected the workmanship of nearly all potential developers,
and has excluded several experienced developers known for
shoddy work.
The New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal has been actively involved in the initial stage of
projects through its sponsor development unit. This unit,
in conjunction with the state-created Empire Housing
Foundation, actively solicits nonprofit groups to sponsor
housing developments for the elderly. Using specially
appropriated funds, the unit then provides them with
technical and financial assistance in undertaking the
initial architectural, engineering, planning, legal, and
packaging steps necessary to determine project feasibility.
While MSHDA and the Illinois Housing Development Authority
have also used specially appropriated State funds to provide
seed money loans to nonprofit sponsors to pay pre-construc-
tion expenses, neither have been particularly active in
seeking nonprofit sponsors and both have encouraged these
sponsors to apply to HUD for permanent mortgage support
rather than risk funds raised through bond proceeds.
Like most of the older HFA's, many of the newer state
housing finance agencies have also actively encouraged
development in particular parts of their state. The
Alaska Housing Finance Corporation has gone into smaller,
remote communities promoting loans by local banks which
the Corporation could then purchase. Similarly, the West
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Virginia Housing Development Fund has asked developers to
build in rural areas of that state where housing is needed
but not being built.
The ultimate extension of HFA involvement inihe selec-
tion of site and developer is the initiatory role performed
by UDC in its normal course of operation. Rather than wait
for developers to come to it with proposals, on the basis
of a request by a municipality or on its own initiative,
UDC will acquire the site, do all of the necessary planning,
obtain all of the required approvals, and seek out a
developer to construct and own it. While as seen by UDC's
large losses on abandoned projects and more indirectly by
its mortgage risks taken to avoid the abandonment of
particular projects, the assumption of the role of the
developer during the project initiation stage involves
high risks. These risks, however, are far less than
would be required of a private developer involved in the
same project. Indeed, many, if not most, of the projects
successfully completed by UDC were projects that developers
rejected because of their high risks. Particularly during
its early years, UDC frequently worked with municipalities
on facilitating development on urban renewal sites where
no private developer could be found. Its largest under-
1
Report of the Task Force on UDC, p.B.5.13.
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taking, Roosevelt Island, has proceeded despite numerous
unsuccessful prior attempts by private developers and the
City of New York to develop the site.
The reasons why UDC can reduce normal development risks
relate to its powers, position in government, and experience.
At the outset of the development process UDC will generally
sign a memorandum of understanding with the local community
that serves to reduce risks with regard to tax assessments,
the removal of surrounding blight, and the provision of
municipal services. UDC's experience reduces risks con-
cerning the preparation and interpretation of marketability,
financing, planning, and engineering studies. UDC's eminent
domain power eliminates the risks of title problems and
holdouts by individual parcel owners on multi-parcel sites.
Other state agencies have, on a relatively small scale,
engaged in planning and development activities similar to
the ones performed by UDC on a routine basis. The Massachu-
setts HFA has worked with tenants, the housing authority,
and city officials in planning the rebuilding of two large
public housing projects and conversion of them into mixed
income housing. While at this writing one of these pro-
posals is awaiting further steps by the City of Boston, MHFA
See Arnold Yoskowitz, "Roosevelt Island" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1975).
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has secured bids from several prospective developers
interested in working on the other site.
Similarly, the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal initiated the development of several
thousand units of housing in the Inwood-Sherman Creek
section of Manhattan during the late 1950's and early
1960's, some of it before the creation of the New York HFA.
More recently, DHCR initiated planning for the now defunct
45,000 dwelling unit development on Floyd Bennett Field in
Brooklyn.
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority and
the Illinois Housing Development Authority have avoided
similar opportunities afforded them to actively initiate
development. MSHDA has received $2,750,000 and IHDA has
received $1,900,000 in land acquisition funds. All of
MSHDA's funds have been sitting in bank accounts and similar
1
investments, while $300,000 of IHDA's funds were used to
buy a parcel of land on which development has thus far
proven infeasible with the remainder of funds having been
2
returned to the State of Illinois.
1
Arthur Andersen & Co., "Financial Statements," in MSHDA,
Annual Report, 1973, p. 2 8 .
2
Arthur Andersen & Co., "Statement of Income, Expenses and
Changes in Fund Balances," in IHDA, Annual Report, 1973, p.11 .
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In contrast to the activism of many of the state
agencies in selecting developers and sites, HUD has played
a relatively passive role. The HUD Central Office has
attempted to impose an impartiality on local field offices
that has hampered the achievement of certain program goals
and has required local offices to work with many incompetent
or irresponsible developers. The Task Force on Improving
the Operation of Federally Insured or Financed Housing
Programs found that:
From the standpoint of HUD Central Office, the
local field offices are intended to be passive
entities in regard to all multifamily housing
projects. Their purported role is to receive,
review, and pick from among applications from
interested sponsors. They are not to encourage
potential sponsors to select specific geographic
areas or sites. In general, they are to judge each
project as it is presented without making prior
determinations about the skill of builders, mort-
gagees, or architects -- so long as these partici-
pants do not fall within any of HUD's "unsatisfac-
tory" or "unacceptable" categories. . . .
In effect, these directives are unworkable. Local
HUD offices -- particularly the most competent
ones -- have strong beliefs about the geographic
areas in which they would like to see projects
located and the types of projects they would
prefer to have built. They know the local
individuals and entities who work on multifamily
projects, and they have formed judgments about
the skills of these persons and their abilities
to perform according to HUD standards. Without
any venality or corrupt motives, they will --
where possible -- attempt to impose these
judgments on the development of multifamily
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housing projects in the communities under their
jurisdiction.1
The possibilities for local offices to impose their
judgments on the selection of sites or developers in an
active way, however, has been relatively limited. While
HUD regulations do provide mechanisms designed to eliminate
"undesirable" participants, the same task force found some
of them to involve "less than risk-slapping" and others as
2
"classic examples of overkill." Consequently, while
perhaps a slight exaggeration, one official from the Boston
Area HUD Office told the author, "Unlike MHFA, we're stuck
with working with all the developers that walk in the
door." For the most part, imposition of local office
judgments has occurred only in subtle and passive ways.
HFA Involvement in Processing, Design, and Construction
The activisim of the HFA's continues after the
selection of the site and developer. Unlike HUD, which in
many offices works through mortgage bankers, the state
agencies generally work directly with the developer and
the architect.
1
Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of
Federally Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Volume III:
Multifamily Housing, pp.119-120.
Ibid., p.557.
224
The Massachusetts HFA plays a strong role in making
programmatic decisions, but does so in conjunction with the
developer and architect. Agreement on these matters is
reached only after negotiation or at times after MFHA
redesign. MHFA requirments on these matters vary from
from development to development depending upon what appears
to be marketable or socially desirable. On occasion, MHFA
requirements for particular projects will change from
negotiating session to negotiating session in a seemingly
capricious manner.
Unlike at HUD, or the other HFA's, however, negotiation
with MHFA primarily centers around programmatic matters
rather than details, with the details being left to the
discretion of the architect. MHFA, however, reserves the
right to reject the developer's choice of architect. MHFA
reviews estimated construction costs primarily on the basis
of aggregate figures rather than, as elsewhere, on the basis
of individual line items. Contractors, however, do have
to meet MHFA approval based on previous work and do have to
certify each individual cost upon the completion of con-
struction. Despite this seemingly casual approach to
costing, and despite a much higher level of amenities
found in MHFA buildings, MHFA was seen to have been the one
state agency whose average development costs per unit were
as low as those of its HUD counterparts across the state.
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UDC is another state agency to take an activist role
in making programmatic and architectural decisions. It
will hire the architect, perform a market study, and make
such programmatic decisions as the number of units, bedroom
count, density, lay-out, building height, non-housing
facilities, and subsidy mix even before bringing in a
private developer. Because of UDC's activist role in
design, some architects have complained to UDC personnel
interviewed by the author that at times they are unsure
whether they or UDC is designing the development.
The Illinois and Michigan Housing Development Author-
ities have both been more attentive to details in costing
and design, however, largely through third-party review.
Both of them contract out the costing function to private
firms while MSHDA contracts out review as well. The
primary task that these two agencies initiate independently
of the developer is a marketability study. The Illinois
agency even has a separate Site and Market Division whose
primary function is to prepare market studies for each
proposed development. This market study serves as the
basis for determining the optimal number of units, bedroom
distribution, and subsidy mix.
The New Jersey HFA and the New York State Division of
Housing and Community Renewal, like HUD, primarily react to
the programmatic preferences of the sponsors. Since the
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majority of sponsors with which these two state agencies
work are nonprofit organizations, more frequently the
agencies find themselves in a position of limiting the
extent to which their projects will serve public purpose
than in inducing greater social concern. During the con-
struction phase, however, where a for-profit contractor is
invariably involved, both the New Jersey HFA and the New
York DHCR have a full-time inspector on site at all times.
Upon completion of construction, DHCR, using its own staff,
will audit the contractor's books for the project.
HFA Involvement in Rent-Up and Management
The active involvement of state housing finance
agencies is most evident during the rent-up and management
phases. Among the most active HFA's during these phases
is the Michigan State Housing Development Authority. MSHDA
staff people are on site during rent-up, on an almost daily
basis, to assist in the preparation of tenant applications
and the setting up of reporting and accounting procedures.
For new managers, MSHDA provides in-depth seminars on those
and other more basic matters. After initial occupancy,
the number of MSHDA visits to the site tapers off, although
the Authority continues to attend monthly tenant meetings
and provide additional on-site assistance where necessary.
Once a year, MSHDA makes a thorough inspection of all
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buildings, grounds, and systems for items needing mainten-
ance, repair, or replacement. While MSHDA's heavy involve-
ment in project affairs has meant high administrative costs
(over $200 per unit per year), it has alleviated problems
on certain developments that had begun to experience
difficulty in meeting debt service. In one case, for
example, it intervened to require the eviction of certain
tenants that had been disrupting the successful operation
of the project. In another case it determined that utility
costs and property taxes were causing the development an
undue financial strain and so provided funds to pay for
added insulation and negotiated a tax abatement from the
1
local community.
The New York State Urban Development Corporation has
also been highly active in the management of the develop-
ments it has financed, although with greater emphasis on
requiring reports. UDC requires managers to submit three
monthly reports, related to finances, occupancy, and opera-
tions. On the basis of these reports, UDC will take
whatever corrective action it deems necessary. At certain
times, it has transferred funds from reserve accounts to
pay certain bills, and at other times it has taken over
Interview with George Fox, MSHDA Director of Finance.
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complete control of the management of the property or
has required a switch of private managers. Upon visiting
several of UDC's most troublesome developments, the Dunham
Task Force found that UDC's active involvement in project
operations had resulted in such improvements as greater
security, better maintenance, and more effective marketing.
Problems persisted on certain projects, however, primarily
because of undesirable project locations.
Another way in which UDC has been involved in an
active way after occupancy has been through its "live-ins."
With an eye toward improving both the present development
and future developments, UDC senior staff and their
families have spent a few days living in several UDC-financed
apartments. They slept in the developments, used the laundry
facilities, attended tenant meetings, and shared in all of
the other activities of the residents. As a result of their
experiences, they learned such things as to provide more
public telephones and more screens in particular existing
developments, and to provide better noise insulation in all
future developments.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency has actively
been involved in the rent-up and management of developments
1
Report of the Task Force on UDC, pp.D.l.23 - D.1.33.
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in a manner that on the whole, has worked to reduce normal
development risks. As it does with other professionals,
MHFA inspects the prior work of management agents before
allowing them to be hired. Should any problems occur in
rent-up, MHFA's management officer will go out to the site
to check on it. On occasion, it will allocate more subsidy
funds to a mixed income development having difficulties.
As occupancy continues, the management officer will visit
the project approximately once a month. While he will
generally go for a specific purpose, on each visit the
management officer will make an assessment of the quality
of maintenance and of how well the office staff relates
to tenants. Such assessments have led to changes in
management. MHFA has resolved problems in certain buildings
by working with the tenants to gain their concurrence to
significant rent increases, but only after the completion
of repairs by the project owner.
Like the other state HFA's, the New Jersey Housing
Finance Agency plays a relatively assertive role regarding
rent-up and management, at least in comparison to HUD.
The Agency makes a quarterly visit to each development at
which time its primary concern is looking at the books. It
will also make recommendations in such areas as how to
obtain a better price on purchases of materials and how to
handle bothersome tenants.
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The New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal has also played an assertive role in rent-up and
management despite the fact that it allocates the least
amount of dollars per unit to these areas. While the fact
that it visits each development site approximately once
every four to eight weeks provides a rough quantitative
measure of the degree of active involvement in management
by the Division, the manner in which it handles rent
increases provides a qualitative, but more meaningful
measure. New York City law requires that the Commissioner
of Housing and Community Renewal (the chief executive
officer of DHCR) conduct a hearing in the presence of all
interested parties prior to granting any rent increase.
One developer related to the author that on one occasion,
DHCR informally recommended that his management staff
file for a rent increase of $15 per month, despite the fact
that the firm had not contemplated any rent increase until
a few months later, and then only a $10 increase. By the
time the application was filed and proper notice for a
hearing given, two months had passed. At the hearing,
tenants protested that the increase was too great. The
DHCR commissioner agreed, and granted only a $10 per month
increase. The outcome, although certainly achieved in a
manipulative manner, pleased all concerned. It pleased
DHCR and the project owner in that the increase would
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provide sufficient funds to keep the development in a
financially strong position, and satisfied the tenants in
that they had successfully defeated an even greater increase.
While the management staff of the Illinois Housing
Development Authority initially maintained a low profile,
once Irving Gerick became IHDA's executive director in 1973,
it too began to assume an aggressive role. To fulfill its
public purpose objectives, IHDA takes the initiative in
seeking out minority tenants during the rent-up stage. To
reduce normal real estate risks, IHDA will make recommenda-
tions on equipment purchases and staffing, and occasionally
suggest rent increases. In at least one instance, it
required a developer to replace his management agent.
The passivity with which HUD services mortgages is
illustrated by one case history related to the author by
the ultimate management agent. Here, a speculative developer
purchased some inner city buildings, rehabilitated them in
a largely superficial manner, and sold them to the residents
at a substantial profit. HUD mortgage assistance enabled
the residents to meet the monthly payments and a loan from
a credit company owned by the developer enabled many of them
to meet the downpayment. Despite a complete lack of
experience on the part of the resident cooperative, HUD
allowed them to serve as the property manager without pro-
viding them any technical assistance or even insisting upon
normal monthly reporting. The resulting poor management
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combined with latent structural defects to force the
project into default. The mortgagee then assigned the
mortgage to HUD and received the insurance benefits.
HUD, then acting as the mortgagee, began considering
foreclosure on the property. At this point, the local HUD
office and the resident cooperative agreed upon naming a
particular private management firm to both manage the
property and serve as an agent for the cooperative in
passing title to the project over to HUD. Over the next
two years as negotiations continued, the project continued
to not pay any debt service. At that point, the management
firm dissolved but first assigned all of its contracts to
another firm. This second firm began collecting rents on
the property and paying all expenses with the exception of
debt service on the mortgage. In fact, HUD completely lost
track of the property for a period of six months. Finally,
in the process of resuming a title search on the property,
HUD determined who was serving as the new management agent
and asked that they be replaced.
While this case is by no means typical of all or even
a large number of HUD developments, it does represent a
degree of passivity which would be inconceivable at a state
HFA. Not only would any one of the HFA's be more closely
involved itself in day-to-day activities, but its relatively
small size would have made it easier to maintain control of
each development.
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Thus, quite clearly, much of the reason that so many
of the HUD developments and so few of the HFA developments
have experienced significant financial problems, is the
techniques by which the HFA's have managed risk. The
greater activism of the HFA's in project affairs was seen
to have been particularly instrumental. As will be seen
in the following chapter, pressures to maintain a high
bond rating has provided stronger incentives to the HFA's
to straighten out any problems.
CHAPTER 6
SECURING LOANABLE FUNDS FROM THE BOND MARKET
234
235
The role of the state housing finance agencies in the
development process is different from that of the U.S,
Department of Housing and Urban Development in another
fundamental way besides their methods of managing risk.
Unlike HUD, which insures loans made by private mortgagees,
the HFA's borrow funds from the tax-exempt bond and money
markets to enable them to provide mortgage financing
directly to developers. As shall be seen in this chapter,
the ability of the HFA's to borrow tax-exempt money provides
them with both constraints and opportunities. The constraints
result from the high degree of security required on bond and
note offerings. While as shall be seen, state backing can
provide some of the security, HFA projects and operations
must be secure as well. The opportunities result from the
ability of the HFA to provide financing at below market
interest rates. This chapter will spell out these constraints
and opportunities with the first section containing a regression
analysis and discussion of the components determining the net
interest rate to the HFA's and the second analyzing the way
in which interest savings affect the viability of projects.
236
THE BOND MARKET
State housing finance agencies, unlike HUD, must period-
ically go to the bond market to obtain loanable funds. In
order to secure funds at the lowest interest rate, HFA's must
cater to the needs and goals of potential bond buyers. HFA's
can serve some of these needs with little diversion from their
own public purpose goals; however, having to go to the bond
market does place certain constraints on the maximization of
other goals.
To assess the net interest rate that HFA's have to pay
on bond issues, a regression analysis was run based upon data
from 42 bond offerings between January, 1970, and June, 1974.
These 42 sales include all of the long-term HFA bonds issued
during the period. Nineteen independent variables related to
each issue were regressed against the dependent variable,
the net interest rate to the agency. Of these, nine variables
were found to be significant (at the 0.5 level) in explaining
net interest costs with the others either not being significant
enough to enter into the regression equation, or entering
into it in an insignificant manner. The effect of each of
these variables is summarized in Table 28.
The overall results of the regression equation explain
89 percent of the variation in net interest rates (i.e., the
multiple correlation squared equals .893). The standard
Table 28
Regression Results for Dependent Variable: Net Interest Rate
Step 10 of Stepwise Regression
Variable Description
Tax-Exempt Av By Week
Amount in Millions
Moodys Rating
Alaska Special Reserve
Term Amt Over Total Amt
Fund Bal Over Debt
Urb Ren-MC In Tenths
Post Or Pre Moody Reeval
No. Of Months Aft Mar 70
S and P Rating
Regression Constant
Coefficient
1.0996
0.0027
-0.1776
-2.1034
0.2588
0.0804
0.0297
0.2213
-0.0052
0.0547
Std Error of
Coefficient
0.099
0.001
0.026
0.703
0.079
0.036
0.013
0.084
0.002
0.044
Standardized
Coefficient
0.745
0.348
-0.552
-1.285
0.247
0.974
0.152
0.206
-0.210
0.107
t-test DF Significance
Under
Under
Under
11.11***
4.83***
-6.79***
-2.99**
3.28**
2.26*
2.24*
2.64*
-2.35*
1.24
.001
.001
.001
.006
.003
.031
.033
.013
.026
.224
0.143
Multiple Correlation Squared = 0.893
Multiple Correlation = 0.945
Standard Deviation of Residuals = 0.161
F = 25.88 with 10 and 31 degrees of
Freedom
(P under .001)
Partial Correlations with Dependent Variable for Variables not Entered
Average Term
Bid or Negot
No Rating from Moodys
Purpose
Total Amt Within Past Yr
Moral Oblg
Single Family
Secondary or Direct Loan
Non-Profits in Tenths
0.008
0.025
-0.153
0.022
-0.038
0.229
0.009
-0.191
0.157
Unique
Variance
.426
.081
.159
.031
.037
.018
.017
.024
.019
.005
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deviation of the residuals was 0.161, meaning that in about
65 percent of the cases, the actual net interest rate lies1
within 16 basis points of the predicted value. While as
with any regression model, certain observed correlations
between any two variables may simply reflect their mutual
relationship to a third variable, the fact that all of the
variables found to be significantly related to the net interest
rate were computed to be related in the predicted direction,
provides some measure of confidence in the validity of the
results.
Still,the impact of each variable on net interest costs
will be examined in the context of a broader discussion of the
four basic factors determining these costs: market conditions,
perceived security, term, and tax-exempt status. A discussion
of each of these factors will follow in turn based upon the
results of the regression model, as well as a review of docu-
ments and literature on the subject and interviews with
security dealers, rating agency officials, and purchasers and
issuers of HFA bonds.
Market Conditions
As even common sense would suggest, the strongest deter-
minant of the net interest rate paid by state housing finance
agencies is market conditions at the time of issuance. The
10ne basis point equals .01 percentage points of interest.
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Moody's Weekly Average of interest rates paid on all tax-
exempt bond issues was found to explain by itself 43 percent
of the variation in HFA interest rates (p = under .001).
While the tax-exempt market is distinct from other capital
markets, clearly it is interrelated to the general economy.
Because maximum benefits from tax-exempt bonds are derived
by purchasers who have high tax brackets and who are able to
tie up their funds for several years, certain groups of purchasers
have come to dominate the tax-exempt market. Between 1970
and 1972, net purchases of state and local debt obligations
were divided as follows:
Commercial Banks: 65.3%
Fire and Casualty Insurance Companies: 11.2%
Individuals and Trusts: 22.2%2
Others: 1.2%2
According to security dealers interviewed, these same groups
dominate the market for HFA bonds with commercial banks con-
centrating their purchases in short term notes and bonds and
the insurance companies buying longer and riskier issues.
During tight money periods, commercial banks become less
interested in new purchases and concentrate their then limited
1Purists might dispute using this measure because the net interest
rate on each bond considered, i.e., the dependent variable, is
used by Moody's in calculating its index. Still, each individu-
al bond plays an almost insignificant role in determining the
overall tax-exempt bond rate.
2The Bond Buyer, Statistics on State and Local Government
Finance (The Bond Buyer: New York, 1973), Vol. II, p. 17.
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resources on meeting the needs of businesses with whom they
deal on a face-to-face basis.
The slack in the tax-exempt market is picked up primarily
by individuals. In order to attract a sufficient number of
individuals into the tax-exempt market, interest rates have to
increase significantly. Since conventional mortgage rates
also increase during such periods, HFA's maintain a competitive
advantage.
Other bond market factors are more specific-in impact.
The market for HFA bonds varies by locality. Bond purchasers
are generally more interested in buying local bond issues than
out-of-state issues because these issues are more likely to
be exempt from state income tax, because their issuers are more
familiar, because these bonds can be used by banks to satisfy
pledging requirements, and because such bonds appeal to senti-
ments for local boosterism. Consequently, local banks whose
contacts are also local, generally serve as co-underwriters
for HFA bond issues. Undoubtedly, a certain percentage of
the unexplained variation in net interest rates results from
differences between the local and national market conditions
at the time of issuance, an analysis that was not attempted
in this dissertation.
The supply side of the market for specific issues, however,
was found to have an extremely significant influence on the
net interest rate. The bond market has had difficulty in
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absorbing large issues. After taking into account all other
factors, the net interest rate has been 0.27 basis points
higher for every million dollars of bonds contained in the
offering (p = .001). Thus, the largest offerings, which have
been on the order of $250 million, have had to pay a premium
of about 65 basis points compared with the smallest offerings,
which have been about $12 million. The other measure used of
the ability of the market to absorb new issues, the total volume
of bonds issued by the agency within the prior year, failed to
provide any additional explanatory value.
A final variable related to market conditions that was
tested was whether the bonds were sold on a bid or a negoti-
ated basis. Several bond underwriters have argued that on
unusual types of offerings like moral obligation bonds, nego-
tiated sales lead to lower interest rates in that they reduce
the risk to the underwriter by enabling him to pre-sell the
issue in advance of quoting a price. Most HFA's have accepted
this argument and have sold their bonds on a negotiated basis
to favored underwriters. Arthur Levitt, New York State
Comptroller, however, has argued that competitive bidding
leads to lower rates. Consequently, in June of 1973,
he requested that all New York State agencies begin selling
bonds on a competitive basis. The results of the regression
analysis reveal an insignificant difference on interest rates
between bonds sold on a bid basis and those sold on a negotiated
basis.
'Weekly Bond Buyer, June 4, 1973, p. 1.
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Perceived Security
The perceived security of the bonds is the determinant
of the interest rate that states and state agencies can most
easily alter. The market perception of the security of housing
finance agency bonds depends in a large measure on the rating
given by Moody's Investors Service. Only the largest institu-
tional buyers are capable of making a thorough, independent
analysis of the security of bonds. Even they realize that
the value of the bond, should they choose to sell it, will
depend in part on its Moody's rating. The regression analysis
found an average difference in net interest cost paid by HFA's
of 18 basis points per rating increment counting an increase
in rating from A to A-1 as one increment (p = less than .001).l
The rating given by Standard & Poors, however, was found
to have had a statistically insignificant independent effect
on interest rates. The primary value of a Standard & Poors
rating would appear to have been to provide a justification
for purchases made of HFA bonds that lack a rating by Moody's.
Banking commissioners and many investment committees of banks
and insurance companies will forbid or carefully scrutinize
purchases that are not rated at least BBB (or for some, A)
'The highest Moody's bond rating is Aaa followed in descending
order by Aa, A, and Baa. Moody's also gives the rating of A-1
to bonds between A and Aa, and gives a rating of Baa-l to
bonds between Baa and A. Bonds that are rated below Baa are
deemed to be not of "investment grade."
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by Standard & Poors or Baa (or for some, A) by Moody's.
Thus, the AA rating from Standard & Poors on Alaska Housing
Finance Corporation, Missouri Housing Development Commission,
and certain New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency bonds that had
been unrated by Moody's has undoubtedly enabled investors to
look beyond the ratings in purchasing these bonds. The Alaska
Housing Finance Corporation bonds, for example, largely on the
basis of their Special Reserve Fund backing, have sold at a
rate that is 210 basis points lower than would be.expected on
unrated bonds, even lower than would be expected on AAA rated
bonds.
Because all of the bonds under consideration that have
been unrated by Moody's have received an identical AA rating
from Standard & Poors, the impact that the Standard & Poors
rating has had on bonds like those issued by the Alaska
agency cannot be ascertained through regression analysis.
Moody's, Standard & Poors, and individual investors
look at the security of a state housing finance agency bond
issue from three levels. First, they look at state back-ups
for bond repayment, Second, they look at reserves being
provided by the agency. Finally, they look at the basic
source of repayment of the bond, agency operations including
the mortgage loans being made, and the personnel making them.
These three levels of security will be looked at in order.
The four highest Standard & Poors ratings are AAA, AA, A, and
BAA which are regarded as the equivalent to Moody's ratings of
AAA, Aa, A, and Baa, respectively.
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State back-ups
The most common form of state backing of housing finance
agency bonds is known as the moral obligation. The mechanics
of the moral obligation vary slightly from state to state, but
basically all call upon the state to be responsible for debt
service payments when the state agency is unable to do so.
The state agency generally covenants to place in reserve the
full amount of the following year's debt service payment.
In certain states, in any year that the agency is unable to
meet the debt service reserve, the legislature is directed by
statute to approve the appropriation of whatever funds are
necessary to restore the debt service reserve; in others, the
governor is directed to include the deficit in his budget for
consideration by the legislature. The difference simply
reflects the manner in which states formulate their budgets.
In Virginia, the legislature is simply directed to consider
making such an appropriation. Despite these variations in
wording, the effect is the same. As has often been spelled
out in state court rulings, a legislature creating an HFA
generally cannot legally obligate future legislatures to
appropriate the necessary funds. In fact, an Oregon court
The Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Tennessee agency statutes
are among those where the legislature must appropriate the funds;
the Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin agency
statutes require the governor to budget the funds.
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ruled that moral obligation provision backing bonds to be
issued by the Oregon Division of Housing invalid because it
stated that future legislatures "shall" appropriate the funds
necessary to restore deficiencies in the agency's reserve
1
funds. Courts in other states have ruled that the word
"shall" really means "may" and consequently, such reserve
fund back-ups do not constitute a legal debt of the state
2
and are not charged against the state debt limit. Official
offering statements accordingly use language on their cover
such as:
The Agency has no taxing power. The State of
Minnesota is not liable on the Series A Bon s
and said Bonds are not a debt of the state.
These back-up provisions, however, do constitute a "moral
obligation" of the state in the sense that future legisla-
tures are "morally obligated" to respect the intent of their
predecessors. The housing finance agencies that currently
1Housing and Development Reporter, Pebr,%ry Z-./r75, 83,
2Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants
National Bank, 249 N.E. 2d 599: RE: Advisory Opinion on
Constitutionality of Act No. 346 of Public Acts of 1966
(Michigan), 158 N.W. 2d 416: Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing
Finance Agency, 9-19-73; Maine State Housing Authority v.
Depositors Trust Co., 278 A. 2d 699.
3Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, Official Statement, August
23, 1973.
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have the moral backing of their states include:
Connecticut Housing Finance Authority
Illinois Housing Development Authority
Maine State Housing Authority
Massachusetts Home Mortgage Finance Agency
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
New Jersey Housing Finance Agency
New York State Housing Finance Agency
State of New York Mortgage Authority
New York State Urban Development Corporation
Ohio HousingDevelopment Board
Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency
Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency
South Dakota Housing Development Authority
Tennessee Housing Development Agency
Virginia Housing Development Authority
West Virginia Housing Development Fund
Wisconsin Housing Finance Agency
The New York City Housing Development Corporation has the
equivalent to state moral obligation backing in that New
York City has pledged to use the general revenues allocated
to it by the State to satisfy any deficiencies in the Corpora-
tion's reserve fund. In addition, state moral obligation
backing stands behind the bonds issued by the following other
agencies:
New Jersey-New Jersey Sports and Exhibition Center
South Jersey Port Authority
New York- Battery Park City Development Corporation
New York City Educational Construction Fund
New York City Stabilization Reserve Corporation
New York State Atomic and Space Agency
New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation
New York State Job Development Authority
United Nations Development Corporation
When Moody's and Standard & Poors began rating bonds backed
by the moral obligation of the state, they both assigned them a
rating one level below that given on general obligation bonds
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of that state. Thus, for example, since the State -of Illinois
has a "triple A" rating from both agencies, the Illinois Housing
Development Authority bonds had been rated as "double A" by
both of them. While Standard & Poors has for the most part
retained this rating system, Moody's began placing less credence
in state moral obligations. In its September 17, 1973, Bond
Survey, Moody's cited the burgeoning use of moral obligation
2
bond financing, particularly in the state of New York. Were
that state called upon then to simultaneously satisfy all of
its moral obligations, it would have had to increase its
budget by 10 percent. As of June 30, 1973, New York had $3.3
billion in moral obligation notes and bonds outstanding compared
with $6.4 billion in tax-supported debt. Moody's questioned
whether any state would raise taxes to meet a moral obligation.
It concluded that:
The analysis of obligations secured by revenues
associated with a project must look first and
primarily to those revenues. Where the issue
is secondarily secured by an opinion that the
state may legally appropriate funds to fill a
reserve deficiency, that element of security
can at best, in our opinion, be regarded as a 5ating
floor in which elements of speculation remain.
1The one exception to Standard & Poors ratings has been the New
York State Housing Finance Agency, which maintained its A rating
in 1972 when the rating for New York State and other agencies
with New York State moral obligation backing was being lowered.
2
"Backups, Makeups, ard Moral Obligations," Moody's Bond
Survey, September 17, 1973, pp. 568-9.
3Ibid.
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As the result of this reexamination, the rating of
the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC) slipped
from A to Baa-i (a high Baa) as Moody's made the determination
that despite competent management, UDC had the "glaring
weakness" of not being able to generate sufficient revenues
without state appropriations to meet its debt service payments
1
for at least the following five years. Unlike most other
HFA's who tie the repayment of each bond to specific mortgages,
UDC's role as a developer has led it to structure its bond
issues to enable it to use the proceeds for any corporate
purpose without identifying specific sources of repayment.
At the same time that Moody's lowered UDC's rating, it also
lowered the ratings of the Illinois Housing Development
Authority and the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency from AA
to A-1, but raised those of the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency and the New York State Housing Finance Agency from A
to A-1.
The impact of Moody's reevaluation announcement on the
market for moral obligation bonds was considerably stronger
than would be expected by a simple change in a few ratings.
While interest rates on moral obligation bonds had been declining
at the rate of about one-half of a basis point per month as
investors gradually gained more confidence and familiarity with
1Moody's Bond Survey, October 8, 1973, p. 507.
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these bonds, all such bonds issued after the date of Moody's
announcement have sold at 22 basis points higher than those
issued previously after controlling for each of the other
independent variables, including the market level for all
tax-exempt bonds. Apparently, Moody's questioning of the
worth of state moral obligations sent shock waves through the
investment community and led investors to make their own
reevaluations with the consensus being even more skeptical
than Moody's itself.
The next questioning of the worth of state moral obliga-
tion financing came in June, 1974, when the New York and New
Jersey legislatures simultaneously rescinded the moral obliga-
tion backing they had provided to the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. Since all of the bond offerings examined
were issued prior to this revocation, no analysis of its
impact on other issues was made. The New Jersey Legislature,
however, has maintained its moral obligation backing for the
South Jersey Port Authority, the first agency to require state
appropriations to fund deficiencies in its reserve fund. On
three occasions, the South Jersey Port Authority required state
appropriations to restore its debt service reserve fund. In
each instance, the New Jersey Legislature made good on its
moral obligation.
1Moody's Bond Survey, June 24, 1974, p. 77.
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In New York, the initial legislative response to the
Urban Development Corporation's default on $100 million in
1
maturing bond anticipation notes was less affirmative.
Statutorily, moral obligation backing did not apply to these
and all other bond anticipation notes. Nonetheless, the
investment community had widely regarded states morally
responsible for defaults on bond anticipation notes issued
by agencies with moral obligation backing for their bonds.
Rather than pay off the notes as they matured, the New York
Legislature first voted to create a separate Project Finance
Agency and provide it with $90 million to buy UDC mortgages
and forbid it to use the funds to repay noteholders. Only
after a few months of negotiations when it became clear that
the major New York City banks would not support offerings of
this agency or by UDC itself, did the Legislature relent and
allocate funds toward the repayment of the notes. Still,
UDC's default has had a strong negative impact on the market
for moral obligation bonds. According to Alan N. Weeden,
president of Weeden and Company, the UDC default could increase
the net interest rate paid by agencies with the moral obligation
backing of New York State by 100 basis and increase the rate
paid by agencies in other states with equivalent backing by as
2
much as 25 basis points.
lSee Appendix B on "Why the UDC Default."
2Housing and Development Reporter, March 10, 1975, p. 1035.
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Certain states have provided backing for housing finance
agencies in a manner that avoids the ambiguity in the minds
of the investors as to whether the state will uphold its moral
obligation. Upon certification by its Chairman that deficiencies
exist in the reserve fund of the Connecticut Housing Finance
Authority, such appropriations are automatically made without
any required legislative action. Presumably, however, future
legislatures could alter this provision. Consequently, these
bonds do not constitute a debt or liability of the State of
2
Connecticut or a pledge of its full credit. Still, this
mechanism has enabled the Connecticut agency to receive an
Aa rating from Moody's.
Should a deficiency occur in the debt service reserve
fund of the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation, the Corporation
can turn to a "Special Pledge Fund" held by the Alaska Commis-
3
sioner of Revenues. This fund consists of cash and mortgages
purchased with State moneys having a value equal to 20 percent
of the amount of bonds the Corporation has outstanding for
about the first five years, and 10 percent thereafter. The
State has no further legal or moral obligation to meet
1Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, Proposed Official State-
ment Dated December 7, 1973, p. 1.
2Ibid.
3Alaska Housing Finance Corporation, Official Statement, April
24, 1973, p. 13-14.
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deficiencies beyond this amount. The Alaska Housing Finance
Corporation, however, has covenanted to obtain Federal mortgage
insurance or guarantees on 90 percent of its mortgages. As
mentioned above, the result of these security measures has
been to decrease the net interest rate to the agency by 210
basis points.
The Missouri Housing Development Commission has no moral
obligation backing, but does have a mortgage insurance fund of
$1 million. This fund was created through an appropriation of
revenue sharing funds in 1973. The one Missouri agency bond
offering included in the regression analysis, however, was
issued prior to the establishment of this fund. Its security
rests with the Federal insurance provided on each of its mort-
gages.
Housing finance agencies in other states, including
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Vermont, still
have no state back-up. In order to market their bonds, they
have had to agree to use the proceeds to finance only insured
mortgages. The North Carolina Housing Corporation, which also
had no state back-up, found that at the time it considered
going to market, the interest it had to pay approximated the
interest on the HUD insured mortgages it planned to purchase
leaving insufficient margin to cover its own operating expenses.
Michael Stegman, The Multiple Roles of State Housing Finance
Agencies: The North Carolina Housing Corporation, (North
Carolina Department of Administration: Raleigh, May, 1972.)
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As a result, it issued no bonds, and the North Carolina Legis-
lature terminated its operation, although they later created
a new North Carolina State Housing Finance Agency with moral
obligation backing. The Kentucky Housing Corporation, which
also lacks the statutory backing of a state moral obligation,
has attempted to approximate the security provided by a statu-
tory moral obligation clause. In its bond resolution, the
Corporation covenants that it will make a formal request for
funds to the Kentucky legislature should its reserves dip
below the amount required to meet the debt service required
for the following year. This covenant appears to have had
little or no effect on the marketability of the Corporation's
bonds. The fact that the legislation creating the Kentucky
Housing Corporation requires it to secure Federal insurance
on each of its mortgages has enabled it to receive an A rating
from Moody's. The Missouri and West Virginia agencies, which
initially issued bonds without state backing, along with
Alaska, were the only ones to do so without a Moody's rating.
Their bonds sold at an interest rate indicative of a Baa or
Baa-l rating.
Otherwise, market acceptance of bond issues backed by
Federally insured or guaranteed mortgages have corresponded
with the Moody's rating. While such insurance and guarantees
have had significant influence in determining the rating given
by Moody's, their presence has not caused them to perform any
differently from other bond issues with the same rating.
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Delaware, Hawaii, and Maryland each provide the strongest
state backing possible. In these states, housing bonds are
general obligations of the state's full faith and credit,
including its taxing power. The bonds are issued by the state
with the proceeds being turned over to the state housing
authority or division.
These state agencies, however, have received proceeds
from only a small volume of bonds. Moreoever, except for the
Maryland agency which is using part of the proceeds from
state general obligation bond issues as an insurance fund to
back the issuance of its own revenue bonds and thereby lever-
aging their impact, those agencies that rely upon the general
obligation backing of the state are unlikely to ever receive
a large amount of funds through the bond market. The bonds
that support these agencies count toward their state's debt
limit. Precisely because New York City and New York State
borrowing for housing was already pushing these bodies too
heavily into debt at a time when they wanted to expand borrowing
for housing, they created the New York City Housing Finance
Corporation and New York State Housing Finance Agency with
moral obligation backing. No analysis was performed on the
interest rate on general obligation bonds.
Reserves
In addition to the debt service reserve fund to meet the
principal and interest due on their outstanding bonds during
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the coming year, the HFA's also maintain funds in other assorted
accounts that they can use if necessary to meet their bond
obligations. These funds represent an added cushion to bond
holders and reduce uncertainty regarding state back-ups. While
Moody's often includes an abbreviated financial statement in
its credit report on the agencies it rates, it clearly places
less importance on the amount of fund balances available to
meet debt service than do investors. Data was incorporated
into the regression analysis on the ratio of fund balances
available to meet debt service to outstanding notes and bonds
1
for each agency at the time of issuing each bond. The
resulting regression coefficient was 0.0804 per every one
percent of reserves compared with outstanding notes and bonds
(p = .031). In other words, each one percent of reserves was
found to have made a difference of about 8 basis points after
controlling for the Moody's rating and the other factors
considered. These reserves may have also made a difference
in determining the Moody's rating. The high reserve ratio
of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency at the time of
its 1972 Series A issue, which at 2.78 percent of outstanding
debt was the highest of any HFA issues, reduced net interest
costs to the agency by about 25 basis points in comparison
'Debt service reserve funds accruing from bond proceeds
were excluded. The amount of the bonds in the issue being
considered was counted as an outstanding debt.
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with the 1971 Series A issue of the Missouri Housing Development
Commission, which with a reserve ratio at that time of -0.34
percent had the lowest ratio.
Agency operations
The basic source of funds to repay bonds comes from
mortgage repayments. Yet, neither the ratings agencies nor
the bulk of the securities investment community are real estate
experts. Even if they were, it would be difficult for them to
examine each project contained in most bond issues. Nonethe-
less, on occasion, persons from the ratings agencies and their
projects are influenced by their impressions. The professional
capability and experience of the staff is also regarded as a
key factor. While Moody's officials did tell the author that
they do recognize differences in the capabilities of the dif-
ferent agencies, each of the HFA's making uninsured loans have
been deemed by Moody's simply to be "professional." In
retaining the A rating it gave the New York State Housing
Finance Agency at a time when it was lowering the rating it
gave to other New York State agencies with moral obligation
backing, Standard & Poors was impressed by the fact that the
agency administered its housing programs with a staff of only
five, disregarding the fact that about 200 employees of the
New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal
perform the processing, regulative, and managerial functions
for the HFA that are done in-house by the other finance agencies.
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The ratings agencies as well as investors generally respect
the professionalism of housing agency staffs in determining
the adequacy of project sites and amenities.
The one aspect of the loans made by the HFA's that investors
have looked at more critically than the rating agencies has been
the extent to which they have been located in inner-city slum
areas. The indicator used to measure slum areas in the regres-
sion analysis was whether the property was within the boundaries
of an urban renewal or model cities area. Even on the basis
of this somewhat crude measure, bonds backed by projects that
all lie within such "slum areas" were found to sell at a premium
of 30 basis points (p = .033) compared with bonds backed by
projects lying completely outside of these areas. Other mort-
gage underwriting policies, including use of nonprofit or
limited dividend sponsors, loan-to-value ratios, single family
versus multi-family housing, and secondary versus direct lending
were found to have made an insignificant difference in terms of
interest cost or rating.
The fact that the type of project sponsor, whether it be
nonprofit or limited dividend, has had an insignificant impact
is revealed by the fact that this variable does not enter the
regression equation. Additional evidence of its insignificance
comes from the fact that both ratings agencies give individual
but identical ratings to the New York State Housing Finance
Agency's nonprofit housing program as they do to the agency's
other housing programs used by limited dividend sponsors, even
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though the reserves backing the nonprofit program are a slightly
lower percentage of outstanding debt than those backing their
other housing programs. Further, New York State Housing Finance
Agency's Nonprofit Housing Series A bonds were initially
reoffered to the public on the same day at the identical rate
for equal terms as New York State Housing Finance Agency
1971 General Housing Series A bonds. Should nonprofit
sponsors of New York Agency projects or of projects of any
other state agency, however, show a higher default and fore-
2
closure rate, as they have on HUD projects, then investors
will undoubtedly begin to demand a higher rate of interest
on bonds backed by projects sponsored by nonprofit organizations.
Likewise, the loan-to-value ratio given on HFA financed
mortgages has made no difference on the interest rate. Most
private mortgages regard any mortgages with a loan-to-value
ratio in excess of 80 percent as highly speculative. They
only provide mortgages with high loan-to-value ratios on the
soundest projects with the most financially solvent mortgagors,
and then only when funds are freely available. They worry that
in the event of a foreclosure, they will be unable to sell the
New York State Housing Finance Agency, Official Statement,
Nonprofit Housing Project Bonds and Official Statement,
General Housing Loan Bonds, December 3, 1971.
2HUD, "Selected Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance
Programs," (OZ series), as of December 31, 1973.
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project for a sufficient amount to recoup their investment.
State housing finance agencies, however, provide mortgages
with a minimum loan-to-value ratio of 90 percent in order to
entice sponsors and investors without having to pay them high
profits through higher rents. The New York State Housing
Finance Agency allows loans of 90 percent of value under its
General Housing Program; 95 percent of value under its Urban
Rental Housing Program; and 100 percent of value under its
Nonprofit Housing Program. The only significant difference
between the first two of these programs is the loan-to-value
ratio and the type of sponsor. Despite these differences,
both ratings agencies have given each program the identical
rating as the other programs. Further, no significant differ-
ence in interest rates has been manifest. In fact, the observed
interest rate on the one Urban Rental Program issue was actually
slightly lower than the predicted value while the reverse was
true with regard to two of the three General Housing Program
issues. Clearly, differences in the loan-to-value ratio are
not a significant consideration to investors because if they
had been, the signs of these residuals would have been reversed.
The other two variables considered relating to the
character of the mortgage portfolio were single family versus
multi-family lending and direct lending to developers or
consumers versus secondary lending through mortgage purchases.
Secondary lenders were found to be preferred to direct lenders
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in the marketplace, although to an insignificant degree.
No difference was found between single-family and multi-family
lenders.
Term
The effect that the average term of all the bonds within
a single issue has had on the composite net interest rate paid
by the HFA's was computed to be surprisingly small. In fact,
the variable, "average term," failed to enter the regression
equation and showed a partial correlation of 0.008 with those
variables that did. The reason that this result is surprising
is that most issues have consisted of serial bonds with varying
maturities that securities underwriters have purchased on an
aggregate basis at a fixed price and then reoffered the indi-
vidual bonds within the offering at a schedule of prices and
corresponding yields that depend solely upon the term. With
regard to every offering examined, the yield was lower on
shorter bonds than on longer bonds. For example, the Massa-
chusetts Housing Finance Agency 1973 Series A issue contained
$250,000 in bonds maturing in 1974 and increasing amounts on
additional bonds maturing in each succeeding year as expected
mortgage debt service repayments are made until 2013 when
$2,615,000 in bonds mature. Securities dealers initially
priced the bonds maturing in 1974 to yield 4.0 percent and
those in each succeeding year to yield an increasing rate of
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interest up to 5.7 percent for 40 year bonds maturing in
2013. MHFA sold the entire $43,425,000 issue to a syndicate
of underwriters at a price that would require MHFA to pay a
net interest of 5.68 percent.
Part of the anomaly of the highly significant difference
that the term has made with regard to reoffering yields and
the insignificant impact average term is reconciled by the
fact that offerings consisting exclusively of term bonds,
i.e., bonds with a single maturity date, were found to yield
26 basis points more than serial bonds, i.e., bonds with mul-
tiple annual maturity dates and relatively short average terms.
The other reason for the insignificant impact that the average
term was computed to have had on the net interest cost is
the relatively small range within which the average terms of
each serial issue considered has fallen. The range has been
between 20 and 34 years.
The relative insensitivity of the net interest rate to
the average term, particularly among long term bonds within
the range already tested in the marketplace, means that many
HFA's would be able to reduce the annual debt service on their
mortgages by issuing longer term bonds and correspondingly
longer term mortgages. The New Jersey Housing Finance Agency
and the New York City Housing Development Corporation have
demonstrated that 50 year bonds are as salable in the bond
market as 40 year bonds. The reoffering yields on the New
Jersey Agency's 1972 Series B bonds maturing 50 years after
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the date of issue were identical to those on bonds maturing
1
after 36 through 49 years. The reoffering yields on the
New York City agency's 1973 Series A bonds maturing 50 years
after the date of issue were identical to those on bonds in
2
the same issue maturing after 30 through 49 years. In other
words, underwriters perceived no difference in risk in the
repayment of bonds due in 50 years than they did on bonds
due in 30 or 36 years. As a result, these agencies were able
to extend mortgages out to 50 rather than 40 years, and thereby
reduce the constant annual debt service from 6.40 percent to
6.10 percent, assuming an interest rate of 5.75 percent in
both cases. Based upon an average mortgage of $25,000 per
unit, this extension allows a $6.25 savings in rent or subsidy
per unit per month throughout the life of the loan.
The extreme difference between the average term on HFA
notes as compared with bonds has made a significant difference
between the rate on notes and bonds. Bond anticipation notes
and construction loan notes have generally had a maturity of
between six months and two years, and have been used by HFA's
to provide interim financing during the period of construction.
Consequently, HFA's have generally been able to finance construction
'New Jersey Housing Finance Agency, Official Statement, December
14, 1972, p. 1.
2New York Housing Development Corporation, Official Statement,
November 1, 1972, p. 1.
263
loans at lower rates than the low rates they provide on
permanent mortgages. Only when long-term interest rates are
expected to climb markedly do short-term rates exceed long-
term rates. Only then do HFA's charge higher rates on construc-
tion loans.
The relationship between short-term construction loan
rates and long-term permanent mortgage rates on privately-
financed housing developments is the reverse of that normally
found on HFA-financed developments. Construction loan financing
by private lenders is more expensive than permanent financing
because private lenders regard it as considerably more risky.
Private construction lenders realize that their basic security
is the commitment on the part of another lender to provide
permanent mortgage financing. Similarly, purchasers of HFA
bond anticipation notes must rely on the willingness of other
investors to buy long-term HFA bonds to enable the HFA to
have sufficient funds to redeem their notes. As illustrated
in the UDC default, such investors may not be readily available.
Investors in HFA notes (who are generally commercial banks that
have a department that makes construction loans) had regarded
their investment as being at least as secure as HFA bonds, and
had believed that its short-term nature justified a low rate
of interest.
Until 1973, neither Moody's nor Standard & Poors provided
ratings on note issues, thus investors usually looked at the
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bond rating as a guide to security of the bond anticipation
note. Finally, Moody's began assigning "MIG" ratings on notes
when requested by the state agency. While many HFA's have
chosen to continue to market their notes without applying for
a rating, those that have asked for an "MIG" rating have
generally received a rating at least comparable to their bond
rating and often higher. UDC, for example, received a middle
level, MIG-2, rating on its notes while it had a relatively
low Baa-l rating on its bonds.
The difference in interest rates between conventionally
financed construction loans and state agency-financed construc-
tion loans has been marked. As can be ascertained from the
above discussion, the differences have been much greater than
on the permanent loan. As a typical example, the Michigan
State Housing Development Authority provided construction
loans at 3.4 percent in November, 1972, after having issued
notes at 2.9 percent. At the same point in time, construction
loans in the private market in the Detroit area went for about
10 percent on the open market. The UDC default, more than
likely, will lower "MIG" ratings and investor perception of
the security of HFA bond anticipation notes more than it will
lower Moody's ratings and investor confidence in HFA bonds.
Consequently, the savings that HFA's have been able to provide
on construction loan interest is likely to be reduced more than
on permanent mortgage financing. Still, during most periods,
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HFA's should be able to provide greater savings on construction
loans than on long-term mortgages.
Tax-Exempt Status
The reason that HFA's should be able to maintain their
competitive advantage is the tax-exempt status of their
bonds arising from the fact that the HFA's are instrumentalities
of the states. The legal basis for Federal tax exemption of
state bonds goes back to the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 (1819), where the Supreme Court enunciated the
doctrine of reciprocal immunity between the states and the
federal government. Daniel Webster made the telling argument
before the court that, "An -unlimited power to tax involves
necessarily a power to destroy." In Pollock v. Farmers Loan
and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) the Court specifically
forbid the imposition of a federal income tax on income from
state and municipal bonds. The 16th Amendment, however,has
since given Congress the power to tax income "from whatever
source derived." When Congress began implementing an income
tax in 1913, it specifically exempted interest on bonds of
states and their instrumentalities from taxation. This exemption
has remained in the Internal Revenue Code through the years.
The first Congressional attempt to tax municipal bonds
applies only to state housing finance agency issues. The
lSection 802, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1974.
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Housing and Community Development Assistance Act of 1974
provides HFA's with a 33-1/3 percent interest subsidy if
they opt to issue taxable bonds. Funds, however, have
yet to be appropriated, and even when they are, state agencies
will still have the option to issue tax-exempts.
The primary reason for Federal efforts to eliminate
or reduce the number of tax-exempt state and local debt
financing is the high cost to the Treasury in relation to
the benefits conferred to the state or state entity. Virtually
all of the buyers of state and state entity bonds are in high
tax brackets. Commercial banks and fire and casualty companies
which account for over three-quarters of all net purchases of
tax-exempt bonds each fall into a corporate tax bracket of
48 percent. The precise tax bracket of the only other major net
purchaser of tax-exempt bonds, individuals, is unknown. Two
studies, however, have shown that in past years, two-thirds of
all tax-exempt bonds were held by the upper one percent income
2
group. Given that the top bracket is 50 percent on earned
1The most direct challenge to the ability of state HFA's to issue
tax-exempt bonds came from the Office of Management and Budget
in its 1974 proposed Circular A-70 (Section 5-C) which specified
that all state and local bonds backed by direct or indirect
Federal guarantees be denied tax-exempt status. The language
clearly implied that Federal interest subsidy payments or
mortgage insurance would constitute an indirect Federal guarantee
and render any associated bond financing taxable. State housing
finance agencies, however, were able to rally sufficient politi-
cal pressure to eliminate this provision from the final regulations.
2Thomas R. Atkinson, The Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership;
Wisconsin Individuals 1949 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956), The Impact of the Undistributed Profits Tax, 1936-
1937 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 116.
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income and 70 percent on other income, an average individual
bracket of 48 percent would be a reasonable estimate. In
any event, the actual average bracket of individuals holding
state and local debt obligations would not deviate from 48
percent by enough to cause the average bracket of all holders
of such debt to deviate from 48 percent by more than a couple
of percentage points. This 48 percent represents the loss to
the U.S. Treasury in forgone tax revenue.
The amount of benefits conferred to state and local enti-
ties in general and to HFA's in particular, is considerably
less than a 48 percent savings in interest costs. Benefits
can be computed by comparing average yields on state and local
bonds with those of taxable corporate bonds of equivalent quality
and equal terms. During the period of 1970-1973, the interest
Some economists have argued that if state and municipal bonds
were made taxable, they would sell at slightly higher yields
than corporate bonds with a comparable rating and term. The
reason they give is that most states and municipalities, unlike
corporations, issue serial bonds. The small volume of bonds in
a serial issue maturing in a given year are said to cause
marketing problems. The shorter average term achieved by seri-
alizing bonds, however, provides compensating interest savings.
Prior to the imposition of an income tax in 1913, corporate bonds
sold at about the same interest rate as state and municipals,
sometimes slightly more and sometimes slightly less. Thus, it
seems fair to say that state and local bonds and corporate bonds
of comparable rating and term would sell at the same price if
each received the same tax treatment. However, the removal of
tax-exemption is likely to cause a shift of some individuals out
of debt investments and into equities. The result would be that
state and local as well as corporate bonds would sell at a
slightly higher price than corporate bonds would if state and
locals were kept tax-exempt. The amount of shift to equities
resulting from the taxing of interest on HFA bonds while leaving
other state and municipal bonds tax-exempt, however, is likely
to be imperceptible if it occurred at all. For a more detailed
treatment of effect on yields caused by the removal of tax-
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rate on long-term corporate bonds with an average of Aaa,
Aa, A, and Baa ratings has been between 17 and 41 percent, with
an average of about 31 percent higher than on comparable tax-
2
exempt bonds. This 31 percent differential is the interest
savings accruing to state agencies. Looking at the matter
from a different perspective, an investor in a 31 percent
bracket would be equally well off buying a taxable bond as
compared with a tax-exempt bond. The difference between the
48 percent bracket of tax-exempt purchasers and 31 percent
represents the added inducement necessary to attract suffi-
cient buyers to sell all of the tax-exempt issues. This
excess of supply over demand in the tax-exempt sector as compared
with the taxable bond sector means that any shift of particular
types of tax-exempt issues, such as housing finance agency
issues, from tax-exempt to taxable status would lower interest
rates on bonds remaining tax-exempt. The 33-1/3 percent
compensation provided to HFA's who elect to issue taxable bonds
would be in an average market slightly more than enough to
offset the higher rate they would have to pay bondholders.
The unfamiliarity with which taxable bond buyers would have
with HFA issue would, no doubt, increase the rate which HFA's
first testing the market would have to pay. Still, particularly
exemption on state andmunic-ipal bonds, see David J, Ott and Allen
H. Meltzer, Federal Tax Treatment-of State-and Local Securities
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1963), p. 18.
1Compiled from Moody's Municipal and Government Manual (New
York: Moody's Investors Service, 1974).
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over the long run, implementation of the subsidized taxable
bond provision would benefit both the state HFA's and the
U.S. Treasury.
USE OF BOND PROCEEDS
As a result of the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds,
the net rate at which HFA's lend money to developers has been
about 2 percentage points below conventional rates for 90
percent mortgage loans when such conventional loans have been
available at all, and on average, about 0.5 percentage points
below HUD-insured loan rates. Between February, 1971, and
August, 1973, the maximum interest rate allowed by HUD on
Section 236 and other developments it insured was 7.0 percent.
Virtually all HUD-insured, privately-financed, 236 loans
2
carried the maximum allowable rate. The average HFA bond
sold during that period carried an interest rate of 6.0
percent with the average mortgage loan going for about 6.5
percent. Conventional multi-family loans during the same
IU.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Reg. 236.15.
2Based upon an examination of the subsidy amounts shown on FHA
Form 2088, "Weekly Multifamily Project Status and Control
Report" prepared by area offices and mortgage amounts shown in
HUD, "Selected Multifamily Status Reports: Mortgage Insurance
Programs." / O-2 Series) as of December 31, 1973/ Private
mortgages have had no incentive to provide loans at any lower
rate than the maximum allowable.
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period went for about 8.5 percent. The average amortization
period on HFA loans and HUD-insured loans has been about forty
years, compared with under thirty years for conventionals.
Were all of the difference in debt service between HFA and
conventional rates to be passed along to the resident, the
savings on a typical $22,000 mortgage would be about $40 per
month. While this amount of savings makes a large difference
to a middle income family, it is grossly insufficient to bring
down the typical $200 - $250 per month cost of a new apartment
to a level that a low or moderate income family can afford.
Since a primary purpose of nearly all state housing finance
agencies is to provide housing for low and moderate income
families, they all have used Federal Section 236 subsidies on
the vast majority of the units they financed between 1970 and
1973. These subsidies reduce the interest rate on the permanent
mortgage to 1 percent for 40 years. Thus, regardless of the
lower borrowing rate that HFA's have, the effective rate
applicable to most dwelling units at which developers received
mortgage money from the HFA's was the same 1 percent rate as
was also available on HUD-insured Section 236 mortgages. In
marginal instances, the lower rate HFA permanent financing
has made the difference between a development being eligible
for Section 236 subsidies and requiring too great of a subsidy
to qualify or between qualifying with no amenities and quali-
fying with the addition of some amenities. HUD regulations
require that the Section 236 subsidy cost per unit on HFA-financed
271
developments not exceed the subsidy level for HUD-insured
Section 236 projects which are comparable in terms of
bedroom count, type, construction, and location. When no
such comparable HUD development exists, as is generally
the case, the local area office must formulate a hypo-
thetical development for the purpose of making this test.
Under the new Section 8 program where the primary determina-
tion of whether a development qualifies for subsidies is
whether its rents before applying any subsidies fall below
the maximum level fixed for the market area, the interest
cost advantage that HFA financing provides in relation to
both HUD-insured and conventional financing is even more
significant in marginal instances. In non-marginal instances,
the lower cost financing translates into higher profits for
the developer.
Other advantages accrue to developers and tenants of
HFA-financed housing because of the lower interest rate
provided on the construction loan and lower financing fees.
Both of these types of savings reduce the total amount of
the mortgage for a given construction budget. On Section
236 projects where rent levels depend upon the amount of
1
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Interest
Reduction Assistance and Rent Supplement Payments for Projects
Developed Under State and Local Programs," HPMC-FHA 4400.46,
Paragraph 3-5, February, 1972.
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the mortgage, such reductions translate into either lower
rent levels or higher allowable construction costs for the
same rents; on Section 8 projects where rent levels are
a function of only family size and income, lower mortgage
levels resulting from cheaper financing can result in
higher profits for the developer. The interest rate
charged by HFA's on construction loans depends primarily
upon the interest rate they must pay on short-term, tax-
exempt bond anticipation notes. Generally, these short-
term rates have considerably lower than long-term rates.
State housing finance agencies have paid between 2.5 and
7.5 percent, or an average of about 3.5 percent, for short-
term money. Unlike conventional lenders, who charge a
large premium to compensate for the inherent risks involved
in construction lending, most HFA's charge only 0.5 percent
above their own borrowing, while the New York State Housing
Finance Agency charges no premium at all. The result was
that during most of the period of 1970-73, the HFA's
supplied construction loan money at an average rate of
about 4 percent compared with conventional rates of about
9 percent and a HUD-insured rate of 7 percent. Considering
that the average life of a multi-family construction loan
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1
is about 15 months and that the average outstanding
balance is about 50 percent of the full loan, HFA below
market rate construction loans have allowed a savings of
a little over 3 percent of the mortgage compared with
conventional rates and of a little under 2 percent compared
with HUD-insured rates.
The other savings provided by many HFA's to developers,
at least in comparison with HUD-insured financing, has been
in fees. While the fees charged by HFA's and included in
the mortgage vary considerably from the 0.18 percent fee
charged by the New York State HFA to the slightly over 4
percent fee charged by UDC, the average has been about
2 percent. In comparison, HUD charges a 0.5 percent per
annum mortgage insurance premium, a 0.3 percent examination
fee, a 0.5 percent inspection fee, and a 1.75 percent
FNMA/GNMA fee. In addition, it allows the lender a fee
of about 2 percent which may or may not have to be paid in
full. Overall, fees on HUD-insured developments are likely
to add up to about 5 percent of the mortgage, or 3 percent
of the mortgage higher than on a typical HFA development.
When taken together, the 3 percent savings on fees
and 2 percent savings on construction interest which HFA's
1
Booz, Allen and Hamilton, op. cit., pp.III(l)-III(2).
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provide in comparison with HUD, allow a savings of about
5 percent of the mortgage, or about $1,100 on a typical
mortgage of $22,000. While state HFA's have had the
opportunity to direct this savings toward reduced rents,
as has been seen, the response of the HFA's on the whole
has been to procure housing with more amenities, larger
room sizes, higher quality, and better design, with rents
that about equal those charged by HUD.
CHAPTER 7
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT:
STATE VERSUS FEDERAL
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The issue of which level of government within the federal
system should have primary responsibility for administering
public purpose housing development programs is part of a larger
debate on the optimal workings of federalism which dates
back to before the founding of the Union. With the coming of
revenue sharing, state and local control has become more
fashionable but disputes persist over which functions are
best suited for which level of government. With regard to
most governmental functions, the resolution of such issues
has been either a sharing of authority among various levels
of government or a clear delineation of authority to a parti-
cular level. Public purpose housing, however, represents a
rare instance where, despite a certain amount of sharing of
power between levels of government, the states and the federal
government have each developed competing systems for delivering
essentially the same service.
As seen in Chapter 4, the state HFA's on the whole were
found to be more effective in satisfying public purposes.
In fact, they did slightly better than HUD in achieving
the national goal of providing racially integrated housing
and did slightly better than HUD in satisfying particular
local goals. Part of the reason for their success relates
to the fact that they are state agencies rather than Federal
ones. As seen in Chapter 4, because the HFA's are entities
of the state governments, they have been able to secure funds
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from the tax-exempt securities markets at interest rates
low enough to provide below market rate mortgage loans. As
will be seen in the chapter on the degree of bureaucratiza-
tion, the relatively small staff required by an agency serving
a single state as compared with the staff required by an
organization serving all fifty states has been a primary
factor in allowing the HFA's to structure themselves in
the relatively non-bureaucratic manner appropriate for public
purpose housing development lending.
This chapter will discuss the other way in which their
being on a state rather than a Federal level has enabled the
HFA's to have been more effective than HUD, namely that being
on a state level better enables an agency to formulate policies
consistent with the local nature of housing markets. Since
the logic of this point parallels that of more general debates
on issues of federalism, the chapter will first retrace the
general debate concerning which level of government is most
appropriate as it applies to the provision of public purpose
housing. Following that discussion will be a section that
identifies instances where the fact that the HFA's are part
of state government has contributed to their success.
The Federalist Debate
The relative power of the States and the Federal govern-
1
ment has been in flux throughout the history of the Union.
1Robert L. Merriam, "Federalism in Transition," in Jean Brand
and Lowell H. Watts (ed.)Federalism Today (Washington D.C.:
Graduate School Press, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1969) pp. 5-16.
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The strong state and weak central government views of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson rather than the centralist views
of Alexander Hamilton dominated the workings of government
during the early years of the life of this country, a time
when little government concern was devoted to housing.
Gradually, a shift occurred toward more central control. The
John Marshall Supreme Court determined that the Constitution
had given the Federal government certain "implied powers"
beyond those enumerated; the Civil War established the supremacy
of the Federal government; the Sixteenth Amendment in allowing
a Federal income tax gave the Federal government superior
access to revenues; and strong presidents beginning with
Franklin D. Roosevelt further enhanced Federal power by using
its superior revenue producing capabilities to finance various
programs including the subsidization of housing. Early plans
of both the Public Works Administration and the Federal Housing
Administration contemplated a degree of state control of
projects, but Federal controls became so complete that state
controls would have been excessive.
The Kestnbaum Commission appointed by President Dwight
D. Eisenhower unsuccessfully attempted to reverse what it
perceived to have been an unwholesome usurpation of power by
the Federal government. As a principle, it suggested that
the best way to divide civic responsibilities was to:
1Dorothy Schafter, op. cit., p. 618.
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Leave to private initiative all the functions that
citizens can perform privately; use the level of
government closest to the community for all public
functionsit can handle; utilize cooperative inter-
governmental arrangements where appropriate to attain
economical performance and popular approval; reserve
National action for residual participation where State
and local governments are not fully adequate, and for
the continuing responsibilities that only the National
Government can undertake. 1
Still, the amount of power held by the Federal government
continued to increase.
Yet, with increases in Federal power have come additions
to the power of the states. The Federal income tax brought
the states and their instrumentalities, including HFA's, a
competitive advantage in securing capital because of the
tax-exempt nature of the bonds they issue. State HFA's have
also been able to take advantage of Federal housing subsidies.
State power has also increased as the result of the Federally-
mandated reapportionment of state legislatures. The new law-
makers have taken a more activistic approach toward meeting
urban needs, including multi-family housing. While revenue
sharing has further increased the power of the states, the
emergence of the state housing finance agencies considered in
this thesis actually predates this movement. The 1974 Housing
and Community Development Act, which has provided local governments
1The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Meyer Kestnbaum,
Chairman), A Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1955), p. 6.
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with more discretion in the spending of community development
funds, has done relatively little to alter the basic relation-
ships between HUD and the state HFA's in the area of housing
development.
In practice, state and Federal relationships have blended
together in the form of a marble cake rather than as a layer
1
cake as has often been presumed. Morton Grodzins expands
upon this notion by writing:
From the point of view of the local consumer of govern-
ment products, the American system of government is
not a pyramid, but a range of sometimes supplementary
and sometimes duplicating (but rarely alternative)
services. Accidents of history, politics, and places
have produced bundles of governmental services. No
logic can distinguish between the 'local character'
of one government's services and the 'nonlocal character'
of another's. 2
In a sense, housing finance functions have taken on marble
cake characteristics. State housing finance agencies utilize
Federal subsidy dollars as well as, on occasion, federal
mortgage insurance. Federally insured developments must conform
to state and local property tax policies as well as state and
local zoning, building, and land use codes. The governor of
the State of New York has even had control over the distribu-
tion of Federal Section 236 subsidies among Federal, state,
and local agencies operating within that state.
1Morton Grodzins, "Centralization and Decentralization in the
American Federal System," in Robert A. Goldwin, A Nation of
States (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1964), p. 3.
2Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government
in the United States, ed. by Daniel Elazar (Chicago: Rand,
McNally, 1966), p. 121.
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Nonetheless, the financing of non-insured developments
by state housing finance agencies can rightfully be considered
a state function and the insurance of privately financed
developments by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development can rightfully be looked upon as an alternative
Federal activity. At the very least, the two housing finance
systems provide alternative recipes for mixing the marble cake.
The mixture that the state housing finance agency approach
provides is akin to the one suggested by John Stuart Mill in
his treatise, On Representative Government:
The authority which is most conversant with principles
should be supreme over principles, while that which
is most competent in details should have the details
left to it. The principal business of the central
authority should be to give instruction, of the local
authority to apply it.
As described in the chapter evaluating agency performance,
the Federal government has set forth certain principles to
which the state HFA's must adhere if they desire to use Federal
Housing funds. These national concerns relate to equal
opportunity for minorities, environmental protection, and
equitable relocation. This arrangement conforms to the nature
of public purpose housing. Aside from certain generalizable
national concerns, the impact and environment are local in
scope. Housing markets are limited to single metropolitan
1As quoted in Frank Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, Materials
on Government in Urban Areas, p. 222.
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areas with submarkets that are even more localized. While
increases in the supply of housing in one part of a metro-
politan area will affect prices throughout the metropolitan
area, they will have no effect in other parts of the country.
Programs appropriate for areas with a low vacancy rate may
fail in areas with a high rate. Construction costs, operating
expenses, and competing rent levels as well as the availability
of labor, materials, and professional skills all vary by housing
market. Climatic conditions and consumer tastes are matters
that differ from region to region if not by subregion. The
strength and institutional structure of homebuilders, banks,
labor, and other actors vary from state to state. Finally,
property tax policy, landlord-tenant relationships, and
building and zoning codes depend upon state laws.
Meeting Local Circumstances
As was also seen in the evaluation chapter, certain state
agencies have done a better job than HUD in serving legisla-
tively defined local needs. The Massachusetts HFA has done
a better job at promoting tenant rights; the New York and
Massachusetts HFA's have produced more housing for the elderly.
In addition, the local jurisdiction of the state HFA's
in certain ways has allowed them to better serve general
housing goals by adapting their operations to local circum-
stances. For example, as has been seen, each of the six
state agencies examined have required bedroom sizes that
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are far larger than those demanded by HUD. The HUD Minimum
Property Standards allow bedrooms occupied by two children
to contain as little as 80 square feet. While bedrooms of
this size may be large enough for two children living in the
South or Southwest, they are woefully inadequate for children
living in areas where cold weather and lack of land limits
their ability to play outdoors.
Another HUD regulation that certain state agencies have
found to be inappropriate for local circumstances is the
maximum mortgage amounts. To avoid having any one of its
developments oversaturate a market and avoid taking too
great a risk on a single mortgage, HUD has set a limit of
$12,500,000 as the maximum it can insure under a single
1
mortgage. Yet, the scale of development in New York State,
especially in New York City, far exceeds that in other parts
of the country. Thus, 30 of the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation's 112 developments between 1970 and 1973,
representing over 50 percent of its dollar volume of residen-
tial construction and 6 of the New York State HFA's 58 devel-
opments in those years, representing over 65 percent of its
dollar volume of residential construction, have mortgages
that exceed the HUD limit. The per unit cost of construction
in the New York City metropolitan area, including Northern
FHA Regulations Sec. 221.514 as incorporated to the Section
236 program by Sec. 236.1.
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New Jersey, frequently exceeds the national limits for HUD-
insured projects, even after the maximum allowable adjustments
are made.
The state agencies have been able to overcome these
cost limitations partially through providing construction
loans at a lower interest rate and partially through not
being subject to maximum mortgage per unit limitations.
Consequently, the New York State UDC and HFA and the New
Jersey HFA have built far more moderate income dwellings
in these areas than has HUD.
Discussions with HFA officials from agencies other than
those studied in detail have provided anecdotal evidence
that state agencies have been able to build housing in areas
with unique local problems that HUD, because of its national
regulations, has been unable to tackle. In Alaska, the extreme
cold requires an extraordinary amount of insulation as well
as frequently building on pilings, a practice precluded by
HUD standards. The Alaska Housing Finance Corporation has
devised its own standards which are more relevant to local
conditions.
In West Virginia, the hilly terrain limits the number
of buildable sites. Most sites require extensive site devel-
opment work. HUD standards require far more work than is
customary on conventional developments, are more costly than
HUD regulations alloweandlmore expensive than most West
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Virginians can afford. The West Virginia Housing Development
Fund has been active in providing funds to builders to prepare
sites for development and has adopted less stringent site
development regulations.
The national jurisdiction of HUD also leads to the
imposition of irrelevant paperwork on developers in much
of the country. For example, developers in Hawaii must
submit all of the same forms directed toward equal opportunities
for minorities, despite the fact that members of what is
considered minority groups in the rest of the country not
only comprise a majority of the population in Hawaii, but
also control a majority of the high status positions. The
one group which is the subject of discrimination is Filipinos.
Yet, developers can comply fully with the HUD forms and still
grossly discriminate against Filipinos.
A similar irrelevant requirement is an extensive market
survey for fully subsidized developments in much of New York
City or Boston where vacancy rates are extremely low. However,
the same type of marketing study would be insufficient to
measure whether a development will rent in much of Michigan
or Illinois where vacancy rates are relatively high.
Despite the fact that HUD area offices span a jurisdiction
no broader than a single state, and the personnel working there
are generally local residents, HFA's are in a better position
to provide housing that is compatible with local circumstances.
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Unlike HUD, the HFA's have been able to create rules that
have only local applicability or their personnel have been
so familiar with local circumstances that they have been able
to dispense with making a large number of rules. Presumably,
HUD could allow each of its area offices to create its own
rules and procedures subject only to the same requirements
with regard to national concerns faced by the state agencies
and statutory requirements related to mortgage insurance.
Such independent local HUD offices, unlike the HFA's, however,
would be completely independent of accountability to local
officials.
Jerome T. Murphy's description of how such accountability
led to a distortion of Federal priorities in the implementation
of Title I education funds provides a note of caution on the
ability of state agencies to implement housing programs in a
manner consistent with national interests. In that program,
Federal concerns for spending funds in impoverished areas
and establishing parent-teacher councils were neglected locally.
Weak enforcement by the U.S. Office of Education combined with
the vagueness of language in the statute necessary for passage
and Congressional intervention at the local level to facilitated
the subversion of the "real" objectives of the legislation by
local officials.
The Education Bureaucracies Implement Novel Policy," in Allan
P. Sindler, Policy and Politics in America, Boston: Little-Brown, 1973.
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The clarity with which Congress and the Courts have
articulated national concerns with regard to housing has made
state control of housing development a different story. State
housing finance agencies receiving Section 236 funds have had
to satisfy the same Federal standards as have HUD-insured
developments with regard to racial integration, environmental
protection, and equitable relocation. As was seen in the
evaluation chapter, based upon the data available, the states
have done as good if not a better job than has HUD in implementing
national objectives. Whether this finding would be true in
states outside the Northeast and Middle West with different
political cultures remains untested.
CHAPTER 8
AUTONOMY AND CONTROLS
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In his survey of organization studies, James L. Price
found that "organizations which have a high degree of autonomy
are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than
organizations which have a low degree of autonomy." By
autonomy, he meant the degree to which a social system has
the freedom to make decisions with respect to its environment.
While the amount of freedom that state housing finance
agencies have had to make decisions with respect to their
environment has varied from agency to agency, on the whole,
the HFA's have been more autonomous than HUD. Rather than
being a line agency within the executive branch of government,
nearly all HFA's have their own board of directors who make
basic policy decisions.
This autonomy will be seen to have contributed to the
relative effectiveness of the HFA's. Unlike HUD, the ability
of most of the HFA's to exist, expand, and to pay high salaries
depends more on their own financial success than upon direct
governmental appropriations. The first section of this chapter
will discuss how this profit orientation has increased HFA
effectiveness. As will be seen in the second section, the
independence of even the most autonomous HFA is far from complete.
Each is subject to certain controls by the governor, other
1James L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory
of Propositions (Richard D. Irwin: Homewood, Illinois, 1968),
p.96
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executive bureaus (especially auditors), the legislature,
the judiciary, and special interest groups. These outside
forces will be seen to direct HFA's toward the fulfillment
of their own goals and often, but not always, away from the
public purpose goals of the HFA.
PROFIT ORIENTATION
Most HFA's meet their administrative and bad-debt expenses
through the generation of arbitrage profits on the sale of their
notes and bonds. They issue mortgages at an interest rate of
between 0.25 and 1.00 percent above their own borrowing
rate in the tax-exempt capital and money markets. In addition,
they build into each mortgage one-time fees of between 0.3
and 6.0 percent. (See Table 18 in Chapter 4).
Financially autonomous HFA's can use increased profits
to provide increases in salaries or staff size. In 1972
when the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency generated a
sizable surplus after working long hours, the executive
director sounded out the rest of the staff as to whether
they wanted increases in salary and a continuation of long
hours, or an increase in staff size. A consensus favored
salary increases which the board of directors approved.
Since much of the MHFA staff left private enterprise at
middle age to join the agency, the move reaffirmed to them
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the connection between employer profits and employee benefits.
The relative abundance of MHFA reserves ($9.3 million at June
30, 1974) has further allowed them to engage in planning for
the risky rebuilding and conversion of two large scale low
income public housing developments into mixed income housing.
For the Michigan State Housing Development Authority
and the New York State Housing Finance Agency/Division of
Housing and Community Renewal where salaries are set by state
civil service regulations and all administrative expenses
are met by Legislative appropriations, increased profits or
profit potential are reflected in increases in staff size or
reduced fees. Between 1971 and 1974, the size of the MSHDA
staff increased from 42 to 158. The New York HFA/DHCR charges
the lowest fee at closing of any HFA (0.3 percent compared
with 1.0 or more for the others) and the second lowest annual
fee (0.3 percent plus $4.20 per room or about 0.37 percent
compared with 0.5 percent for most of the others).
While all of the moxt autonomous HFA's are profit oriented,
not all of them have been able to generate a profit. The
inability of the New York State Urban Development Corporation
to generate sufficient profits led to a one-third reduction
in its workforce, and has left a cloud over its ability to
continue operations. Similarly, as discussed in Appendix A,
the inability of the North Carolina Housing Corporation to
generate its own income resulted in its formal termination
by the North Carolina Legislature.
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While HUD charges fees similar to those charged by HFA's
(0.8 percent in examination and inspection fees plus an annual
0.5 percent mortgage insurance premium), the generation of
these fees has no effect on their administrative budget or
ability to satisfy claims resulting from assignments on
properties insured under Section 236 and other socially oriented
programs. Losses on Section 236 and certain other loans in
excess of the amount of premiums paid into the Special Risk
Insurance Fund backing these projects, are guaranteed by
Congressional mandate. The authorization for such payments
has the same legal effect as the "moral obligation" provisions
backing state housing finance agency bonds. While the 91st
Congress authorized the expenditure of whatever funds that
might be necessary to meet any deficits in the Special Risk
Insurance Fund, future Congresses have no legal obligation,
although they have a definite moral obligation to meet them.
While HUD has yet to ask Congress for a direct appropriation,
it has frequently borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to meet
the deficits in the Special Risk Insurance Fund (See Table
15, Chapter 4).
The reason that HUD has had to do so and the reason that
the State agencies, aside from UDC, have not had to do anything
similar can be traced in large part to expectations. In
creating a separate fund with a title including the words
"special risk," Congress clearly enunciated its intent that
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mortgages insured under the program be of a risky nature.
Most of the HFA's, on the other hand, particularly those
that have undergone a court test making explicit the tentative
legal nature of the moral backing, have regarded this backing
merely as an additional protection for conservation bond
investors. Members of HFA board, in particular, have regarded
the fiscal soundness of each individual project as the pre-
eminent consideration.
In terms of generating large-scale production, however,
the bureaucratic incentives to expand found at HUD have been
just as successful as the profit incentives found at the
HFA's. As seen in Chapter 4, both HUD and the HFA's in
aggregate have contributed to the production of virtually
the same number of moderate income dwelling units in the
states under study. While the number of states examined
is toosmall to make a definitive assertion, the profit
incentive of HFA's does seem to have produeced a more optimal
distribution of projects than the untempered organizational
incentive to expand found at the local HUD office. The
HFA's have outproduced local HUD offices in those states where
vacancy rates have been low and a large volume of new con-
struction is desirable, and the reverse has been true where
vacancy rates have been high. The ability of local markets
to absorb new housing has affected the production totals of
the various HFA's. The Illinois Housing Development Authority
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and the Michigan State Housing Development Authority which
operate in states with relatively high rental vacancy rates
(6.6 percent and 8.0 percent, respectively) have both been
more cautious in financing projects than have been the state
agencies in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, three
states with low vacancy rates overall (4.8 percent, 3.5
percent, and 3.0 percent, respectively). This caution is
seen in the importance IHDA and MSHDA place on market studies.
The untempered drive for high production of the Urban
Development Corporation throughout New York State, particularly
on sites where in its role as developer, it had made an initial
investment, however, was a key factor in causing its financial
hardships. While UDC's large volume approach in the New
York City area where the rental vacancy rate was only 2.1
percent in 1970 may have been appropriate in most instances,
in the Buffalo area where the vacancy rate was 4.5 percent and
even the "least desirable" tenants had a wide choice as
where to live, the same approach proved disastrous. Although
construction had been completed for at least a year on five
projects in relatively undesirable parts of the Buffalo area,
as of October 31, 1974, they had a combined occupancy rate of
2
only 68 percent (829 out of 1196 units).
1Vacancy rates are 1970 figures for rental units taken from
U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book, 1972, p. 6.
2 UDC Department of Management and Regulation, "Management
Status Report," pp. 3-4.
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The resulting losses have led to changes in UDC's procedures
in qualifying projects. Clearly, where marketability is
a real issue, a cautious approach must be taken to avoid
vacancy problems. Where markets are tight, the maximization
of production is the correct approach. In either instance,
the profit incentives found with the HFA's are likely to
induce the use of proper approach.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS
Despite their autonomy in fiscal affairs and independent
board of directors, the HFA's are subject to controisby various
actors, including governors, auditors, civil service boards,
legislators, courts, and special interest groups. As will
be seen, these controls have often but not always limited
HFA effectiveness.
Gubernatorial Controls
Governors, by the nature of their positions, have broader
concerns than housing, including such matters as state growth
policy, the fiscal integrity of the state, and partisan
politics. They have been able to exert a certain measure of
control over housing finance agencies with regard to these and
other matters through their appointments and influence.
1Report of UDC Task Force, p. B.5.13.
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The primary control exercized by governors over housing
finance agencies is in the selection of members of the board
of directors. In most states, however, such selections are
subject to the advise and consent of the state senate and
other restrictions. While Massachusetts is the only state
among those with advanced HFA's which does not require sena-
torial confirmation, it does require that the governor appoint
one member experienced in mortgage banking, one trained in
architecture or city or regional planning, and one experienced
in real estate transactions. All of the HFA's except Illinois
reserve one or more positions on the board for ex officio
directors who are specified public officials generally appointed
by the governor to serve in other capacities. Illinois
limits the number of board members residing in a single
county to no more than three out of a total of seven, and,
along with Michigan, requires a balance of representation
by political party.
The amount and nature of influence that governors have
been able to exert through their appointees on boards, however,
has varied from governor to governor. New Jersey Governor
Thomas Cahill retained strong control over board actions
during his years in office between 1969 and 1973. One staff
member described the tone of decision making on the board
level during the Cahill years as being "political." Whenever
a choice had to be made between funding two projects desired
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by local communities, invariably the one located in the city
or town whose mayor had the ear of the governor would win.
In policy areas, Cahill succeeded in blocking the advocacy
of low and moderate income housing by the New Jersey HFA
in suburban towns. Most other HFA boards have been more
independent of gubernatorial control.
Governor Francis Sargent of Massachusetts exerted his
influence on that state's HFA in a different direction.
He pushed for the construction of low and moderate income
housing in Cape Cod. Permanent residents of that resort
area had carried out a highly publicized demonstration against
their being displaced to make way for more affluent summer
residents. The Governor responded to their action by calling
upon MHFA to build housing there. While MHFA previously
had not built any housing in that section of the state,
within a little over a year after the Governor's request,
it had begun construction of 570 dwelling units with 230
more committed. These figures compare with an estimated
need of 600 units there.
Similarly, Governor Nelson Rockefeller was able to
save Griffiss Air Base from being moved outside the state
through his influence with the New York UDC Board. In 1970,
the Air Force was deciding whether to expand facilities at
that base or discontinue operations there entirely. The
major problem was the shortage of adequate housing nearby
for families. When Governor Rockefeller learned of the
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problem, he asked UDC to act upon the problem in concert with
the Division of Housing and Community Renewal and the Depart-
ment of Commerce. The result was the construction of the 500
dwelling units through UDC. Not all of the projects advo-
cated by Governor Rockefeller, however, were pursued. According
to UDC staff persons interviewed, UDC rejected several projects
initially supported by the governor which it believed infeasi-
ble.
In some states, governors have more appointive powers
than just the board of directors. With regard to the Illinois
Housing Development Authority and the New York State Urban
Development Corporation, the governor has the statutory power
to appint the executive director. In other instances, including
New Jersey, gubernatorial influence with the board has allowed
him to effectively choose the executive director as well.
On occasion, governors also have taken it upon themselves
to suggest names of individuals for lower staff positions
2
on HFA's. In Massachusetts, the governor has recommended
one or two well qualified individuals who did receive positions.
In New York, well qualified persons recommended by the governor
have often received positions in the field with the Division
'New York State Urban Development Corporation, 1970 Annual
Report, p. 47.
2All information regarding such appointments is based upon
interviews with officials in each agency.
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of Housing and Community Renewal while poorly qualified
individuals have been rejected. In New Jersey, however,
Governor Cahill saw to it that one or two unqualified and
inexperienced individuals obtained employment as project
directors for the NJHFA at the highest salary grade for
the job. While governors in Illinois have refrained from
sending job-seekers to the Illinois Housing Development
Authority, the Authority did hire one person sent to it by
Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago. Otherwise, IHDA has steered
clear of the Daley organization.
The Board of Directors structure has preserved for all
of the HFA's far more autonomy than is likely to be the
case with direct gubernatorial control. In Hawaii, where
the Hawaii Housing Authority comes under the direct control
of the governor, Governor John A.Burns has limited the housing
development staff of the Authority to just four, despite
the fact that arbitrage income from the sale of bonds could
pay for a far larger staff.
Auditor Controls
Another executive officer who has some control over
housing finance agencies is the state auditor. In each of
the five states being considered closely, the auditor makes
periodic audits of the local HFA. The net effect of these
audits has been to keep them slightly more honest and require
them to adopt and adhere to more bureaucratic procedures. In
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New Jersey and Illinois, these audits have involved only
a post-audit of financial statements prepared and audited
by an independent accounting firm. In neither of these
two states has the state auditor found any discrepancies.
The private auditor in Illinois did suggest minor changes in
accounting procedures which the Illinois Housing Development
Authority adopted. In New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan,
the state auditor has made independent investigations into
programmatic as well as financial areas. While recommenda-
tions of state auditors carry no enforcement authority, the
HFA's have accepted most of these recommendations.
The most recent state audit of the New York State Urban
Development Corporation was conducted in 1971. The most
serious charge which was leveled by the state auditor was
that UDC had been purchasing land prior to making the statu-
torily required finding that all housing developments be located
in areas with a need for safe and sanitary housing which
private industry cannot provide and that industrial develop-
ments be located in substandard or insanitary areas where they
can prevent or reduce unemployment or underemployment. UDC
replied that suburban solutions are often necessary to solve
urban problems, and that limitations on UDC's ability to
acquire land and make other expenditures prior to making
1Office of the Comptroller, "Report on Survey of the Initial
Financial and Operating Practices: New York State Urban
Development Corporation," Report No. NY-Auth-5-71.
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the requisite findings would "...impede UDC's ability to
act swiftly and effectively, and impose upon the Corporation
impractical and inflexible limitations." In November of
1972, the New York State Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit
brought by the Rochester suburb, Greece, which challenged
2
UDC's right to construct housing in suburban areas.
The audit report also recommended that UDC award all of
its construction contracts on the basis of bids rather than
negotiations. UDC rejected this suggestion as being too
time-consuming, too costly, and incompatible with the need
to secure equity financing and long-term ownership and manage-
ment from the builder/developer. UDC however, did accept
several recommendations made by the comptroller, including
suggestions to use pro forma contracts, to re-use certain
pre-existing architectural plans, to devise and install a
system of records and internal controls, and to reevaluate
its fee structure.
The auditor in Massachusetts has used extremely biting
2
language to make several substantively minor points. One
set of criticisms related to the provision of certain fringe
Annual Report of the New York State Urban Development Corpora-
tion: 1972, p. 52.
2Massachusetts Department of the State Auditor, "Report on
the Examination of the Accounts of the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972," No. 73-A-39.
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benefits to employees, like rental cars for private use,
which are common in private industry but prohibited in state
government. Other criticisms related to the use of more
conventional accounting procedures. The Massachusetts HFA
accepted these accounting changes.
In Michigan, a state with a strong good government
tradition, both the Office of the Auditor General and the
Office of Program Effectiveness Review have conducted exten-
sive audits of that state's HFA. The Auditor General reports
have come out on a semi-annual basis, and have reviewed
virtually every possible deviation MSHDA has made from its
established rules on every project. Various reports cited
such deviations as:
1) On a few particular projects, MSHDA failed
to fully document in the files how it arrived
at particular land valuations even though sub-
sequent investigations showed that it had al-
ways followed its own rules or had made a
conscious but reasonable decision to waive
them.
2) Six of twenty reports 2submitted by management
agents were unsigned.
3) Certain documents were not in the files at
the time of the audit, although were located
subsequently. 3
1Office of Auditor General, Audit Report: Michigan State
Housing Development Authority, Department of Social Services,
July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1972, pp. 4-7, and Ibid.,
July 1, 1971 through June 30, 1972, p. 23.
2 Ibid., July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1972, pp. 10-11.
31bid., p. 32.
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4) Six of sixteen architectural inspection contracts 1
reviewed were not dated, although properly signed.
As the result of other findings, the Auditor General
has pushed MSHDA into creating new rules. For example,
he recommended that:
1) MSHDA provide managing and marketing agents
with "written policy" to define such administra-
tions criteria as whether an unborn child is to
be counted as a minor in computing adjusted
income, under what conditions the limitation
on number of bedrooms required may be waived,
and the proper procedure ;or certifying incomes
of self-employed persons.
2) MSHDA establish policy upon which to base its
approvals in allowing expenses to be paid from
the replacement reserves of MSHDA-insured devel-
opments and designate staff to approve these
expenses.3
3) MSHDA "maintain time schedules, production logs,
and establish oals or standards with which to
measure output on rented magnetic card type-
writers in order that the auditor be able to
determine if MSHDA has rented too many of these
typewriters. This recommendation came despite
the fact that secretaries had waited before
gaining access to these typewriters when fewer
of them were being rented.4
As will be seen more clearly in the chapter on organizational
structure and dynamics, such requirements to formulate and
lOffice of Auditor General, Audit Report: Michigan State
Housing Development Authority, Department of Social Services,
July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1972, p.. 3 1 .
2 Ibid., July 1, 1971 through June 30, 1972, p. 12.
3Ibid., p. 13.
4 Ibid., January 1, 1973 through June 30, 1973, p. 37.
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adhere to formal rules and procedures have had a negative
effect on agency effectiveness.
The Michigan Office of Program Effectiveness in its Sub-
sidized Housing Program: An Assessment of Effectiveness
raised several important questions relating to the rationale
for MSHDA's production programs. The questions it asked are
similar to the ones that have been raised on a national level.
It asked whether a need exists for the state to continue to
stimulate the production of housing, what income levels will
continue to need assistance over the long term to afford
"standard" housing, and what social problems can be expected
to abate as the result of the provision of "standard" housing.
In a state like Michigan with a vacancy rate above the national
average, these questions are serious ones. The most serious
effect of this report on the activities of MSHDA, however,
appears to have been to have them perform some analytic
soul-searching.
Civil Service Controls
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA)
along with the New York State HFA and Division of Housing
and Community Renewal are alone among the first and second
generation of HFA's in being subject to civil service regula-
tions. These regulations have had an effect in determining
the type of person coming to work at these agencies despite
attempts to evade them. The overwhelming majority of employees
of the Michigan agency are under the age of 35. This fact
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reflects the relatively high salary level provided to recent
college graduates working in Michigan civil service as compared
with private enterprise and relatively low salary level for
civil servants with more experience. By contrast, Federal
civil service regulations which cover HUD employees provide
strong incentives for long-term civil service. The protec-
tions given by civil service against firing have further
increased the tenure of HUD employees.
MSHDA and the New York HFA have, however, succeeded in
hiring employees on the basis of more relevant criteria than
civil service ratings. Reportedly, on certain occasions,
MSHDA has asked higher scoring but less desirable applicants
to step aside for an applicant judged by the agency to be
better qualified for the particular job.
Legislative Controls
State legislatures have also retained for themselves a
measure of control over the activities of the HFA's. In the
extreme case, as exemplified by the North Carolina Housing
Corporation, the Legislature can disband agency operations
entirely.
Legislative oversight of the operations of most HFA's
recurs on a regular basis. With the exception of New Jersey,
legislatures have placed limits on the bonding capacities
of HFA's. Whenever any HFA comes close to bumping up against
these limits, the legislature will embark on a review of
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agency actions. Except for the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation's late 1974 request, legislatures have
always acceded to providing higher limits, but frequently
have amended HFA enabling legislation in other ways as well.
In Michigan, MSHDA's request to raise its bonding capacity
from $300 million to $800 million resulted in an increase
to only $600 as well as the imposition of the requirements
that MSHDA restrict its operating expense to an amount appro-
priated annually by the Legislature, and that all future
MSHDA multi-family developments provide housing for a minimum
1
of 15 percent low income families.
In Massachusetts, the 1970 increase in MHFA's bonding
capacity to $500 million carried the stipulation that $100
million of this bonding capacity be used in municipalities
2
with an unemployment rate of at least 6 percent. The high
unemployment rate in a large number of cities and towns in
Massachusetts, however, has made this stipulation inconse-
quential. Since Massachusetts has a state interest subsidy
3
program for which appropriations are required annually,
the Legislature reviews at least a portion of MHFA's activities
each year.
lState ofMichigan, Act 310, P.A. 1972.
2 Section 9C. 855 of the Acts of 1970.
3M.G.L.A. c.23A App. Sec. 1-13A.
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The trimming of New York State UDC's zoning override
powers represents the clearest illustration of limits being
placed on the autonomy of state housing finance agencies.
The original enabling legislation gave UDC broad powers to
override local zoning. Yet, UDC's first attempt to utilize
these powers in defiance of local authorities led to the
granting of veto power to villages and towns objecting to a
UDC override.
In addition to the control they exert as part of a body,
legislators attempt to exert influence as individuals. The
Illinois Housing Development Authority used a portion of its
specially appropropriated land development fund to promote
the construction of a subdivision in a small town that was
the home of an influential legislator, despite the fact
that staff members interviewed saw the loan as being a low
priority item except for its political ramifications. The
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency has adhered to a policy
of merely explaining to an inquiring legislator the status
of a particular project and the reasons for any rejection.
Legislative influence on individual HUD-insured projects
seems to be more pervasive than on individual projects at
state agencies. The Task Force on Improving the Operation
of Federally Insured or Financed Housing Programs found in
its examination of the HUD decision-making process for multi-
family developments that, "Political and market considerations
will always affect these decisions. To satisfy a particular
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Congressman, it may be necessary to provide an allocation for
a project in his district--so long as it meets minimum standards
of acceptability." Interviews with HUD officials confirmed
that such practices occur, at least at certain local offices.
The indictment of Senator Edward Gurney of Florida for improper
influence wielding at HUD represents another case in point.
Judicial Controls
A further type of potential control over the independence
of state housing finance agencies comes from the state judiciary.
Yet, only rarely have the courts blocked action by HFA's.
Most HFA's have won court cases brought by "friendly" plaintiffs
to test the Constitutionality of the agency and thereby
ensure the salability of their bonds. In one "friendly"
case and in the two instances where constitutionality tests
have been brought for other motives, the outcome was less
favorable for the HFA. A South Carolina Court ruled that
the moral obligation provision backing bonds that might be
issued by that state's HFA "sidestepped" a vote of the people
in allocated state tax funds. At this writing, the case was
2
being appealed by the agency. The Massachusetts legislature
1Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of Federally
Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Vol. III: Multifamily
Housing (Washington,D.C.: National Center for Housing Manage-
ment), pp. 195-96.
2Housing and Development Reporter, January 5, 1975, p.1013.
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asked its Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion
concerning proposed legislation to create MHFA. The Court
ruled that the agency would have to serve "low" rather than
"moderate" income families in order to be constitutional.
The other case is one which occurred in Oregon where a retired
legislator acting as a private citizen brought suit against
the Oregon Division of Housing claiming that the new financing
powers given to it constitute an unconstitutional pledge of
state resources. The claim has been upheld by the trial
2
court and is now before an appeals court.
Interest Group Controls
State housing finance agencies affect the economic well-
being of several types of powerful interests, including
mortgage bankers, savings and loan associations, homebuilders,
investment bankers, and bond counsels. Each of these interests
have attempted to exert their influence on the activities of
state housing finance agencies through input into the enabling
legislation. At the same time, the HFA's have attempted to
coopt these interests by naming their representatives to
HFA boards and special committees.
Despite differences in requirements and in governors,
board appointments have followed relatively predictable patterns
1Opinion of Justices, 320 Mass. 773.
2Housing and Development Reporter, February 24, 1975, p.865 .
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with regard to occupations. As can be seen from Table 29,
the typical board of directors of state HFA's consists of
seven members: a banker (from either a commercial bank or
thrift institution), a builder or realtor, a non-real estate
businessman, an attorney, the director of the state department
of community affairs, a state fiscal officer, and one other
member who might be a planner, a labor representative, an
investment banker, a municipal officer, a nonprofit housing
agency director, or a professor.
Another proposition induced by Price in his study of
organization studies was that:
Organizations which have major elite cooptation
are more likely to have a high degree of effect-
iveness than organizations which do not have a
major elite cooptationA-
In the classical study on cooptation, Philip Selznick attri-
buted much of the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority
as an institution to its coopting cE the land-grant colleges,
the county-agent system, and the Farm Bureau Federation at
2
the expense of poor farmers.
Similarly, as this section will show, the cooptation
of elite by state housing finance agencies has contributed
to agency financial success, although in certain instances
1James L. Price, op. cit., p. 110.
2Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1949).
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Table 29
State Housing Finance Agency
Boards of Directors by Occupation, 1973
Illinois Mass. Mich. NJ
HDA HFA SHDA HFA
Bankers:
Mortgage
Commercial
Thrift
Investment
Regula tory
NYS
HFA
NYS Conn. Kent. Maine Minn. Mo.-
UDC HFA HC SHA HFA HDB
Ohio Virg. W. Total
HDB HDA VA.
HDF
_______ 4 1 -r t t r 1 7
Aa
Business:
Realtors a a a A aa a 7
Builders A a a Aaa A 7
Industrialists a a a 3
Commercial Aa ae ee ae aa ae 12
Professional:
Attorneys/AG aa e Aa aae Ae a e 12
Planners a ae e a 5
Educators a a 2
Other Public Officials:
Finance/Treas. e e e ee ee ee e e e 12
Cmty. Affs./Soc. Serv. e e E e e e e 7
Local a aa A a 5
Other:
Nonprofit Developers a a a 3
Labor a a a 3
Other ? a a ?e 5
Key: a= appointed; e= ex officio; ?= unknown; Caps. = Chairman.
Sources: Annual Reports and Official Statements
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the same elite have managed to use the HFA's as a vehicle
toward achieving their own ends rather than the intended
public purposes. The reciprocal impacts that the special
interest groups and the HFA's have on each other will be
examined in turn for each special interest.
Mortgage bankers, who finance over 60 percent of all
HUD-insured multi-family developments and a majority of
2
all conventional multi-families, have been the most vocifer-
ous opponents of HFA's. While HUD uses mortgage bankers
as intermediaries, the HFA's work directly with developers.
Robert Lambrecht, President of Lambrecht Realty Company in
Detroit, Michigan, appearing at a panel discussion entitled
"State Housing Finance Agencies: Customer or Competitor?"
at 1974 annual meeting of the National Mortgage Bankers
Association, pointed out the mortgage bankers' chief complaint
by saying:
HFA's are a competitor in the sense that they are
pursuing an area that has been traditionally held
by us, but they have an unfair competitive qdvan-
tage because they can loan at a lower rate.
Lambrecht and the Mortgage Bankers Association of Michigan
had been in the forefront of opposition to raising the bonding
1U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1971 HUD
Statistical Yearbook, p. 175.
2Housing and Development Reporter, 1974, p. E-1.
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limit of the Michigan State Housing Development Authority
from $300 million to $800 million. They succeeded in per-
suading the Michigan Legislature to restrict MSHDA's bonding
limit to $600 million and require them to include 15 percent
low income families in each development. MSHDA is now attempting
to coopt the mortgage bankers by holding meetings with their
leadership on a regular basis and by allowing them to receive
a .75 percent fee for submitting applications from developers
to them. Similarly, the Illinois Housing ;Development Authority
in a political move began allowing mortgage bankers to receive
a 0.7 percent fee for doing similar paper shuffling. By
comparison, mortgage bankers can receive up to a 2 percent
financing fee on HUD developments, although few receive the
1
maximum amount. In Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York, where mortgage bankers have less political clout, they
receive no such fees.
In several of the states with newer housing finance
agencies, mortgage bankers have succeeded in restricting the
extent to which the HFA can engage in direct lending. In
Louisiana, the HFA can only engage in secondary lending.
Mortgage bankers and other private lenders will be able to
sell mortgages which they have initiated to the HFA. Mortgage
bankers succeeded in inserting into the enabling legislation
1Report of the Task Force on Improving Housing Programs, p. 111.
314
for the Tennessee Housing Finance Agency and the new North
Carolina Housing Finance Agency language that restricts the
direct lending roles of these agencies to circumstances where
they will act in a non-competitive manner. The Tennessee
statute reads:
However, the agency will not make or participate
in the making of any insured mortgage loan until
it has notified all qualified lenders that the
insured mortgage loan program is effective and
that the agency is prepared to enter into working
agreements with qualified lenders for the making
of insured mortgage loans to qualified sponsors,
developers, builders, and purchasers; and it has
determined that the insured mortgage is not avail-
able, totally or in part from private qualified
lenders upon reasonably equivalent terms and con-
ditions.1
Mortgage banker opposition in the State of Washington has
2
thus far kept that state from enacting an HFA.
All four of the banking institutions who have officials
sitting on the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority Board
of Directors have participated in the Authority's mortgage
3
purchase program as originators and servicers. Included
have been John P. Eveleth, Assistant Vice-President of the
New Britain National Bank; Kendrick F. Bellows, Jr., Executive
Vice President of the Connecticut Bank and Trust Company;
1Public Acts, 1973, Chapter 241, Section 7.
2 1nterview with H. Milton Patton, Council of State Govern-
ments.
3Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, Report to the Governor
and the State Banking Commissioner for the Period Ending
December 31, 1972, March 30, 1973.
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Edward K. Sentivany, Jr., Vice President of HNC Mortgage
and Realty Investors, a subsidiary of the Hartford National
Bank and Trust Co. In addition, Alex L. Glecker, CHFA's
Assistant Director for Finance and Mortgage Credit, immedi-
ately prior to coming to the Authority served as Vice President
in Charge of Mortgage Loans for the Lomas-Nettleton Company-,
another originator and servicer of CHFA mortgages. The five
banking institutions mentioned represented half of the insti-
tutions doing business with the Authority in 1972 and 1973.
While the Connecticut Legislature has taken no steps to
eliminate such conflicts of interest, it has amended the
CHFA statute to provide more of a balance of interests on
future boards. All appointments made after May, 1972, must
contribute to balancing that agency's board with persons
experienced in all aspects of housing design, development,
management, and state and local finance as well as housing
2
finance.
The Virginia Housing Development Authority has been
more discrete with regard to a potential conflict of interest
situation. When it began considering the purchase of a
mortgage from the Virginia Investment and Mortgage Corporation,
1Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, Official Statement
Dated December 7, 1973, Housing Mortgage Finance Program
Bonds, 1974 Series A. p. 6.
21972 P.A. 208, S. 3.
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Mr. Richard J. Davis, the President of the Corporation and
Commissioner of the Authority, removed himself from the
deliberations and vote on the matter. This control over
HFA's by mortgage bankers is hardly different from their
control over certain HUD offices. According to one high
official in HUD's Central Office, mortgage bankers actually
selected the director of one of the Tennessee field offices.
Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks
have on the whole adopted a more neutral, if not favorable
attitude toward direct lending by the HFA's. They have
also had a somewhat greater presence on HFA boards. Unlike
with the mortgage bankers, the bulk of the lending done by
the thrift institutions is on single family homes, an area
largely ignored by the HFA's. The only HFA's that have
provided mortgage money for single-family homes have been
Michigan (2175 units through June 30, 1974, all of which have
1
been HUD-insured), and the Maryland, Virginia, and West
Virginia agencies, which had each financed about 1000 units by
late 1974. The only multi-family lending done by the thrift
institutions is almost exclusively conventional, generally
serving a higher income bracket than the HFA's. More important
to these institutions than the competition, however, has been
the fact that the HFA's provide secondary loans, and hold out
'The Maryland Community Development Administration requires
two letters of rejection from private lenders before it will
make a loan.
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the possibility of restoring older neighborhoods where the
thrift institutions hold mortgages on properties depreciated
by general neighborhood decline.
Nevertheless, certain voices within the thrift institu-
tion community have urged that these institutions take a
cautious approach regarding the HFA's. In a United States
Savings and Loan League publication, Kenneth J. Thygerson
writes:
The extremely fast growth of these agencies and
the potential arbitrage profits they can generate
indicate a strong desire on the part of the state
legislatures to increase the level of operations
of these agencies. If this occurs, as now seems
apparent, the earning position of the specialized
lending intermediary will continue to suffer. 1
Commercial banks have generally supported the creation
and continued existence of HFA's, despite the fact that
commercial banks in several states have initially objected
to the concept. Sources interviewed generally cited the
initial opposition of Bank of America as a reason for Governor
Ronald Reagan's veto of legislation creating an HFA in Cal-
ifornia. An intensive lobbying campaign, however, succeeded
in changing the bank's official position more recently, but
not in changing that of the governor.
While HFA's do provide a limited measure of lending
competition for the commercial banks, they also provide
1Kenneth J. Thygerson, The Effect of Government Housing and
Mortgage Credit Programs on Savings and Loan Assodiations
(US Savings and Loan League: Chicago, 1973), p. 145.
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depository accounts and opportunities to hold and sell tax-
exempt notes and bonds. Not only do HFA's deposit a portion
of their own funds in accounts in commercial banks, but
they also see to it that developers have funds to deposit
before paying subcontractors and material suppliers, and
that property managers have rent money to deposit before
paying bills. Generally, local commercial banks will serve
as co-underwriters of HFA note and bond issues. The tax-
exempt feature of these notes and bonds provide them with
lucrative short-term investment opportunities during loose
money periods and profit opportunities on the sale of all
maturities of notes and bonds during tight money periods.
At the same time they are making money, the commercial
banks feel they are performing a community service.
While in most states homebuilders have supported the
creation and growth of state housing finance agencies,
certain local homebuilder groups have prevented the creation
of HFA's in their home states. The basic reasons for home-
builder support is that the HFA's provide an alternative
means of financing and open up new markets. The prime
reason for local opposition is the regulations they can
be expected to impose. In Michigan, while homebuilders
initially were cool to MSHDA, since the appointment of the
Vice President of the Michigan Association of Home Builders
to the MSHDA Board, they have become MSHDA's strongest
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ally. In Georgia and Wisconsin, homebuilders' support was
instrumental in securing the creation of HFA's by local
state legislatures. The executive director of the Oregon
Division of Housing has overcome latent homebuilder oppo-
sition to the fulfillment of his organization's new HFA
powers by assuring them that the Division will only require
2
that builders meet local code standards. Opposition by
homebuilders on Ohio and Texas to the creation of HFA's
with full powers in those states has been strong and effec-
tive. The chief complaint of Ohio homebuilders, particularly
those from downstate, had been that the HFA's would require
3
the payment of prevailing wages.
The two groups that have most consistently and most
strongly supported the creation of HFA's have been invest-
ment bankers and bond counsels. Whenever a state legislator
or administrator in a state without a housing finance agency
files a bill to create one or even begins to consider filing
a bill, a whole flock of Wall Street investment bankers
and bond counsels will descend upon the state capital with
offers to prepare legal language, give expert testimony,
and pay for drinks and dinners. The purpose of this gener-
osity is, of course, for the individual firm to be named
In an interview with the author, David L. Froh, MSHDA's
executive director, provided the information that the
homebuilders have been MSHDA's strongest ally.
2 Seminar given by Gregg Smith, Executive Director, Oregon
Division of Housing.
3 Interview with J. Denis O'Toole, Nat'l. Asso. of Homebuilders.
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as an underwriter for agency notes and bonds or as bond
counsel. In South Dakota, an investment banker even ini-
tiated the idea for a state housing finance agency. There,
an investment banker who had worked with a particular leg-
islator on establishing a health and educational facilities
financing program suggested to him that tax-exempt bonds
could also be used to finance housing. The result was that
the two of them worked out a draft piece of legislation for
creating the South Dakota Housing Development Authority which
was quickly passed in 1973 without significant opposition.
The investment banking firm then became the managing under-
writers for the new Authority.
Bond underwriters for the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation have secured their right to sell UDC bonds
through a slightly different process. After George D. Woods,
a director, advisor, consultant, stockholder, and retired
officer of the First Boston Corporation and J. Fred Schoellkoph
IV, Chairman of the Board and stockholder of Marine Midland
Banks, were named to serve as members of the UDC Board, the
Board selected the First Boston Corporation and an affiliate
of Marine Midland Banks as managing underwriter and cd-underwriter,
respectively. Both of these board members, however, have
While Schoellkoph is now deceased, Charles A. Winding, the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of Marine-Midland Banks
has been named to the UDC Board.
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refrained from voting on matters directly related to the
sale of bonds. Woods left the Board at the end of 1974
at the expiration of his term.
In conclusion, while the relative financial autonomy
of the HFA's and consequent profit motivation has been instru-
mental in their success, controls imposed by various parties
have restricted their autonomy and in certain respects reduced
their effectiveness.
CHAPTER 9
DEGREE OF BUREAUCRATIZATION
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The organization and operation of state housing finance
agencies on the whole has been less bureaucratic than that
of HUD. This lesser degree of bureaucratization is a major
reason why the HFA's generally have performed more effectively
than HUD and why particular HFA's have performed better than
others. The first section of this chapter provides a theoretical
basis for this conclusion. While the definition of "bureaucratic"
has varied from author to author, a majority of those writing
on the subject have agreed on five characteristics: hierarchy
of authority, division of labor, procedures for work situations,
rules, and technical competency for participation. Only with
regard to technical competency has HUD generally been less
bureaucratic. The second section of this chapter, entitled
"Structural Complexity," discusses the impact that two of the
characteristics of bureaucracy, hierarchy of authority and
division of labor, have had on agency performance. The third
section, on degree of formalization, uses the characteristics
of procedures for work situations and rules to explain certain
aspects of the differences found in agency success. In addi-
tion, it gives passing reference to the final bureaucratic
characteristic, technical competency.
1Richard Hall, Organizations: Structure and Process,(Prentice
Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972), page 66.
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THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF BUREAUCRACY
In many circumstances, organizations that behave in
bureaucratic manners are the most effective in reaching
their goals. Max Weber, the father of bureaucracy, posited
that the more formalized, stratified, and compartmentalized
an organization becomes, the more effective it will be.
Peter Blau added backing to certain of Weber's propositions
in his study of state employment security offices in which
he found that those offices with the most extensive regulations
were the most efficient in terms of man-hours to perform the
task. James L. Price, in his summation of organization studies,
concluded that:
... organizations which have a high degree of
specialized departmentalization are more likely
to have a high degree of effectiveness than
organizations which have a lw degree of spec-
ialized departmentalization.
The one caveat that Price placed on this conclusion was that
the rule applied "except where there is a high degree of
complexity" in terms of the degree of knowledge required to
produce the output. Similarly, Charles B. Perrow found that:
1Max Weber, Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1946), pp. 196-244.
2John L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory
of Propositions, (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1968), p. 168.
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...before an organization's problems can be
solved, it is essential to determine the
nature of the organization. Once the deter-
mination is made, some administrative proverbs
may apply very well, but others may be irrel-
evant or even invalid.1
Like Price, Perrow determined that the complexity of organ-
izational inputs determines whether a bureaucratic structure
will help or hinder organizational effectiveness. Specifically,
he found that for organizations working with complex inputs
to be effective, they require the informality and flexibility
afforded by a minimum of rules and operating procedures and
the ease of communications found in a structurally simple
organization. The intuitive good sense of these propositions
comes through more clearly in the language of William H.
Starbuck:
A highly flexible and informal organization is
poorly adapted to a stable set of problems, just
as a highly inflexible and formal organization 2
is poorly adapted to an unstable set of problems.
The nature of public purpose housing development is clearly
complex, and poses an unstable set of problems. While
diagrams, by their nature, simplify relationships, Figure 1
hints at the complexity of the development process from the
point of view of the developer, particularly when public
1Charles B. Perrow, Organizational Analysis: A Sociological
View (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1970),
p. T5. See also Richard Hall, Organizations: Structure and
Process (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 168.
2William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development,"
in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by J.G. March (Chicago:
Rand McNally: 1964), p. 481.
FIGURE 1
FVNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN NORMAL AND PBLIC PURPOSE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
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327
purpose goals are involved. As can be seen in the diagram,
the interrelationships between the various steps provides
much of the complexity. While certain steps on the chart
are inapplicable to many projects, other steps, such as
overcoming contractor bonding problems, obtaining financing
for ancillary facilities, and clearing of title difficulties
might apply. This imprecision in the number of steps involved
is another element of complexity. In addition, each step
listed is likely to involve numerous sub-steps interrelated
to the entire process. For example, the obtaining of community
support may require researching the local power structure,
appearing at community group meetings, organizing a citizen
support group, negotiating problem decisions with them, and
engaging in a dozen other similar activities. Obtaining
tax abatement may involve engaging the services of a local
attorney, securing the support of the mayor and city council
through the making of programmatic concessions, submitting
applications to the tax assessor's office and state attorney
general's office, appearing at a hearing, negotiating the
amount of the abatement, and/or any number of similar tasks.
Each substep of each step involves uncertainty and risk.
The public purpose housing development lender or insurer,
even if not participating directly in each step, must keep
in mind the complexities and interrelationship involved in
the entire process. It must constantly make intricate trade-
offs with regard to such choices as:
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Adding amenities versus reducing rents;
Increasing the construction budget versus increasing
the operations budget;
Providing good design versus providing quality hardware;
Meeting the needs of low income families versus ensuring
marketability;
Satisfying programmatic goals versus catering to
political realities;
Maximizing production versus protecting the environment;
Pushing developers to make concessions versus attracting
reputable developers; and
Allowing developers, architects, and managers freedom
to be creative versus controlling against ill-conceived
projects.
Each of these decisions must be looked at in the context of
the development as a whole, with each development demanding
a unique solution. Given this complexity, proper application
of organizational theory clearly demands structural simplicity
and operational flexibility.
STRUCTURAL SIMPLICITY
The two primary measures of organizational simplicity
or complexity used by organizational theorists are span of
control and layers of hierarchy. Span of control means the
number of divisions or subdivisions an administrator has
under his immediate control; layers of hierarchy means the
number of levels of command within an organization from the
lowest level to the chief executive. Complex tasks require
narrow spans of control, generally taken to be less than four.
In the words of Charles Perrow:
But if the tasks are not routine, if they require
discretion and if there is considerable interdependence
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and uncertainty surrounding them, the span of
control is best kept small. This permits the
subordinates and the superior to consult fre-
quently, to exchange information and ideas, and
frequently to reshuffle responsibilities in
search foy optimal solutions to difficult
problems.
At the same time, complex problems require direct communica-
tion between policy makers and those applying policy. The
large number of intermediaries found in overly hierarchial
2
organizations impedes such communication.
As can be seen in Table 30, nearly all of the state
HFA's have both narrower spans of control than HUD and fewer
hierarchial layers. While organizational size is a primary
3
determinant of both the number of layers and span of control,
certain HFA's have taken better advantage of their small size
than others in creating organizations which are structurally
more simple. The Illinois Housing Development Authority,
for example, which has a total staff of only about 50, has
4
a span of control of 8. The executive director and his
1Charles Perrow, op. cit., p. 19.
2Charles Perrow, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of
Organizations," American Sociological Review 32 (1967), p. 198.
3Peter M. Blau, "A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organiza-
tions," American Sociological Review 35 (1970), p. 204.
4Based on "Departmental Listing," January 25, 1974. The only
section not included in prior years was mortgage credit.
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Table 30
Measures of Structural Complexity
Hierarchical
Layers
HUD
Ill. Hsg. Dev't. Auth.
Mass. HFA
Mich. St. Hsg. Auth.
New Jersey HFA
New York DHCR
New York HFA
New York UDC
Span of Layers
Control of
Offices
7 - 9 3
8 1
Sources: Agency organizational charts and departmental listings.
% of
Employ-
ees in
Central
Office
22%
100%
100%
72%
90%
95%
100%
63%
Number
of
Employ-
ees
16,000
50
50
125
75
450
40
500
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assistant must directly supervise the heads of development,
architecture, site and market analysis, mortgage credit, con-
struction, management, marketing, and development advance
divisions. By contrast, the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, which has the same size staff, has a span of control
of only four. MHFA's development division performs the
tasks of IHDA's development, site and market, and mortgage
credit sections; MHFA's management division subsumes the equiv-
alent roles of IHDA's management and marketing sections.
The only IHDA function not performed by MRFA is the distribu-
tion of development advances. The narrow span of control at
MHFA has allowed decisions to be made on the basis of frequent
face-to-face communication between those who make and those
who implement policy rather than necessitating the use of
written memoes, and undoubtedly has contributed to its large
production and effective management of the high degree of risk
associated with public purpose development.
Specialization within particular divisions has created
broad spans of control at lower levels for HUD and the Michigan
State Housing Development Authority. For example, MSHDA's
management and marketing division has specialists in community
affairs, maintenance, and finance, in addition to generalists
assigned to each project. HUD has separate architectural
reviewers for cost, aesthetics, and other aspects of design.
The more specialized the division of labor, the easier it
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is to train people, but the less satisfying the work becomes
for sophisticated professionals. Such specialization also
makes it more difficult to make the proper trade-offs necessary
for successful developments. Documents pass from desk to
desk in serial, assembly-line fashion. Approvals, disapprovals,
and suggested modifications are made on the basis of narrow
technical considerations within the jurisdiction of the
reviewer. Since a different specialist reviews each line
item, a developer cannot readily trade off projected cost
savings on certain items with unusually high projected costs
on other items.
This process also inhibits good architectural design.
In commenting on the 1974 HUD design competition, the Journal
of Housing editorialized:
Well designed projects in the United States
require sensitive and sophisticated program
mechanisms that fully account for the complex
interrelationships between public and private
investment activity. Traditionally, HUD pro-
grams have lacked this sophistication. As in
its public housing programs, design guidelines
have been implemented in a piecemeal and over-
bureaucratic manner that d scourages creative
and resourceful designers.
In the HUD system, the developer is supposed to have no
contact with the technical staff reviewing his application.
Rather, he is supposed to submit the required forms to a
multi-family representative who passes them on to the technical
1Journal of Housing, December, 1974, p. 507.
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specialists for review. Those developers who adhere to
this rule, however, find their applications shunted to the
bottom of the pile on a technician's desk. While the multi-
family representative is supposed to coordinate the flow of
paper and keep the developer informed as to the status of
the application, the multi-family representative often does
not know exactly where an application sits and when he does
know and wants to expedite processing on a particular project,
1
he has little leverage to exert. He is in a different
division and generally has a lower status. Consequently,
experienced developers will attempt to expedite projects
by going to the technicians either directly where necessary
or through lawyers or mortgagees that have had experience
with the local office.
The Boston Urban Observatory's study of HUD Area Office
operations in that city found that:
The unanticipated but major problems fell outside
all the carefully drawn bureaucratic cells of re-
sponsibility, and frequently no one was prepared
to cope with them until they reached crisis pro-
portions...For example, in several projects where
construction defects were uncorrected when occu-
pancy began and the HUD management division took
over responsibility for such projects from the
HUD development division, the development division
no longer concerned itself with seeking corrections
of the defects, and the management division did not
consider uncorrected deficiencies as part of its
responsibility.2
Housing development officers at the Michigan SHDA and of
late at the Illinois HDA have encountered similar problems.
2 Boston Urban Observatory, o_. cit., pp. 194-195.
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By contrast, at the Massachusetts HFA, where spans of
control are narrow and only three levels of authority exist,
developers deal directly with those who have decision-making
authority and each division has broad concerns. The first
meeting a developer has with the agency will be with whomever
the developer happens to know, possibly the executive director,
his deputy, or any one else on the staff. If the development
seems worth consideration, the developer will be introduced
to the mortgage officer who will have to approve the applica-
tion from the point of view of financial viability and the
design and management officers who will have to approve it
from their respective points of view. While each division
has its own area of expertise and primary responsibility,
each looks at the project in its entirety. Disagreements
among divisions or with the developer are resolved through
negotiations, sometimes even resulting in arguments between
divisions in the presence of the developer. Approval of
all loans ultimately must be given by the head of each division,
who may have been the person working with the developer on a
daily basis. Any questions that the division chief may have
will be worked out directly with the developer and/or architect
and/or management agent.
Aside from division of labor and size, the other primary
reason for increasing structural complexity comes from the
number of tasks performed by the agency. While the Massachusetts
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HFA limits itself to the sole furction of providing multi-
family mortgages, the Illinois Housing Development Authority
and the New Jersey HFA take on seed money loans as well, and
the Michigan Housing Development Authority adds seed money
and single family loans to its list of functions. The New
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal administers
seed money, public housing, urban renewal, rent control, and
building code programs for the state in addition to monitoring
private multi-family development, while its companion New
York State Housing Finance Agency finances the construction
of state universities, youth facilities, mental health and
hygiene facilities, hospitals, nursing homes, and senior
citizen centers as well as housing. The New York State Urban
Development Corporation serves as developer and initiator
as well as financier of commercial and industrial property
as well as multi-family housing. The broadest role, however,
is performed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Aside from its role in insuring and subsidizing
private multi-family housing, it insures single family mort-
gages; provides seed money loans; funds public housing, urban
renewal, model cities, neighborhood facilities, water and
sewer lines, public facilities, open space and community
planning; insures against riots, crime, and floods; and regu-
lates interstate land sales. Each additional major function
performed by any agency generally requires an increase in
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either the span of control of the top administrator or an
additional layer of hierarchy.
Anthony Downs has identified agency size rather than
structural complexity as a primary cause of bureaucratic
dysfunction. He found that, because of the inherent limitations
of the man at the top, no matter how capable he may be, all
very large bureaus and relatively small bureaus with high
message volume suffer from one or more of the following
problems: 1) greater delay in making decisions; 2) poorer
coordination of decisions; or 3) more personnel and resources
per unit of output in communicating information and orders.
While other organizational theorists might attribute these
dysfunctions to either the structural complexity or the
large number of hierarchial layers resulting from large
size, each of the large agencies examined suffer from one
or more of the problems that Downs identifies.
HUD and UDC have suffered from relatively poor coordina-
tion of decision making as manifest in their relatively high
percentage of problem projects. On four of the five projects
in the Buffalo area which were seen in the last chapter to have
encountered severe-vacancy problems, top UDC officials gave
scant attention to the problems anticipated by the marketing
1Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little-Brown: Boston,
1967), p. 131.
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studies prepared by its own Division of Economics and Housing
Finance. Clearly, UDC's large size and large span of control
made it difficult for those at the top to spend sufficient
time with Economics and Housing Finance Division personnel
to understand the magnitude of the marketing problem on
these projects, comprehend all of the other problems on
these and all other projects, and still produce a high volume
of projects in a short amount of time. While UDC's unique
role as a developer precludes any definitive statement, UDC's
large size and large span of control also appear to have resulted
in higher costs in communicating information and orders.
The New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal has avoided coordination problems by slowing down
the approval process. DHCR involvement has slowed processing
2
by an average of about 19 months.
DEGREE OF FORMALIZATION
Aside from structural simplicity, the other primary
measure of bureaucratization is the degree of formalization
as expressed in terms of the amount of rules and procedures.
The more rules and procedures an organization has, the less
flexible it can be in handling complex problems. In nearly
1UDC Department of Management and Regulation, "Management
Status Report," pp. 3-4.
2 See p.344 infra.
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all cases, the state HFA's have operated with less formality
than HUD.
The state agency with the least formality unquestionably
has been the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. In this
respect, MHFA has acted most like a private lender. The few
formal rules it does have primarily result from requirements
regarding subsidies made by HUD or the State Department of
Community Affairs. For example, both of these agencies
set income limits on leasing and rent supplement programs,
while HUD limits the number of non-elderly, single occupants.
The flexibility at MHFA is so great that the chief complaint
of the program participants, particularly architects, has
been that on occasion, when MHFA looks at a project, it poses
new and, at times, contradictory requirements.
Overall, this flexibility has enabled MHFA to be the
most effective agency. The lack of rules allows MHFA to
negotiate with developers to achieve maximal overall social
input consistent with financial security. While a given
development may be too isolated to attract a substantial
number of minority residents or former slum dwellers, MHFA
might then require it to take extra steps to accommodate
handicapped residents. In another instance, MHFA might
trade off larger bedrooms against additional community play
space. MHFA's flexibility has enabled it to successfully
undertake several quite unconventional developments. In
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one instance, MHFA financed the conversion of an old piano
factory located in an urban renewal area into housing geared
toward artists. By creating apartments with extraordinarily
large living rooms capable of being used as studios and by
situating the apartments around an inner courtyard to provide
a sense of community, MHFA has created a unique environment
out of a seemingly useless old building. In another instance,
MHFA financed the rehabilitation of a block of five-story
walk-up apartments in an inner city area. To make the buildings
marketable, MHFA insisted that the developer provide elevators
in new shafts added on to the rear of the structure. Similarly,
the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency made the most of its
flexibility when it converted unmarketable two-bedroom apart-
ments in a development it had financed to one-bedroom apart-
ments plus storage after finding that a strong demand existed
in the local area for large one-bedroom apartments.
One state agency to operate by a relatively formal set
of procedures, although with few substantive rules, is the
Michigan State Housing Development Authority. At the outset
of MSHDA's operation, executive director William G. Rosenberg,
whose background as a bond counsel undoubtedly conditioned
him to preferring formalized procedures, asked a consulting
firm to prepare the Michigan Housing Process. This manual,
which serves as the basis for all of MSHDA's processing,
divides the development process into thirteen discreet phases
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and ninety-seven separate subphases. For example, after
the sponsor and Intake Officer have reviewed the suitability
of the proposal for processing at the end of the first phase,
phase two begins with step 0201 during which time the Scheduling
Officer prepares a development processing schedule, suggests
assignments, and secures Division Director approval or modi-
fications. Then, in step 0202, the Housing Development
Officer and Intake Officer review the preliminary development
proposal and documents and identify areas for close attention
by the Market Analyst, Community Affairs Specialist, and
Site Reviewer in steps 0204 through 0206, when they will
screen the proposal. This procedural formality built into
the MSHDA Housing Process has meant that more coordinative
tasks have had to have been performed and explains in large
measure why processing costs per unit developed were seen to
have been 50 - 400 percent higher than at other agencies.
Positions like Scheduling Officer and Intake Officer have no
counterparts at the other agencies. Scheduling binds are
handled at the other state agencies by redoubled efforts or
at MHFA by flexible shifting of personnel to perform tasks
not specified in any job description or process manual.
Intake at other agencies is handled by the same personnel
who would otherwise have to familiarize themselves with the
proposed development and sponsor at a later date. MSHDA's
high degree of formality, however, has proven to have the
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one advantage of allowing new and inexperienced personnel
to readily fit into the development process and know which
decisions have already been made and which remain to be made.
The high degree of turnover and lack of experience at MSHDA
has made this consideration more important than at other
agencies.
The state agencies with the most formalized set of rules
and procedures is the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal. The high degree of formality endemic
to DHCR's processing can be readily seen in its design require-
ments for exterior walls made of brick:
Section 1711-7.7 Exterior Walls...
(d) All facing brick shall meet A.S.T.M. C-216,
latest edition, Grade SW standards.
(e) The Architect, during the preparation of and
prior to the completion of his working drawings,
shall submit to the Sponsor and the Division for
review and approval, samples of the various types
of brick that he recommends, together with certi-
fied cost proposals from the brick manufacturers
and a letter giving reasons for the Architect's
recommendations.
(f) Samples submitted for approval shall be accompanied
with a test report from an approved laboratory
attesting to compliance with the specifications.
(g) All exterior brick and mortar shall meet with the
approval of the Architect and the Division with
respect to color, shade, type, finish, size, and
texture.
(h) The Contractor shall install story height brick
panel with a typical window, window sill, and air
conditioner sleeve, and obtain approval from the
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Architect apd the Division before commencing
brick work.
Each of these procedural requirements have been established
to make absolutely certain that all parties involved are sat-
isfied with the appearance and quality of the bricks used.
Each step has been added over time to close loopholes or po-
tential loopholes found in the development of early projects.
Yet, each step adds to the length of time required to process
or construct a development. The extraordinary procedural
complexity illustrated here provides much of the explanation
as to why the elapsed time between initial application and
the start of construction was seen to be significantly longer
on DHCR projects than on HUD projects done in New York State
or on projects processed by other agencies. In fact, a
regression analysis shows that while most of the variance
in processing time must be attributed to factors unique to
individual projects, those projects processed by DHCR have taken
an average of 19 months longer than those processed elsewhere,
even after controlling for the size of the project, profit
orientation of the sponsor, type of construction (new versus
rehabilitation), agency staff size, presence or absence of
civil service at the agency, and use or non-use of Federal
'New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal,
Design Standards for Limited Profit and Limited Dividend
Housing Projects, Form AB-25, January 1, 1968, p. 53.
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subsidies. (See Table 31).
The slow processing time on DHCR projects, particularly
those requiring the approval of HUD, corroborate the findings
of Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky that the more approvals
required for the successful completion of a project, the longer
2
it will take. Not only do DHCR regulations add considerably
to the number of formal approvals that have to be given by
each of the actors normally involved in the process, but the
separation of the processing and financing functions between
DHCR and the New York HFA adds an additional actor to the
process. Even when DHCR has decided that a particular project
is feasible, it must convince the HFA of the soundness of its
decision. Frequently, the HFA will ask for additional market
research or other materials which will slow the process further.
With the exception of DHCR, none of the HFA's have as
formalized a set of rules and procedures as HUD. The primary
rules and procedures for program participants and HUD staff
to follow concerning insured Section 236 housing are contained
in a 166-page handbook entitled Rental and Cooperative Housing for
1The extraordinarily slow processing time of DHCR Section 236
applications by the HUD offices in New York State account for
3 to 8 months greater delay than on HFA applications for Section
236 funds in other states. Still, DHCR's average processing
time on a sample of unsubsidized Mitchell Lama developments is
22.8 months (n = 5) which is 5.6 months longer than the 17.2
months taken by HUD offices in New York State on their own
Section 236 projects.
2 Implementation (Berkeley, University of California Press,
1973), p. 118.
Table 31
Regression Results for Dependent Variable
Processing Time Fron Initial Occupancy to Initial Closing,
Step 7 of Stepwise Regression
Variable Description
# of Units Rehab.
Profit Orientation
Civil Service
Lack of Fed. Subsidy
Log of Staff Size
Total # of Units
DHCR or Other
Regression Constant
Name
REHAB
NP
CIVSER
FEDSUB
STAFFSZ
TOTAL
DHCR
Coefficient
-0.0180
1.1802
-3.6152
-4.5921
3.1322
-0.0003
19.1903
Std Error of
Coefficient
0.006
0.886
2.070
1.831
0.879
0.002
2.458
t -Test
-2.92**
1.33
-1.75
-2.51*
3.56***
-0.16
7.81***
DF Significance
486
486
486
486
486
486
486
.004
.184
.082
.013
Under .001
Over .500
Under .001
8.347
Multiple Correlation Squared =
Multiple Correlation
Standard Deviation of Residuals =
0.192
0.439
8.913
F = 16.55 with 7 and 486 Degrees of Freedom
(P under .001)
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Lower Income Families: Section 236 Basic Instructions.
The June, 1973, version represents a consolidation and updating
of nine scattered sets of paragraphs in the FHA Manual, nine-
teen circulars, one notice, and two FHA handbooks. Still,
proper implementation of the Section 236 program requires
adherance to the rules and procedures contained in five
additional assorted handbooks relevant to all HUD mortgage
insurance programs, nine others related to all multi-family
projects, and one related to Section 236 fiscal instructions.
Should the project happen to have a nonprofit sponsor, be
intended for cooperative ownership, involve rehabilitation,
or be located in a high cost area, reference must be made to
still other handbooks. Developers complain of difficulties
in obtaining copies of all of the applicable regulations
2
and in making sure they are current.
Compared with the rules at the state agencies, including
at DHCR, HUD rules are cast in concrete. The waiver or altera-
tion of rules at HUD to fit unique or unusual circumstances
applicable to an individual project is extremely difficult to
U.S. Department of Housing and Ufban Development, Rental and
Cooperative Housing for Lower Income Families: Section 236
Basic Instructions, (No. 4510.1), June, 1973.
2Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of Federally
Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Vol. III: Multi-family
Housing (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Housing
Management, 1973), pp. 122-123.
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achieve, even when, as is often the case, the technician agrees
with the developer that the exception would strengthen the
project. One experienced developer told the author that
he often could obtain HUD waivers he believed necessary, but
only after going to someone sufficiently high up in the chain
of command to be "willing to go out on a limb" and only after
great effort. The facts that HUD rules are made in Washington,
are made by personnel several layers higher than those who
directly implement them, and must be made to apply nationwide,
all contribute to this inflexibility.
Reasons for Formality
The extensiveness of HUD rules and procedures in comparison
with those at most of the state agencies results from many
reasons. As shall be seen in this section, HUD's structural
complexity, method of hiring, history, age, role as an insurer,
auditor requirements, and statutory obligations have all
combined to limit the ability of HUD to operate flexibly.
The state agencies are bound by few such constraints and
have had greater opportunity to organize and operate in a
non-bureaucratic manner.
Officials making policy decisions at the state agencies
have the ability to directly supervise those who interact
with developers and managers and thereby assure themselves
directly that policy concerns are being met. At HUD, however,
the large number of layers of hierarchy and geographic dispersion
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of offices has precluded such a possibility, and has required
the formulation of rules to guide employee actions. Through
the medium of rules, directors are able to provide pervasive,
impersonal supervision.
Those at the top of HFA's are generally better able than
HUD to staff their organization with personnel who have pro-
fessional competency and share in organizational values and
goals. The employment of such personnel makes an organization
less dependent upon having to formulate rules. Numerous
studies have shown that the greater degree of professionaliza-
1
tion, the lesser the need for formalization. In fact, pro-
fessionals tend to shy away from and conflict with organiza-
tions that impinge upon their professional integrity through
formalized rules or procedures.
Most of the state agencies have had an excellent oppor-
tunity to attract qualified professionals because their
autonomy and ability to generate arbitrage profits has allowed
them to pay relatively high salaries. As seen in Table 32,
three of the four HFA's with independent hiring power pay
significantly higher salaries than do their respective local
HUD offices. The New Jersey HFA is the one exception. The
two state HFA's having salary levels determined by civil
service, New York DHCR and MSHDA, have salary levels which
ISee Richard Hall, op. cit., p. 121.
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Table 32
Annualized Pay Per Individual
By State Agency and Local Hud Office for Fiscal Year 1973
Pay Man Years/ Total Salaries Annualized
Period Staff Size & Benefits Salaries &
(In 1000's) Benefits/
Employee
Ill. Hsg. Dev't. Auth. FY 72-73 50.0 $1,681 $17,200*
HUD - Chicago FY 73 350.0 5,451 15,600
HUD - Springfield FY 73 59.2 830 14,000
Mass. HFA FY 73 54.0 914 16,900
HUD - Boston FY 73 268.1 4,159 15,500
Mich. St. Hsg. Dev't. Auth. April 73 113.0 139 14,400
HUD - Detroit FY 73 486.3 6,492 13,400
HUD - Grand Rapids FY 73 84.1 1,272 15,100
New Jersey HFA Jan. 73 89.0 97 13,000
HUD - Newark FY 73 257.2 2,271 14,900
HUD - Camden FY 73 137.7 3,839 16,500
New York DHCR FY 73 430.0 5,888 13,700
New York UDC Oct. 72 513.0 882 20,900
HUD - New York City FY 73 250.7 4,293 17,100
HUD - Albany FY 73 50.2 812 16,200
HUD - Buffalo FY 73 138.5 2,043 14,800
*Adjusted by a factor of 102.5% to make equivalent to Fiscal Year 1973.
Sources: Annual totals for states from annual reports except DHCR totals
which are taken from New York State Executive Budget, 1973-74;
single month totals from fiscal officers; HUD figures from HUD
Office of Financial Systems and Services, Administrative Oper-
ations Fund Report of Obligations Incurred, Fiscal Year 1973,
September 26, 1973.
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on average are as low or lower than those for HUD. The
result has been the hiring of less experienced or less pro-
fessional personnel who require more guidance in the form
of established rules and procedures.
Similarly, with certain exceptions, the state agencies
have had greater opportunity to select personnel who share
the values being promoted by the agency. One organizational
theorist found that:
Moreover, as the goals of lower-level members
become more like those of top-level members,
the relative amount of authority leakage de-
clines...Greater goal consensus, therefore,
actually means an increase in the productive
capacity of the bureau. Top-level officials
can retain the same quality of output as before,
but reduce the controls, reports, and other per-
formance checks used.to maintain it. 1
Civil Service restrictions have hindered the ability of HUD
as well as of the New York DHCR/HFA and MSHDA to recruit
2
staff members having compatible values. These restrictions
require the hiring of personnel on purely objective criteria.
As seen in Chapter 8, political patronage has on occasion
hampered the New Jersey HFA in hiring competent individuals
with compatible goals.
Disparities between agency goals and staff goals also
result from abrupt shifts in organizational goals. For
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little-Brown,
1967), p. 223.
2Reportedly, however, both the New York HFA and MSHDA have in
part circumvented these regulations by such devices as asking
those with higher ratings to step aside.
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example, Seymour Martin Lipset traced the initial failures
to make reforms of the Social Democrats when they held power
in Weimar Republic in Germany in 1918-1920 and of the socialist
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan, Canada,
to the lack of compatible values held by entrenched civil
1
servants. HUD has encountered comparable problems. Indi-
viduals hired when the primary role of HUD's predecessor agency,
the Federal Housing Administration (HFA), was in insuring loans
on single family homes in suburban areas, cannot be expected
to whole-heartedly share in the newer goals of HUD like affirma-
tive action and slum area rebuilding.
The Douglas Commission found in 1968 that with regard
to the rent supplement program:
...the rank and file officials, in district and
local (FHA) offices were, in many cases, highly
unsympathetic. They were accustomed to dealing
with the conservative real estate and financial
community. They did not feel at home in having
business dealings with churches and philanthro-
pists whom they tended to regard as soft and im-
practical. Nor did they welcome having the poor
as their constituents. 2
Each of the state agencies are sufficiently new or, as in
the case of DHCR, have had sufficiently stable goals to have
1S.M. Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Change," in Robert K.
Merton et. al. Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois:
Free Press, 1952).
2National Commission on Urban Problems (Paul H. Douglas,
Chairman), Building the American City (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 19.
351
had the opportunity to hire individuals with personal goals
compatible with the agency's current goals. The relative
youth of most of the HFA's has also meant that fewer rules
have accumulated through organizational learning. The fact
that DHCR is over 35 years old accounts in large part for its
high degree of formalism. Rules created by organizations
learning how to deal effectively with recurring situations
having unchanging inputs can be advantageous. The primary
danger in creating such rules, however, is that outside
circumstances may change without corresponding changes in
the rules. The informal policy at MHFA that no projects
will be approved involving electric heat is a good one
considering the high cost of electric heat as compared with
gas or oil. The danger in formalizing this as a rule is that
the comparative economics might change faster than the rule.
Another reason for the relatively large number of rules
at HUD is because of its role as a mortgage insurer in a
national market. In order for it to facilitate the sale of
the mortgages it insures to FNMA, GNMA, or other secondary
lenders, it must assure them that each mortgage meets certain
standardized, objective criteria.
Still another cause of organizational rules and procedures
at both HUD and certain of the HFA's has been the findings of
auditors. As seen in Chapter 5, auditors have not only added
to financial reporting requirements, but in some instances,
particularly in Michigan, have touched on programmatic areas
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as well. The Michigan Auditor General, for example, has
insisted that MSHDA create written rules regarding the cir-
cumstances under which it could waive limits on the number
of bedrooms that can be occupied by a family of a given
size.
A final source of formalization has been statutory
requirements. In particular,the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) has required both HUD and the state agencies to
determine if significant environmental harm will result from
any "major action" they take using Federal funds. While the
aims of this legislation are laudable, the required methods
of implementation are rigid. One law journal commentary
on NEPA's effects on HUD called the law "the purest sort of
lawyer's law--a body of procedures governing political deci-
sions." The article went on to say, "As we see it, NEPA's
major contribution is that it supplies procedures which
2
legitimize agency decisions."
Thus, while bureaucratization has been in certain circum-
stances desirable, and in certain respects unavoidable,
particularly for HUD and the less autonomous state HFA's,
the complexity of the public purpose housing development
process generally demands the flexibility that comes from a
P.D. Durchslag and P.D. Junger, "HUD and the Human Environment,"
Iowa Law Journal, 58 (April, 1973), p. 889.
2 Ibid., p. 890.
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simple organizational structure and non-formalized rules and
procedures. As has been seen, the flexible approach used
by the Massachusetts HFA has been a primary factor in its
success, while certain bureaucratic elements of the operation
of HUD, DHCR, MSHDA, UDC, and IHDA have been seen to have
created problems for them. Other differences in agency
performance can only be explained by differences in leadership,
the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 10
LEADERSHIP
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While numerous books have been written on how to be
an effective leader, most sociological studies of organiza-
tions fail to include any analysis of the quality of leader-
ship provided by its chief executive. Peter M. Blau, for
example, dismisses consideration of leadership by stating:
It is worth repeating that these formal structures
exhibit regularities that are independent of the
individuals in them and that can be studied with-
out inquiring why individual managers make certain
decisions...the structure exerts constraints that
limit the alternatives of individuals. 1
Yet, anyone who has even casually looked at the behavior
of organizations, particularly non-bureaucratic ones, knows that
some seemingly hard-to-define but easy-to-recognize quality
called leadership does make a difference in terms of agency
effectiveness. Some observers interviewed in the course of
researching this dissertation attributed 95 percent of the
success of particular HFA's to the leadership of their executive
direcors. If enough HFA's had been in operation long enough
to provide a statistically significant sample, then proposi-
tions regarding the role of HFA's in the development process,
their position in government, and degree of bureaucratization
could be tested neglecting the quality of leadership because
presumably the good leaders and the bad leaders would counter-
balance each other. Yet, the relatively small number of cases
1The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1955), p. 325.
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and the fact that most HFA's operate in a flexible manner
which increases the importance of leadership, make it necessary
to discuss this issue in this dissertation.
The best available definition of what constitutes leader-
ship in public agencies comes in Philip Selznick's classic
work, Leadership in Administration. Selznick finds four
critical tasks of leadership:
.4. The definition of institutional mission and role;
2. The institutional embodiment of purpose;
3. The defense of institutional integrity; and
4. The ordering of internal conflict.
Selznick asserts that in defining the institutional mission
and role (the first task) leadership "takes account of the
conditions that have already determined what the organization
2
can do, and to some extent, must do." Thus, leaders of
HFA's must choose a mission that is consistent with the public
purposes set forth by the state legislature, the national
concerns of HUD, and the powers of the agency. The institu-
tional embodiment of purpose occurs when the organization
comes to stand for something meaningful, when it embodies--
"in thought and feeling and habit--the value premises of
3
policy." The final critical tasks of leadership, the defense
1Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston,
Illinois: Row, Peterson & Company, 1957), p. 62.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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of institutional integrity and the ordering of internal
conflict involve the reconciling of internal strivings and
environmental pressures, respectively, "paying close attention
to the way adaptive behavior brings about changes in organiza-
tional character.
When defined in Selznick's terms, leadership does cor-
respond with a concept that organizational theorists have found
to be directly related to effectiveness. Price concluded in
his survey of organizational studies that:
Organizations which have an ideology are more
likely to have a high degree of effectiveness 2than organizations which do not have an ideology.
Consequently, on the basis of the four critical tasks of
leadership presented by Selznick, this chapter will compare
the performance of the purported leaders of the various HFA's
and HUD.
One agency executive director to show especially effective
leadership has been William J. White. White has served as
the head of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency since
1969 when the MHFA Board named him to replace the first director,
David Martin, who it believed had failed to be effective. The
mission White has defined for MHFA has been to meet the state's
1Ibid.
2James L. Price, op. cit., p. 104.
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most critical housing needs by financing the development of
housing for low-income families within economically and socially
integrated settings which residents find well-designed, well-
I
constructed, and well-managed. While these goals are derived
from those found in the MHFA statute, White's role in defining
the operative mission of MHFA has been a creative one. The
original statute defined "low income families" as all those
who are unable to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing
without spending over 25 percent of their income, which,
if broadly construed, could be interpreted to include the
majority of the Commonwealth who, on an unsubsidized basis,
could not afford the new decent, safe, and sanitary housing
being provided by MHFA. To clarify the legislative intent
to serve genuinely low income families, he succeeded in having
the statute amended to redefine "low income families" to be
those with incomes low enough to qualify for public housing.
He further put into practice the mission of creating economic
and social integration within the same structure, and formu-
lated the standard, "The satisfaction of the people we serve
2
is our greatest test."
1Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, "Operations Handbook for
Mortgage Loan Financing of Multiple-Dwelling Housing - New
Construction," July 15, 1969, p. 2.
2Statement by the Executive Director, Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency, Fourth Annual Report, September, 1972, p. 4.
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These goals have been thoroughly embodied among the
staff of MHFA. One indicator of this institutional embodi-
ment of purpose has been the fact that MHFA has been able
to maintain high goal performance with a minimal amount
of formal rules. He has been able to do so by hiring a highly
professional staff that shared in the values being promoted
by the agency before coming to work for it. The other evidence
that White has succeeded in making MHFA stand for a meaningful
purpose comes in the responses of staff members to the question
of to what extent did they and other personnel see themselves
as working to protect the interests of the agency. Virtually
everyone questioned responded that they and others saw MHFA
as an agency as holding their highest priority, higher than
the interests of bondholders, developers, tenants (the second
priority), or themselves.
White has also been effective in performing the third
critical task of leadership, defending the integrity of the
agency. All substantively meaningful bills to alter MHFA in
a manner opposed by White including several attempts to have it
take on new functions have been defeated, while virtually
all legislative actions concerning MHFA that have been desired
by MHFA have been adopted. White has responded to all attempts
by individual politicians to influence MHFA's decision with
regard to the approval of projects or the hiring of personnel
simply by explaining the status of the application and the
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reasons for approval or denial. Without violating its insti-
tutional integrity, MHFA, under White's leadership, has developed
satisfactory working relationships with all of the special
interest groups with whom it works or who might have reason
to regard it as a competitor. Despite its having excluded
several developers, managers, and contractors who have demon-
strated incompetency, it maintains the respect of the various
professional associations. Through the spreading of deposits
among a large number of Massachusetts banks, it has maintained
the support of financial institutions. Unlike HFA's in certain
other states, MHFA has been fortunate in being able to avoid
the making of concessions to or incurring the opposition
of mortgage bankers primarily because of their weakness in
the state.
While conflicts have occurred among MHFA staff, White
has succeeded in ordering them in such a way that all signif-
icant subgroups have felt represented while White has maintained
control over the major decisions.
Using the same criteria, the leadership provided by the
executive directors of the Illinois Housing. Development
Authority has been somewhat less effective. Daniel P. Kearney,
the initial head, defined a clear mission for the agency,
namely to create economically integrated housing in suburban
locations. With one exception, each of IHDA's developments
during the Kearney years represented the manifestation of
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this purpose. Compared with MHFA's goals, however, the mission
set by Kearney for IHDA seems less bold. Rather than economic-
ally integrate families with poverty level incomes into a
middle income setting as done at MHFA, IHDA was satisfied
with mixing moderate income, working class families with
middle income level families. The higher vacancy rates in
Illinois compared with Massachusetts (6.6 percent versus 4.8
1
percent) and consequent greater difficulty in renting middle
income dwellings account for part of this conservatism.
Despite doing one small project largely to appease a powerful
legislator, Kearney was generally effective in defending the
institution from outside pressures, and despite some complaints
of ineffective delegation of power, did succeed in ordering
internal conflict.
The election of a new governor in Illinois led to the
replacement of Kearney in January, 1973, with at first an
acting executive director from within the organization, and
then three months later, by Irving Gerick who came to IHDA
from the outside. When Gerick took over, he faced not only
the Federal moratorium on subsidized construction, but also
an organization whose staff had been almost totally decimated.
The new mission he set for IHDA was less straight forward than
that of Kearney. He sought to build up IHDA's reserves to
1U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., p. 6.
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mount an attack on Chicago's inner city housing problems.
However clear this mission may have been in his own mind,
at least by January, 1974, the time interviews were conducted,
the new IHDA staff lacked a sense of purposeful commitment
to the organization. The response of IHDA personnel to the
question of to what extent do personnel work to protect the
interests of the agency was completely the opposite of the
answers given by those working at other HFA's. While the
staff of the other HFA's indicated a strong loyalty to their
organizations, the consensus of responses at IHDA revealed
an overall lack of respect for the agency as an institution.
Some individuals complained of increasing bureaucratization;
others cited the external political changes; and still others
mentioned an apparent lack of direction being taken by the
organization.
The leadership shown by Gerick in defending the integrity
of IHDA has been somewhat better, although apparently, at
least one appointment was made for political reasons and
concessions were made to allow the participation of mortgage
bankers in IHDA programs. Internal conflicts have not all been
resolved in a manner that has been satisfactory to all parties.
While some staff members have received more responsibility
than they ever thought possible, others have complained that
a greater centralization of the organization had deprived
them of responsibility.
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Such failing in leadership, if it be that at all, however,
provides no help in accounting for IHDA's greatest deficiency
in achieving its public purpose goals, notably its small volume
of production, throigh the end of 1973 for low and moderate income
families. Despite the presence of the moratorium, IHDA
closed more units during the six month period of July to
December, 1973, the period just after Gerick took control,
than in any similar period prior to that time and production
levels were even higher throughout 1974.
As in Illinois, the New Jersey HFA experienced upheaval
associated with a change in the governor midway in the growth
of the organization. Thomas Seesel, the initial executive
director, and Paul Ylvisaker, the original chairman of the
HFA board and head of the Department of Community Affairs,
outlined the clear HFA mission of rebuilding inner city
areas. The agency became embodied with such a sense of purpose
that even four years after John Renna took over as executive
director, those who were originally hired by Seesel expressed
the belief that while they found little sense of direction
coming from Renna, the staff retained a strong allegiance to
the New Jersey HFA and its underlying public purpose. While
Seesel and Ylvisaker maintained the integrity of the agency
even to the point where Ylvisaker's social activism became
a campaign issue that helped to defeat Governor Richard Hughes
in his bid for reelection, according to many of those interviewed,
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Renna allowed the agency to be used for the granting of
political favors. During the Renna years, projects were
often approved or given higher priority for subsidy on the
basis of which mayor had the ear of the governor while project
managers and certain other positions were filled more on the
basis of political cronyism than competence. With regard
to the ordering of institutional conflict, both Seesel/
Ylvisaker and Renna seemed to have succeeded in maintaining
control over critical decisions while maintaining the loyalty
of all major elements to the organization.
In Michigan, after the original executive director, Robert
McLain,was fired for failing to move the agency quickly enough,
both William G. Rosenberg and David L. Froh, MSHDA's two chief
administrators throughout most of its existence, have demonstrated
moderately effective leadership. Rosenberg initially defined
MSHDA's mission as serving as a purchasing agent for the consumer
in the production and management of housing for low income and
minority families that will be economically sound and assure
repayment of the Authority's investment. Froh has taken a
less mission-oriented, more opportunistic approach. Rather
than attempt to meet the most pressing housing needs, Froh
has attempted to do whatever is possible with presently avail-
able resources. Rather than attempt to hire personnel who are
1MSHDA, Annual Report, July, 1972, p. 7.
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"planners," he has sought "mortgage bankers." Still, MSHDA
personnel respect MSHDA and its institutional purposes.
While Rosenberg and Froh were both able to maintain the
integrity of the organization with regard to politcal favor-
seekers and special interest groups, the Michigan legislature
enacted two measures during Froh's tenure in office which
restrict MSHDA's autonomy. Despite Froh's opposition, statutes
are now on the books which restrict MSHDA's budget to an
amount appropriated by the legislature, and which require
that at least 15 percent of the units in every development
financed by MSHDA be for genuinely low income families. With
regard to the leadership task of the ordering of internal
conflict, Froh has done a superior job. While Rosenberg, in
building the organization, often made decisions on his own,
Froh, in taking over an existing organization, has been more
collegial in his decision-making while ensuring the fulfill-
ment of key agency commitments.
Edward Logue, the executive director of the New York
State Urban Development Corporation from its inception to
early 1975, came to UDC with a reputation of being a highly
effective leader. In fact, his name and the purposes and
powers set forth in the UDC statute were sufficient to attract
several staff persons to UDC who had themselves been directors
of other large organizations. The basic mission he emphasized
at UDC was simply "to improve the physical environment for
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low and moderate income families and to improve their job
1
opportunities." Unquestionably, this purpose has been
embodied in the behavior of the UDC staff. Despite some
complaints by personnel in certain field offices that the
Central Office maintained too much power, Logue appears to
have ordered internal conflict effectively. Logue's greatest
failing in leadership has come in his defense of UDC's insti-
tutional integrity. By pursuing organizational goals beyond
the limits of the environment, Logue generated opposition
among suburban legislators and the financial community. As
a result of his aborted campaign to push low income housing
in suburban Westchester County, the State Legislature restricted
UDC's zoning override powers in towns. As a result of his
overemphasizing UDC's role as a developer and neglecting to
provide competent financial monitoring until late in the devel-
opment of the organization, UDC lost the confidence of the
banking community and was unable to raise funds to avoid
defaulting on the bond anticipation notes due February 25, 1975.
These difficulties, however, are as much a result of the role
performed by UDC and the risk it took as it is a failure in
leadership.
While less information has been obtained on the quality
of leadership provided by Charles Urstadt and Lee Goodwin of
the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal
UDC, Annual Report, 1971, p. 7.
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and Paul Belica of the New York State HFA and while each
were in office at a relatively late point in the life cycle
of their agency, each appears to have been reasonably effective.
Urstadt's primary mission for DHCR as expressed in annual
reports was to generate new approaches to providing decent
housing; Goodwin's mission has been to foster community
development through the linking of housing with community
2
planning. Belica has set the maintenance of low cost financing
3
on a self-sufficient basis as the mission of his agency.
The information available indicates that each of these agency
directors have performed the other critical tasks of leadership
in at least a satisfactory manner.
The leadership provided by George Romney as Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has to
receive a mixed rating. The mission he set forth for HUD was
clear and well-known. It was to maximize the production
of housing. The extent to which he succeeded in achieving
the embodiment of this purpose within the organization was
made clear by the staff response to the news of the moratorium
New York State DHCR, New Approaches, March 31, 1971, pp. 4-5.
2New York State DHCR, Programs for Urban Growth, 1972-1973, p. 5.
3New York State Housing Finance Agency, 1973 Annual Report, p. 4.
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on subsidized housing. During the last week of 1972 and the
first week of 1973 just after news of the impending moratorium
became widespread, more applications were granted feasibility
than in all of the remainder of 1972. Staff personnel throughout
the country worked late at night and over weekends to carry out
the purpose of the organization despite instructions from the
Central Office not to do so. Where Romney was ineffective
was in his defense of the integrity of the organization. During
his tenure of office, indictments were handed down against
six office directors and hundreds of other individuals for
preparing excess property valuations, taking kickbacks, and
similar fraudulent activities. This corruption, however,
provides only minor explanatory value with regard to the
financial solvency of HUD's multi-family developments, the
area of its greatest failing. While the Detroit area office
was the one HUD office among those in states with advanced
HFA's to experience a substantial number of indictments, the
incidence of "problem projects" in Michigan was seen in
Chapter 4 to have been 24 percent, a rate that was only
slightly greater than the 20 percent recorded in the other
four examined where little, if any, corruption was revealed.
The scandals ultimately led to the national moratorium, an
event that except in reducing slightly the total volume of
units produced, did little to change the relative ineffectiveness
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of HUD as compared with the state agencies during the period
of 1970 - 1973.
The other Secretary of HUD during the time period studied
was James T. Lynn. The coincidence of the start of his tenure
with the beginning of the moratorium made it virtually impos-
sible to provide effective leadership. The mission he set
for the agency was to curtail production efforts and devise
a new set of programs. For those who had been involved in
the implementation of programs, particularly personnel in
field offices, the embodiment of this mission would have meant
a complete recognition of failure and thus became a source
of conflict. The integrity of HUD also came into question
as the formulation of new program guidelines came to be more
a product of the Office of Management and Budget than of
HUD.
Thus, significant differences in the quality of leadership
have been found. The leadership shown by William J. White
provides an added reason why the Massachusetts HFA was seen
to have been the most effective agency. Differences in the
quality of leadership, however, offer relatively little assistance
in explaining differences in effectiveness between other pairs
of agencies or between the state HFA's as a group and HUD.
In making these comparisons, differences in role in the develop-
ment process, position in government, and degree of bureaucrat-
ization provide ample explanatory value.
Hiousing and Development Reporter, DcenemAer 12, 97 ,./o.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, this dissertation has shown that the
state housing finance agencies as a group have been more
effective than the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development in that they have generally done as well as
HUD in satisfying the common public purposes outlined for
them in their enabling legislation, while being more effective
in maintaining the fiscal solvency of their developments and
operations. The HFA's have better fulfilled certain public
purposes, while HUD has better fulfilled certain national
goals not shared by the HFA's.
In particular, the state agencies as a group have been
seen to have produced a similar volume of privately-owned
multi-family housing for low and moderate income families
as HUD within the states considered in this thesis, despite
the fact that HUD has generally controlled the allocation of
subsidies. The HFA's have made available a considerably
higher proportion of this housing to genuinely low income
families than has HUD. No significant difference was found
in the rents charged by the HFA's or HUD on developments
with the same number of bedrooms in the same substate area
under the same subsidy program, despite the fact that the
HFA's have produced units that contain more amenities, have
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been better designed, and often have stronger construction
warranties. The only significant difference between the
HFA's and HUD in terms of slum rebuilding efforts was that
most of the HFA's tended to concentrate their efforts in urban
renewal areas while HUD has focused upon areas of concentrated
poverty. No significant difference was found between the two
types of agencies in terms of locating housing near jobs.
With regard to the national public purpose of promoting
racial integration, the state agencies examined were found
to have more consistently created integrated environments than
their HUD counterparts, although HUD was found to have provided
housing for a higher percentage of minority families. HUD
has clearly outperformed the HFA's with regard to two other
national goals for which data was available, both of which
involve high risk and both of which are vaguely defined by
statute but clearly defined by HUD administratively to apply
to HUD-insured Section 236 developments but not to uninsured
state agency-financed developments. In particular, HUD has
provided housing for a higher percentage of large families
and has provided a higher percentage of rehabilitated as
opposed to newly constructed units.
The HFA's have clearly done a better job than HUD in
satisfying certain locally defined public purposes that
were not shared by HUD in its implementation of the Section
236 program but in other contexts would be considered national
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goals. In particular, the HFA's have provided a higher
percentage of housing for the elderly. Largely as a result
of the achievements of a single agency, the HFA's have also
created housing having a much broader mixture of incomes within
the same development. While the provision of elderly housing
has involved lower risk, the mixing of income levels has
generally been perceived as involving higher risk.
Despite the financial problems of the New York State
Urban Development Corporation, the area in which the state
agencies have most clearly performed better than HUD has been
in maintaining the financial solvency of their developments.
The HFA's have had a tar lower rate of significant arrearages
on their Section 236 developments and have had a lower vacancy
rate. With the exception of UDC, the state agencies have
generated substantial reserves from their operations while
HUD has operated the Section 236 program at a substantial
loss.
Leaving UDC aside, which because of their added role as
a developer is quite legitimate, the financial success of
the HFA's compared with HUD is overwhelming. Excluding UDC,
however, reduces the aggregate fulfillment of public purposes
by the HFA's. Specifically, without UDC the state agencies
have produced fewer units for low and moderate income families
than their HUD counterparts (51,000 versus 80,000 units) and
placed a significantly lower percentage of their units in urban
374
renewal and poverty areas (22 to 42 percent). The difference
in production totals can be dismissed in part by the fact that
HUD controlled the amount of subsidies. The difference in
inner city risks taken is primarily a function of the fact
that certain HFA's have almost completely avoided these
areas to protect their standing in the bond market.
As has been seen, the primary reason for the superior
performance by the state agencies has been the non-bureaucratic,
hand-crafted approach that most of them have taken toward
public purpose housing development. In taking this approach,
the HFA's have actively participated in the structuring of
each development, have better oriented their policies to
local circumstances, and have usually organized themselves
in a flexible, structurally simple manner. By contrast,
HUD has taken a factory approach characterized by passive
regulation, a large scale, and a bureaucratic method of organ-
ization. The hand-crafted approach of the HFA's has resulted
from their necessity to control risk to be able to sell bonds
at a favorable rate, from the opportunities provided many of
them to organize themselves in a non-bureaucratic manner by
virtue of their limited jurisdiction and relative autonomy,
and from the opportunity to be active by virtue of their
mortgagee role.
The hand-crafted approach has been seen to be appropriate
because of the risky, localistic, and complex nature of the
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process. By actively participating in the development process,
the HFA's have been able to structure developments in a manner
that allows them to achieve a high level of social purpose
but at lower risks than would be incurred by a private developer
acting alone or through HUD. The comparatively local jurisdic-
tion of the state HFA's as opposed to that of the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development has in certain
respects enabled the HFA's to better formulate policies con-
sistent with the local nature of housing markets. The smaller
jurisdictions of the HFA's have also enabled many of them to
organize in the structurally simple and flexible manner
appropriate for handling the complexities inherent in the
nature of public purpose development. While a more highly
decentralized Federal operation would possess these same
advantages, such a system would lack public accountability
on the local level.
The HFA's have also been better able to relate to the
other critical element of the nature of public purpose housing
development, its high dependency upon debt financing. By
being entities of state government, the HFA's have been
able to raise funds in the tax-exempt securities markets
and relend them at below market interest rates. This advantage
explains why the HFA's have been able to provide larger, more
luxurious, and better designed housing at the same rents as
that produced by HUD. This mechanism, however, has been
costly to the Federal Treasury in terms of forgone tax revenues.
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Individual Agency Success
On an individual basis, the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency stands out as the most effective agency examined.
The public purpose that it has served in the most demonstrably
superior manner has been the mixing of tenants of varying
income levels within the same development. While no other
agency was able to integrate more than 200 poverty level
families in developments it financed during the period of 1970
through 1973 containing a substantial number of middle income
families, MHFA was able to provide housing for over 2,500
such families in a largely middle income setting. In addition,
its total production of privately-owned, multi-family housing
for low income families in relation to the number of inhabi-
tants of the state it serves has far exceeded that of any other
agency. While its total production of low and moderate income
housing and of all housing has been no greater than that of
HUD in Massachusetts, its production figures per capita far
exceed those of any other state agency.
With regard to slum rebuilding, MHFA has placed a slightly
higher percentage of its Section 236 units in poverty or urban
renewal areas than its HUD counterpart and has ranked above
average among all HFA's in this regard. MHFA's record in
racial integration, while in certain respects being somewhat
better than that of HUD in the same state, has been characterized
by a relatively high percentage of developments with only
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"token" minority representation. This blemish on MHFA's
record, however, is partially removed after controlling
for the small percentage of minority households living in
Massachusetts compared with that in the other states being
considered. While not a public purpose expressed in its
enabling act, the promotion of the rights of tenants is
another social goal with regard to which MHFA has outper-
formed the other agencies being considered.
In terms of efficiency, MHFA again has excelled. Besides
processing applications more quickly than any other state
agency, it was the one HFA to be significantly faster than its
HUD counterpart. Its processing costs per project and per
unit have been demonstrably lower than those of any other
HFA or of HUD in any state. While MHFA developments have
suffered a few arrearages, particularly its rehabilitation
projects in the inner city, it appears to be on top of its
problem and to have devised workable solutions in virtually
everycase. Also, the reserves it has generated from its
own operations have been more than adequate to cover any
potential losses.
Consistent with the underlying thesis of this disserta-
tion, MHFA has been the one agency to have most clearly
taken a hand-crafted, non-bureaucratic approach to development
lending. It has actively participated in every phase of the
development process; it has retained a high degree of flexi-
bility by having the fewest number of rules and formal operating
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procedures, and has maintained a simple pattern of organiza-
tional structure. MHFA's executive director throughout
nearly all of its formative years, William J. White, made
the most of this non-bureaucratic approach by exhibiting
effective leadership in the sense of infusing MHFA with a
sense of purpose and successfully defending its integrity.
The two HFA's that have come closest to matching NHFA's
overall level of effectiveness, the Illinois Housing Develop-
ment Authority and the New Jersey Housing Finance Agency, have
been the two agencies to most closely approximate MHFA's method
of operation, particularly in terms of a flexible, hand-crafted
approach. Both of these agencies achieved as much as they did
despite sharp disruptions in their staffs as a result of a
change in governors midway through the period studied.
The Illinois Housing Development Authority has had an
unblemished record with regard to serious arrearages despite
having located a respectably high percentage of its Section
236 units (42.4 percent) in urban renewal areas of the Chicago
SMSA. IHDA has achieved a superior record with regard to racial
integration. It had the highest percentage of developments of
any agency or HUD office examined which are integrated in a
substantial manner.
While IHDA has prided itself in its record of achieving
economic integration, the type of integration it has provided
has been the mixing of middle income, unsubsidized families
with moderate income families receiving Section 236 subsidies.
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Contrary to the expectations of the legislative study commission
IHDA has generally failed to provide housing for genuinely
poor families in a middle income setting. Altogether through
the end of 1973, IHDA had served only about 125 low income
families. It had also served the fewest low and moderate
income families per capita of any HFA or of HUD in any state
examined, having provided less than one-third of the housing
for low and moderate income families as HUD in the State of
Illinois. IHDA's low production figures have also meant
relatively high administrative costs per unit and per project
during the project operation stage.
IHDA's limited production totals have resulted from a
combination of several factors. First, the relatively high
vacancy rate in Illinois coupled with a relatively high
volume of conventional construction in the Chicago SMSA has
limited the number of opportunities available to IHDA to
make profitable mortgage loans. Second, the broad span of
control maintained by IHDA's executive directors reduced its
capacity to process a large volume of projects. IHDA's
policy decision against providing permanent financing to most
of the nonprofit sponsors to whom it granted seed money also
limited production. Finally, the change in governors at the
beginning of 1973 resulted in a change in executive directors,
and a nearly complete turnover of staff.
The New Jersey HFA, which has also operated in a reasonably
hand-crafted manner, has also been quite effective despite
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the occurrence of a certain amount of patronage and internal
dissension during much of the study period. The New Jersey
HFA has located a reasonably high percentage of its New York-
Northeastern New Jersey metropolitan area units in urban renewal
areas (19 percent) where it has a legislative mandate and in
poverty areas (an additional 17 percent). Still, it has
maintained one of the highest reserve ratios of any HFA, and
has had no arrearages in excess of three months on its Section
236 projects (although it did provide special state subsidies
prior to the occupancy of a few of them to avoid anticipated
deficits and has had problems on two unsubsidized projects).
The New Jersey agency, aside from UDC, was the only HFA to
produce more units for low and moderate income families than
its HUD counterpart.
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority and the
New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, the
two most bureaucratic state agencies, have been somewhat less
effective in terms of satisfying public purpose goals. Both
agencies have placed only a handful of units in urban renewal
or poverty areas, and neither was able to produce as many units
for low and moderate income families during the study period
as their HUD counterparts. Unlike the other HFA's examined,
both of these agencies are subject to state civil service
regulations. While the Michigan agency has also been subject
to stringent procedural controls by the state auditor's office,
it has created a considerable body of formalized procedures
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of its own as contained in its highly detailed housing process
manual. The formalism found at the New York State DHCR includes
a large number of substantive rules in addition to procedural
controls. These rules and procedures have arisen as a result
of a combination of DHCR's size, age, and inability to pay
the salary level required to attract experienced, self-directed
employees. One clear dysfunctional consequence of its large
body of rules and procedures was that its average processing
time was 19 months longer than that of any other agency,
even after controlling for project size, type of sponsor,
1
and location. At least during the development stage, both
Michigan and New York agencies had higher than average admin-
istrative costs.
Still another reason for the high degree of formalism
at both MSHDA and DHCR undoubtedly has been the conservatism
of these agencies in wanting to ensure that all contingencies
are covered. This conservatism is also evident in the extremely
small percentage of units that each has located in urban renewal
or poverty neighborhoods. This avoidance of risk in addition to
the activist role played by both agencies and the fact that,
particularly in MSHDA's case, they have formulated ways of
shifting mich of the risk back to developers, has enabled both
of them to generate large reserves and to avoid problems on
virtually all of their self-insured developments.
lSee p. 344 supra.
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The New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC)
has been the one state agency to experience substantial
financial problems. The culmination of these problems, of
course, was UDC's default on $135 million in maturing bond
anticipation and bank notes in February, 1975. As can be
seen in Appendix 2 of this thesis, UDC was unable to raise
cash through the sale of securities or mortgages to meet
these debts because of its relatively high incidence of
"problem" projects as perceived by the State Division of
Housing and Community Renewal, its inability to generate a
positive cash flow, its lack of political backing, and the
tight money conditions in the economy as a whole.
The evaluation chapter of this thesis showed that
UDC's projects have experienced a substantially higher rate
of vacancies and incidence of arrearages than each of the
other state agencies. To date, however, UDC has had a
significantly lower percentage of "problem" projects than
HUD. The problems that UDC has had on its projects have
resulted primarily from UDC's unique role as a developer,
from UDC's size and desire to act quickly, and from the
risks that UDC has taken.
This risk orientation is seen in the fact that nearly
70 percent of UDC's production of Section 236 housing in
the New York City SMSA has been in urban renewal areas or
in census tracts where over 25 of the households have
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incomes below the poverty line set for the area. While
this percentage was only slightly higher than the 65
percent of units placed in these areas by the HUD area
office in New York City, it represents a far higher percent-
age than achieved by any of the other state agencies or HUD
offices examined. UDC's satisfaction of its public
purposes is also seen in the 29,000 units produced by UDC
for low and moderate income families between the beginning
of 1970 and the end of 1973. This total was by far the
largest total financed or insured by any HFA or by HUD in
any state, and with the exception of Massachusetts it also
represented the highest production per capita as well. This
high production particularly in relation to that of the HUD
area office in New York City, has meant that UDC has clearly
had the highest volume of construction in urban renewal or
poverty areas of any state agency or HUD office.
The major reason that UDC took these and other risks
less oriented toward the achievement of public purposes was
its role as a developer. Particularly in its early years
before it had a strong financial team, UDC proceeded with
every project it could, both to avoid loss of seed money
equity invested in these developments and to enhance its
own and Governor Rockefeller's political support, particu-
larly among big city mayors. On occasion this support came
against the recommendation of UDC's own Division of Housing
Economics. UDC's large size and desire to act quickly were
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also reasons those at the top of UDC dismissed or failed to
fully hear those in the organization urging a more cautious
approach. In later years, UDC did begin to take a more
cautious approach to development lending but also began to
amass large losses on abandoned projects.
While UDC was seen to have had significantly higher
development costs than those of each of the three HUD area
offices in New York State (although not higher than those
of the New York DHCR/HFA), its rents were not found to be
significantly higher for two bedroom apartments receiving
Section 236 subsidies. UDC was seen to have had clearly
the best designed developments of any agency or HUD office,
at least in terms of number of design awards won, and along
with DHCR to have required the strongest guarantees from
contractors as to the durability of component parts.
UDC's ability to sustain its high level of production,
however, has been crippled by its note defaults. Not only
has it made it difficult, if not impossible, for UDC to
raise funds through the bond market to finance further
projects, but its layoff of 165 employees has eliminated
a major segment of its development staff.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY
While this thesis has found that on the whole the
state agencies have been more effective in producing public
purpose housing than has HUD, the similarity of the states
examined prevents the making of a sweeping generalization
about the ability of all of the states to perform as well.
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York
are all located in the North East and North Central portions
of the country, and are all among the most urbanized states
in the union. While the limited contact that the author
has had with the newer state agencies in other less urban-
ized sections of the country has made him optimistic as to
their ability to duplicate the accomplishments of their
more advanced brethren, a conclusive assessment in this
regard awaits the further development of these agencies and
analysis by other writers.
Still, a primary implication of this thesis is that
because of their ability to operate in a flexible, non-
bureaucratic manner, the state agencies should be allowed
to be the primary implementors of public purpose multi-
family housing. While as in the field of education, the
state agencies were seen to have ignored certain vaguely
defined, unenforced Federal objectives, particularly
rehabilitation and to a lesser extent the housing of large
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families,, the experience of the HFA's in implementing
those public purpose objectives of the Section 236 program
where HUD maintained a certain degree of control, was that
they were able to satisfy these objectives as well as HUD
on its own projects in addition to better servicing certain
local public purposes. In particular, the HFA's were seen
to have provided more highly integrated housing although
with fewer minorities.
Consequently, Federal regulation of the state agencies
with regard to national concerns should remain at about the
same level of rigor as under the Section 236 program but
broadened to include a few other objectives. Because the
complex nature of public purpose housing makes relatively
informal approaches more effective, HUD regulations, however,
might best be written in terms of performance rather than
procedural requirements. Since competitive market forces
were seen to have been so successful in forcing the HFA's
to effectively manage risk, HUD might create a market for
Section 8 funds based upon HFA ability to take public
purpose risks. The danger of such an approach, however,
would be that those who suffer most would be families
living in dilapidated housing in states with relatively
ineffective housing finance agencies. Consequently, HUD
should retain back-up ability to provide housing where the
state agencies fail to perform adequately, or fail to
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perform at all. Such an approach would be similar to the
manner in which HUD steps in to enforce civil rights legis-
lation in states which lack "substantially equivalent"
statutes or enforcement mechanisms.
To a large degree, the final regulations prepared by
HUD for state agency participation in the Section 8 program
are consistent with the implications of this thesis.
The state agencies are given a reasonably free hand to
implement the program. As under the Section 236 program,
they are given a set-aside of funds to allocate to projects
where they must assume the primary risks. Federal procedural
controls are limited to the same areas of national concern
as under Section 236. HUD has added performance incentives
for the achievement of certain other public purposes.
Specifically it has based the amount of set-asides going to
individual agencies in part upon the ability and performance
of the HFA's in promoting economic integration and in housing
large families.
The area of regulation where HUD can play a more
positive role is in the implementation of Section 802 of
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. At least
40 FR 16934.
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at this writing, both HUD and the Treasury Department had
failed to formulate regulations necessary to activate the
programs contained in this section. What this ection does -
is increase the financing advantages held by the state
agencies while at the same time, reduce the revenue loss
to the U.S. Treasury. Specifically, one provision of
Section 802 gives the state agencies the option of continuing
to issue tax-exempt bonds or to issue taxable bonds with a
33 1/3 percent interest subsidy. Since the HFA's were seen
to have received benefits from the tax exemption worth on
average about a 31 percent savings in interest (and at times
as little as 12 percent), the direct subsidy of 33 1/3
1
percent will often be of significant value to the HFA's.
Since the quid pro quo of this subsidy is the taxing of
HFA bonds, the U.S. Treasury benefits by the implementation
of this provision to the extent of the difference between
the 48 percent bracket of the taxpayers owning these bonds
2
and 33 1/3 percent subsidy it pays out. While the tax-
exempt route is highly inefficient in that much of the
subsidy goes to wealthy investors, the direct subsidy route
would be highly efficient in that all but a small administra-
tion cost would go to the project. In order for this
1
See p.266 supra.
2
See p. 268 supra.
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provision to be advantageous for the state agencies its
implementation must be virtually automatic as is the case
with the Federal tax exemption it supplants. Because of
the Federal control already provided on individually subsidized
projects and because of the fact that implementation of this
provision would increase rather than decrease Federal
revenues, any regulations more honorous than that provided
to tax-exempt offerings would be improper.
The other potential benefit provided the HFA's in
Section 802 is the ability to add a Federal guarantee to
bonds issued on a subsidized basis if the proceeds are used
to finance developments that will contribute to "slum
revitalization." The guarantee would allow HFA bonds to
sell on a taxable basis at a rate equivalent to that of
other Federally-guaranteed bonds, such as those issued by
the Tennessee Valley Authority, or only about 200basis
points above that of a typical A-rated tax-exempt HFA
issue. After receiving the 33 1/3 percent subsidy, HFA's
that take advantage of this combination of guarantee and
subsidy would benefit to the extent of about 100-300 basis
points.
Since aside from UDC which suffered severe financial
problems in large part because of its slum revitalization
efforts, the state HFA's particularly in certain states,
have avoided slum areas, implementation of this guarantee
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could have a strong impact on the direction taken by the
state agencies. The danger of this provision is that it
might allow the HFA's to become so dependent upon this
guarantee that they lose their incentive to actively control
risks. If such passivity were to occur the result would
likely be a high proportion of problem projects and a
drain on the Treasury. To reduce the likelihood of such
an occurrence, HUD could predicate the provision of future
guarantees on agency performance on projects initially
receiving such guarantees, although with consideration
given toward unusual local economic conditions.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Prospects for the future of the HFA's appear bright.
The older HFA's have organizations that have shown them-
selves capable of effectively implementing public purpose
housing programs. The Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 provides them with significant advantages.
Provided that this act is implemented in the proper manner
on a Federal level and provided that the state housing
finance agencies guard against over-bureaucratization, they
should continue to be successful in the coming years.
APPENDIX 1
HISTORY OF OTHER STATE HOUSING AGENCIES
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In addition to the six state agencies which serve as
the primary focus of this dissertation, through the end of
1974, 21 other state agencies have received the power to
independently finance the development of privately-owned
housing using proceeds from the sale of their own bonds.
Each of the agencies having these powers has received or is
eligible for a set-aside of Section 8 leasing subsidy funds
from HUD. Included in this category are agencies from the
states of Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
The New York City Housing Development Corporation and the
Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (Maryland)
have similar powers on a local level.
Another six state agencies have the primary mission of
providing secondary mortgage market funds through either pro-
viding loans to lenders or purchasing mortgages. While these
agencies might be considered a different breed of agency,
they share the same source of financing with the HFA's that
provide direct loans and participate as members of the Council
of State Housing Agencies. Included in this category are the
New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency, the State of New York
Mortgage Agency, the North Carolina State Housing Finance
Agency, the Vermont Housing Finance Agency, the Louisiana
Development Authority for Housing Finance, and the Massachusetts
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Home Mortgage Finance Agency. The HFA's with direct lending
powers that can also make secondary loans are Alaska, Color-
ado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Finally, certain state agencies have received the power
to finance housing using proceeds from the sale of State
general obligation bonds. Each of these agencies has carried
out unique programs. Among these agencies are the Hawaii
Housing Authority, the Delaware State Housing Authority, the
Maryland Community Development Administration, and the Cal-
ifornia and Wisconsin veterans' departments.
This appendix will discuss each of the housing agencies
mentioned beginning with those state agencies with independent
direct lending powers, then local agencies with the same powers,
followed by those state agencies involved in secondary financing,
and finally, those having available State general obligation
bond financing. Within each section, agencies will be discussed
in roughly the chronological order in which they were created.
Table 1 in the main text of this thesis provides a comparative
summary of the activities of all of the agencies.
STATE AGENCIES WITH DIRECT LENDING POWERS
One state HFA that became operational just after most
of those being studied in detail is the West Virginia Housing
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Development Fund. The West Virginia legislature passed the
enabling legislation for this agency in 1968 and it made its
1
first loan in 1970. Missing from this legislation, however,
was a clause to provide state back-up for its bonds. Thus,
while the West Virginia Housing Development Fund was able
to finance approximately 1,500 dwelling units between 1970
and 1972, successful marketing of its bonds required that
all of these units be HUD-insured. With HUD insurance,
of course, came HUD controls, thus making the independent
impact of the State as compared with that of the Federal
government extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess.
In 1973, the West Virginia Housing Development Fund did
receive the "moral obligation" backing of the State, but at
the time research for this thesis was being conducted, had
not had an opportunity to amass a significant track record
on uninsured projects. Of late, the Fund has also become
active in providing loans to single family mortgage lenders
and in making site development loans to overcome West Virginia's
hilly terrain-.
The history of the Missouri Housing Development Commission
parallels that of the West Virginia agency. The Missouri
2
agency came into being in 1969 without any State backing.
It financed aboutel,500 HUD-insured dwelling units between
W. Va. Code, Sec. 31-18-1 et seq.
2V.A.M.S. Sec. 215.
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1970 and 1973, at which time it received a $2 million state
appropriation to provide its own mortgage insurance fund.
It has also become involved in a mortgage purchase program.
Statutorily, Pennsylvania was one of the first states
to create a housing agency for the purpose of financing
housing. The Legislature created the Pennsylvania Housing
Agency in 1959 to aid homebuyers, but successive governors
failed to appoint a board of directors until ten years later.
Even then, the lack of state moral obligation backing kept
1
the Agency from helping more than 49 families. In 1972,
a new Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency with the moral
backing of the State and a full range of financing powers
2
was created to supercede the earlier agency. Governor
Milton J. Shapp hailed the legislation as "the most important
piece of housin legislation that has been introduced since
I took office."
As in Pennsylvania, the Connecticut Housing Finance
Agency grew out of an earlier entity. The original Connecti-
4
cut Mortgage Authority was created in 1969. It had no
direct lending powers and acted as a purchaser of HUD-insured
single family and Section 236 multi-family mortgages. In so
1The Weekly Bond Buyer, June 19, 1972, p. 1.
235 P.S. Sec. 1680.
3The Weekly Bond Buyer, June 19, 1972, p. 1.
4 Public Act No. 840 of 1971.
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doing, it overcame private lender reluctance in the state to
participate in these programs. In May, 1972, the newly created
Connecticut Housing Finance Agency subsumed the operations of
the older Authority. In addition to having secondary financing
powers, it can provide direct mortgage loans insured by its
own insurance fund. Unlike in each of the other states, the
state backing of its bonds requires no further action by the
Legislature, a factor that has increased the salability of
its bonds.
Georgia, Rhode Island, and Maryland all created state
housing agencies despite voter referenda opposing them or
similar agencies. In November, 1970, Georgia voters rejected
a housing finance agency with only 38 percent in favor. None-
theless, in 1972 the legislature created the Georgia Develop-
ment Authority for Housing Finance with secondary finance
2
powers, and in 1974 the Georgia Residential Finance Agency
3
with direct finance powers. While the earlier agency was
never activated, the Residential Finance Agency has a board
of directors.
Rhode Island voters turned down both a self-help Housing
Agency in 1971 and a Mortgage Authority with insurance powers
C.G.S.A. Sec. 8-241 et seq.
2Code of GA. Ann. Sec. 99-3601 et seq.
3Ibid.
397
in 1972. Nonetheless, a year later the Legislature created
the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency with
1
both direct and secondary loan powers. By the end of 1974,
the Agency had successfully marketed three bond issues.
After receiving initial criticism for the fact that the
properties that had received mortgage money from the proceeds
of its initial bond sale were all located in suburban areas,
the agency began requiring lenders to accept loans in all
2
areas and give reasons for any rejections.
In 1969, the Maryland Legislature enacted a bill to
create a state development corporation with powers comparable
to those of New York's UDC but not zoning override. As the
result of pressure from a citizens' group, the legislature
repealed that a year later, but gave housing and community
development financing powers to the Maryland Community
Development Administration within the Department of Economic
3
and Community Development. The same citizens' group then
collected signatures for a referendum to void the new legisla-
tion. Although the Maryland electorate approved the measure,
the Circuit Court for Baltimore found many of the petition
signatures to be invalid, and declared the law to be in full
4
force.
1Chapter 262 of Public Laws of 1973.
2Housing and Development Reporter, November 4, 1974, p. 625.
3Laws of Maryland Ch. 527 Sec. 266 DD.
4Nitzburg v. Wineland, Cir. Ct. for Baltimore County, Proctor,
J., March 22, 1971.
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The independent power of the Community Development Admin-
istration to issue its own bonds is made possible through the
mortgage insurance provided by the Maryland Housing Fund under
its control. While the primary purpose of this fund through
the end of 1974 had been to insure single-family homeowner
mortgages, it had also been used to insure an $8.6 million
bond anticipation note to be used for the financing of the
construction of multi-family housing.
In Wisconsin, the need for a state housing finance
agency became apparent when the State Department of Local
Affairs and Developmetrejected relocation plans for six Mil-
waukee urban renewal projects because of the shortage of
housing. Governor Patrick J. Lucey then became a strong
advocate of creating an HFA, and generated the support of
the Wisconsin Realtors' Association, the Wisconsin Builders'
Association, the Wisconsin AFL-CIO, the Wisconsin Alliance
of Cities, the Farmers Home Administration, the Northwestern
Wisconsin Community Action Agency, Catholic Charities of the
Northwestern Diocese, and the Wisconsin Department of Local
2
Affairs and Development. While the legislation creating the
Wisconsin Housing Finance Agency was initially approved in
See p.I1 infra. for discussion of Maryland's single family
housing programs.
2Wisconsin Department of Local Affairs and Development, Wisconsin
Housing Finance Authority, 1973, p. 3. (Mimeographed).
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1972, it had to go back before the Legislature in 1974 for
amendment to remedy technical deficiencies in the wording
of the moral obligation clause.
The Minnesota Housing Finance Agency has also received
strong support from the governor's office and others in the
2
state. As a result, it has received not only direct and secondary
financing powers, but also an appropriation of $1 million for
a reserve fund, funds to make grants to local communities for
planning and providing infrastructure for low and moderate
income housing, and funds for rehabilitation grants for
homeowners. The initial bond offering of the agency marked
the first backing of state agency bonds by mortgages guaranteed
by the Government National Mortgage Agency as to the timely
payment of principal and interest. Since then, the Agency
has issued other bonds for the purpose of making direct loans.
The Virginia Housing Development Authority has also been
3
active with both direct and secondary financing. It has been
the most active HFA in providing construction loans on single
family housing. With 3,500 units of all types of housing
under construction or completed by November, 1974, and another
800 units in the pipeline, it promises to quickly become
one of the volume leaders among the HFA's in the direct
W.S.A. Sec. 234.01 et seq.
2 M.S.A. Ch. 462A.
3Code of Virginia Sec. 36-55.24 et seq.
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financing of housing. In addition, it has issued $74 million
to finance mortgage purchase from private lenders.
Similarly, the Tennessee Housing Development Authority
has geared up relatively fast, although on a smaller scale.
One year after its creation in 1973, it had issued $33 million
in bonds for the purposes of both purchasing mortgages from
lenders and making direct loans itself.
Another young HFA to be active in both direct and secondary
financing is the South Dakota Housing Development Authority.
2
Established in 1973, the Authority has gained experience
quickly by providing construction loans on 47 small multi-
family developments for which permanent financing will come
from the Farmers Home Administration or private lenders with
HUD insurance and sdbsidies by November, 1974. In addition,
it has issued over $25 million in bonds for the purpose of
purchasing mortgages from private lenders.
3
The Kentucky Housing Corporation, another young HFA, has
used the proceeds of its bond issue to purchase mortgages
from the Federal National Mortgage Association. While the
social benefits derived from using the tax-exempt market to
make purchases from another secondary lender are questionable,
11973 H220.
2 S.D.C.L. 11-7.
3
K.R.S. Sec. 198A.
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the arbitrage profits derived from the sale are being used
for the socially valid purpose of directly providing developers
of low and moderate income housing with construction loans at
an interest rate of two percent.
The Colorado Housing Finance Authority and the Idaho
Housing Agency have also been concentrating on providing
construction loans, although directly from the proceeds of
tax-exempt notes. Permanent financing has been arranged
through the Government National Mortgage Association for the
Colorado developments and through the Farmers Home Administra-
tion and HUD Turnkey Program for the Idaho housing. On certain
of its projects, the Idaho Housing Agency was also instrumental
in having the local community agree to donate the land, thereby
reducing the rent.
In addition to being active in providing direct Section
236 uninsured mortgage loans and making secondary mortgage
purchases, the Maine State Housing Authority has been the
pioneer among the state agencies with regard to leased
2
housing. Through March 1, 1973, it had used Section 23
funds to subsidize the leasing to low income families of
130 dwelling units in 8 new rural developments it had financed
and in another 115 existing or rehabilitated units. The
1C.R.S. Sec. 69-11-1 et seq.; Idaho Code Sec. 67-6201 et seq.
230 M.R.S.A. Sec. 4552 et seq.
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Authority found the program to be extremely effective in
terms of speed and community acceptance, and found that small
1
builders liked it because of the small amount of red tape.
Since the Section 23 program was the forerunner to the new
Section 8 leasing program which is currently the only Federal
subsidy program with substantial funding, Maine's experience
bodes well for the new program in rural areas.
The Ohio Housing Development Board, which also has
direct mortgage lending authority, has yet to finance its
first permanent mortgage. The Board, which was originally
created in 1970 with only the power to make seed money loans
to nonprofit sponsors, did not receive bonding authority to
2
finance permanent loans until 1974.
The only other HFA's with independent direct lending
powers have been unable or unwilling to use them. The Alaska
Housing Finance Corporation has confined its activities to
secondary lending and is discussed in that section. The
Oregon Division of Housing and the South Carolina State Housing
3
Authority have been unable to issue notes or bonds. Unlike
HFA's in other states, they both lost and are now appealing
Maine State Housing Authority, Response to UDC Questionnaire,
March, 1973, p. 2.
2Page's Ohio Revised Code Ann., Sec.124.01 et seq.
30.R.S. Sec. 456.550 et seq.; Code of Laws of South Carolina,
Sec. 36-291.
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cases which challenged the Constitutionality of the moral
obligation provision necessary for them to issue bonds to
finance direct loans. The Oregon agency has also been
active in providing seed money loans to nonprofit sponsors
from a specially appropriated revolving fund while the South
Carolina agency has been active in financing public housing
using bond proceeds secured by the Federal contract to make
all mortgage payments.
Another state agency to fail completely in its attempts
to directly finance housing was the North Carolina Housing
Corporation. Having received neither state moral obligation
backing nor operational funding, it found that it would be
unable to market its bonds at a rate sufficiently low enough
to come within the maximum limit for HUD-insured mortgages and
still be able to finance its own operations. As a result,
it floundered totally during its two years of operation
2
between 1970 and 1972. Upon termination of agency operations
by the legislature, a legislative panel began assessing a new
role for the state in housing. The recommended result was
a new agency to provide mortgage insurance and secondary
mortgage financing in the state. Accordingly, the legislature
1
See Housing and Development Reporter, February 24, 1975, p. 1011
and January 5, 1975, p. 865.
2Michael Stegman, The Multiple Roles of State Housing Finance
Agencies: The North Carolina Housing Corporation (Raleigh:
N.C. Office of State Planning, 1972), pp. 19-35.
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created the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency along
these lines in 1973, which at this writing had yet to become
1
active.
LOCAL HOUSING AGENCIES
The most productive housing finance agency not being
considered in detail is the New York City Housing Development
2
Corporation (HDC). The reason for this omission is simply
that HDC is a city agency rather than a state agency. The
history of HDC in many respects parallels that of the New
York State Housing Finance Agency. For years, the Housing
Development Administration (HDA), the city department directly
under the control of the Mayor of New York like the Department
of Housing and Community Renewal on the state level, not only
has had responsibility for the supervision of such activities
as rent control, urban renewal, building inspection, and reloca-
tion, but also has had control of the production of middle
income, Mitchell-Lama housing by private developers. Also
similar to the State history, financing for this housing
initially came from tax-exempt general obligation bonds backed
by the taxing power of the City. However, once the City
1General Statutes of North Carolina, Sec. 122A-1 et, seq.
2Private Housing Finance Law, Sec. 650 et seq.
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bumped up against a Constitutional limitation that no more
than 2 percent of its outstanding bonds be devoted to housing,
the City had to seek an alternative source of financing from
the State Legislature.
The quasi-independent Housing Development Corporation
was created by the Legislature in 1971 to fill this role. It
has a board of directors and the power to issue tax-exempt
bonds backed by the City's "moral obligation" pledge of general
revenues coming to it from the State. The City Housing Devel-
opment Administration still maintains direct control over
projects that receive HDC financing, comparable to the way
in which the state Division of Housing and Community Renewal
controls projects that receive HFA financing. Through November 1,
1974, the HDC had financed 6,756 dwelling units. Like the
state HFA, the HDC has-, piggy-backed Section 236 interest
subsidies on most of its projects to serve moderate income
families.
The Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery
County (Maryland), which was originally a public housing
authority, has also received the power to issue bonds for
1
the purpose of making mortgage loans. It, however, has
yet to implement this power.
lAnn. Code of Maryland, Ch. 44A.Sec. 8A.
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MORTGAGE FINANCE AGENCIES
Certain state agencies operate only in the secondary
mortgage market by either lending money to mortgage lenders
or purchasing mortgages from them. Under loans-to-lenders
programs, mortgage lenders are generally allowed a mark-up
of about 1.5 percent over the state agency's borrowing rate
in the tax-exempt bond market with an additional one-half
percent going to the state agency as an arbitrage profit.
Under mortgage purchase programs, either the state agency
will make forward commitments to buy particular mortgages
being considered by lenders which they otherwise might refuse
to make or the agency will purchase mortgages from the existing
portfolios of lenders and require them to use the funds to
write new loans. Under either type of purchase program, the
lender is allowed a mark-up of about 0.5 percent. The reason
for the higher allowable mark-up with a loans-to-lenders
program is that under this type of program, the lender must
assume all risks resulting from the new loan, while under a
mortgage purchase program, the state agency assumes all risks
related to the mortgages it purchases. This difference in the
amount of risk assumed by the agency, however, has meant that
loans-to-lenders bond issues backed by collateral pledged by
mortgage lending institutions have sold at an average net
407
interest rate of just under 1 percent lower than mortgage
purchase issues after controlling for market conditions,
size of the issue, and Moody's rating of the issuer. Thus,
the interest rate charged the homebuyer is almost exactly
the same under a mortgage purchase program as a loans-to-
lenders program.
The most active provider of loans to lenders has been
the New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency, which was created in
1970 in response to then-existing credit shortage for home-
2
buyers. Periodically, the agency will survey mortgage
institutions in the State to determine if they have requests
for mortgages on moderately priced homes which they cannot
meet because of limited funds. When the demand is sufficiently
great, the agency will contract with these institutions to lend
them funds; it obtains these funds by issuing tax-exempt
revenue bonds. The private mortgage institutions must secure
the borrowed funds with government-insured mortgages or govern-
ment bonds as collateral, and they must use the funds within
a period of 180 days to make commitments to homebuyers to provide
below-market interest rate mortgages. Agency rules require
that single-family homes purchased with these funds shall not
have a value above $28,000 and multi-family homes shall not
'Based on a separate run of the regression analysis included
in Chapter 6.
2 N.J.S.A. C. 17: 1 B-4 et seq.
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have a value above $45,000. One effect of these rules is to
exclude new construction. In its first issue, the New Jersey
Mortgage Finance Agency sold its bonds at 4.5 percent, added
0.5 percent for its own expenses, and allowed institutional
lenders a mark-up of 1.7 percent. As a result, individual
homebuyers were able to borrow mortgage money at an annual
interest rate of 6.7 percent as compared with a conventional
rate at the time of 7.5 percent. The homebuyer thus saved
about $125 per year on a 25-year, $20,000 mortgage, assuming
that a mortgage would otherwise have been available.
The most active HFA in purchasing mortgages has been
1
the State of New York Mortgage Agency. It, too, was established
in 1970 in response to the then-existing credit crunch. It
uses the proceeds from the sale of tax-exempt bonds to purchase
mortgages from the portfolios of private lenders who must re-
invest the proceeds in residential mortgages. The agency
purchased $95 million in mortgages in 1970-71. As mortgage
funds became plentiful late in 1971, it confined its role to
servicing the mortgages it had acquired. When shortages in
mortgage funds again developed in late 1973 and 1979, it
provided private lenders with an additional $160 million in
loanable funds through its purchases.
IPublic Authorities Law, Sec. 2400 et seq.
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1
The Alaska Housing Finance Corporation has also been
active in making secondary mortgage purchases. Between 1972
when it became operational and November, 1974, the Corporation
floated four bond issues for this purpose totalling $104
million. Rather than primarily purchase mortgages from the
existing portfolios of mortgage lenders like the State of
NewYork Mortgage Agency, the Alaska Corporation generally makes
forward commitments to lenders to purchase mortgages on
specified developments to be constructed. In this manner, the
Corporation has been able to induce lenders to make loans
in remote parts of the state and in other areas they would
not normally lend. Over 90 percent of the Corporation's
purchases, however, are insured by HUD with the rest being
conventional. While the Corporation has yet to use its limited
powers to make direct first mortgage loans, it has on occasion
provided junior mortgages to reduce the amount of downpayment
required by a moderate income homebuyer.
The Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency was created to
assist private lenders in providing mortgage financing on
2
favorable terms to individual homebuyers. It guarantees
private lenders against loss of interest and principal on
the top 25 percent of loans made to homebuyers. This guar-
antee enables purchasers of homes of $30,000 or less to avoid
1Alaska Statutes, Title 18, Ch. 56.
210 V.S.A. Sec. 601 et seq.
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any downpayment except for closing costs and a one percent
guarantee fee. While the Home Mortgage Credit Agency had
also been given statutory authority to purchase Federally
insured loans, when credit conditions made the activation
of a mortgage purchase program desirable in 1974, the Legis-
lature decided to create a separate agency, the Vermont Housing
Finance Agency to serve as the vehicle for it.
The only other state agencies with secondary mortgage
market powers are the Louisiana Development Authority for
2
Housing Finance, which can purchase Federally insured
3
mortgages, and the Massachusetts Home Mortgage Finance Agency,
which can provide loans to lenders. Neither agency has become
operational as yet.
Housing Agencies with State General Obligation Financing
The state housing agency with the most dynamic statutory
powers in the country is the Hawaii Housing Authority. Ori-
ginally created in 1947 to administer public housing, the
authority was given broad new powers beginning in 1970 to
4
attempt to meet the worsening housing crisis on the islands.
Among the new powers were the authority to develop projects,
override local zoning and subdivision controls, insure mortgage,
lVermont Stat. Ann. Title 10, Sec. 241 et seq.
2M.G.L.A. c. 23A App. Sec. 2-3.
3L.S.A.-R.S. Sec. 40: 581 et seq.
4Act 105, Session Laws of 1970.
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and provide mortgage financing either directly or as part of
a co-venture, as well as to carry out a housing allowance
program. Unlike with most HFA's, the source for mortgage
proceeds for the Hawaii Housing Authority is general obligation
issued by the State. Despite legislative authorization in
1970 and 1971 for the issuance of $165 million in housing
bonds, the State had issued only $35 million by the end of
1973. As of that time,the Authority had closed only 1550
non-public housing units. The restraining factor has been that
the governor, John A. Burns, has made it impossible for the
Authority to hire a development staff of more than four.
The Maryland Community Development Administration uses
the proceeds from general obligation bonds for the purpose
of both mortgage insurance and direct financing. The sale
of $7 million in state general obligation bonds for deposit
in the Maryland Housing Fund should enable the Community
Development Administration to insure $100 million in mortgages.
The bulk of the insurance coverage to date has gone for the
rehabilitation of single-family housing in inner-city areas
of Baltimore, although some has gone for single family housing
in other-areas-and as discussed previously, some has gone
for multi-family housing development. Local banks are given
See Arthur A. Goldberg and Leonard Elenowitz, "Maryland's
Housing Insurance Program," The Urban Lawyer, 5 (Summer, 1973).
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the responsibility for deciding which properties and which
families constitute an acceptable risk. The banks then apply
to the Division of Housing for insurance on up to 100 percent
of value. Through the end of 1974, the Fund had insured 700
1
loans on single family homes. In 1972 the Legislature gave
the Division direct lending powers. Moderate income Maryland
families who receive rejection letters from two or more
lenders because of the location of the property or lack of
income can apply to the Division for a direct loan. The program
has proven quite popular politically with the original $10
million allocation having been increased substantially in
both 1974 and again in early 1975.
The oldest and largest on-going state housing finance
program in the country began in California in 1921. The Cal-
Vet Home Loan Program has provided direct loans on below-market
2
terms to over 270,000 veterans acquiring their own homes.
The California Department of Veterans' Affairs authorizes the
issuance of tax-exempt bonds backed by the full faith and credit
of the State and lends the funds directly to veterans through
its local offices. While the loans can be used for the purchase
of either newly constructed or rehabilitated housing, the Cal-
Vet Program differs from those of the state housing finance
1Maryland Department of Economic and Community Development,
Annual Report, 1974, p. 8.
2West's Ann. Mil. & Vet. Code, Sec. 984 et seq.
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agencies which . Wer'e analyzed in this thesis in that the
HFA's being considered primarily concern themselves with
production of housing by developers rather than the purchase
of housing by individuals.
In a somewhat similar program, the Wisconsin Department
of Veterans' Affairs provides loans to veterans with insuffi-
cient resources to make a full downpayment on the purchase of
a conventionally built home or mobile home, or to meet the
full cost of home improvements. The Department provides
direct second mortgages of up to $5000, at least 3 percent
interest over 30 years on property with a total value of up
to $25,000. The veteran must provide at least five percent
equity.
The Delaware State Housing Authority was created in
1968 with the unique ability to make interest-free mortgage
2
loans. Yet, since it received only limited funds to imple-
ment this program and no independent source of financing,
it has concentrated its efforts on providing interest-free
construction loans on Federally subsidized developments.
In this manner, it has been able to keep recycling its funds
over a short period of time. Its first no-interest permanent
mortgage loan was on a 24-dwelling unit demonstration project
using $500,000 from a state general obligation bond issue.
1W.S.A. Sec. 45.352.
2Delaware Code Ann. c. 31, Sec. 4050 et seq.
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WHY THE UDC DEFAULT
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In its most simple terms, the reason that UDC defaulted
on the $100 million in bond anticipation notes (plus $4.5
million in accrued interest) due February 25, 1975, and $30
million bank loan originally due February 21, was that it
lacked sufficient cash on hand. When UDC first issued these
notes in 1974, it expected to be in a position to issue long
term bonds to repay the notes. Indeed, UDC's 18 month budget
dated October 24, 1974, showed that UDC would receive $125
1
million from the sale of bonds in February, 1975. The same
budget also showed that UDC would receive $100 million in
December, 1974, from the sale of mortgages to the New York
State Housing Finance Agency which it could also use to repay
the notes.
Although neither of these sales took place, at the time
the budget was formulated, it was reasonable to assume that
they would occur. In September, 1974, UDC had sold $125
million in bonds despite the fact that the fire and casualty
insurance companies, ordinarily a primary purchaser of low
rated bonds, were largely out of the market because of the
on-going recession. While the interest rate UDC had to pay
was high, 9.07 percent, investors gave no indication that
they would no longer purchase UDC bonds. In fact, the issue2
was substantially oversubscribed at the time of its sale.
1UDC Fiscal Planning and Budgets Department.
2 Report of the Task Force on UDC, p. C. 1. 7.
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The sale of $100 million in mortgages to the New York State
Housing Agency was a reasonable assumption in that in response
to a request made by investors in UDC's September, 1974, issue,
Governor Malcolm Wilson had announced that the HFA had committed
itself to buying $190 million in UDC mortgages subject to a
review of the projects involved by the New York State Division
1
of Housing and Community Renewal.
When DHCR examined UDC's projects using the same con-
servative criteria it uses to screen all other developments
to be financed by the HFA, it recommended against making
any purchases. Not only did this decision directly limit
the amount of cash accruing to UDC, it also made the sale of
bonds more difficult. Rather than tie the repayment of each
bond issue to special mortgages, like other HFA's, UDC has
made all of its bonds general obligations of the corporation.
While this mechanism enabled UDC to utilize its funds in a
flexible manner, it has meant that investors buying new UDC
bond issues must more carefully look at the security provided
by all of UDC's outstanding mortgages.
Consequently, the determination by DHCR that UDC's
mortgages did not meet their own standards gave potential
investors reason to more carefully look beyond the security
provided by these mortgages to the ultimate security of the
'New York Times, October 6, 1975, p. 1.
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state's moral obligation. In the months immediately prior
to the default, whether New York State would honor its moral
obligations was questioned openly. The revocation of State
moral obligation backing for the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey in June, 1974, was prominent in the minds of
the investment community. In addition, the Dunham Task Force
report on UDC issued in December, 1974, but leaked out before
then, created new doubts about the agency's long-term viability.
Whilethe report found that UDC's staff were an "aggressive
and competent team which appears well-qualified for carrying
out the organization's objectives," the conclusion reached
by the Task Force was that UDC should be restricted from making
2
any future mortgage commitments. While implementation of
this suggestion might have been viewed by potential investors
as limiting UDC's ability to engage in any potentially risky
future developments, as mentioned in the accountant's statement
in conjunction with UDC's financial statements of October 31,
1974, termination of UDC's on-going programs would mean sig-
nificant losses, particularly with regard to its new communities
developments where substantial costs were incurred for planning
and infra-structure that would be wasted if these projects were
1Report of Task Force on UDC, p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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3
not fully completed. In addition, termination of future
UDC developments could be seen as making the agency politically
more vulnerable to the revocation of moral obligation backing.
The other political cloud came from the governor's office.
Once Hugh Carey won the Democratic gubernatorial primary in
September and all the polls predicted him to be a certain winner
in the November general election, Governor Wilson became regarded
as a lame duck. In this status, Wilson was unable to work
effectively on behalf of UDC. In particular, he did not have
the clout to compel the HFA to buy the UDC mortgages. Carey,
being a Democrat, and UDC being so closely identified with a
Republican administration, at that time also provided the
investment community with little grounds for confidence.
In fact, his campaign rhetoric on UDC's mismanagement only
exacerbated their concern.
In this context, UDC's bond underwriter, the First Boston
Corporation, told UDC that given the necessity to fully disclose
all of the risks inherent in a UDC offering and given the large
volume of securities UDC needed to sell, any attempted new of-
fering to the public at that time would attract an insufficient
number of investors. UDC accepted judgment in this regard, and
S.D. Leidesdorf & Co., "Accountant's Report," in UDC, Annual
Report, 1974, p. 65.
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rather than approach another underwriter, turned to the
major New York City banks and the State Legislature.
The only success UDC could achieve in its negotiations
with the banks was to secure from them a 30-day loan on
January 2, on which it also defaulted. The loan did, however,
enable UDC to continue operations while it attempted to secure
funds from the Legislature. In his State of the State message
on January 23, 1973, newly installed Governor Carey gave his
first public indication of support for UDC. While announcing
the resignation of Edward Logue as President of UDC, Carey
proposed that the State lend UDC $178 million, $100 million
of which to pay off the maturing bond anticipation note and
$78 million to allow UDC to continue operations. In addition,
he stated that he was considering asking the Legislature to
create a $50 million special reserve fund originally proposed
by the Dunham Task Force. The purpose of this fund was to
remove any doubts as to whether the Legislature would honor
its moral obligation. UDC was particularly hopeful that this
suggestion be implemented in that it had received assurances
from First Boston that it would be able to sell UDC bonds the
Moodys Investors Service, which undoubtedly had less informa-
tion than First Boston, apparently disagreed with First Boston's
conclusion in that on February 2, 1975, it revised UDC's rating
to Baa. While this revision did reflect a downgrading from
UDC's previous rating of Baa-1, it did reflect an investment
grade rating and an indication that UDC bonds would be salable.
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day after such a measure was signed into law. The Legislature,
howver, was in no mood to assist UDC noteholders, and turned
down the proposals. Consequently, UDC had insufficient funds
to meet its debt obligations.
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STATE AGENCY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON BOND OFFERINGS
Alaska Housing Finance Corporation
Series A
Series A, B
Connecticut Housing Finance Agency
Series A
Series A
Series A
Missouri Housing Development
Commission
1971 Series A
New Jersey Housing Finance Agency
1971
1972
1972
Series A
Series A
Series B
Connecticut Mortgage Authority
1971 Series A
Illinois Housing Development Authority
New York City Housing Development
Corporation
1972
1972
1973
Series A
Series A
Series A, B
1972 Series A
Kentucky Housing Corporation
1973
New York State Housing Finance
Agency General Housing
1970
1972Series A
Series A, B
Series A
Maine State Housing Authority
1972
1974
Series A
Series A
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
1972 Series A
1973 Series A
1974 Series A
Michigan State Housing Development Authority
New York State Housing Finance
Agency Non-Profit
1970
1971
1973
Series A,B
Series A
Series A
New York State Urban Development
Corporation
1971
1972
1973
Series A
Series A
Series A, B
Series A, B
Series A
Series A, B
New York State Urban Rental
Housing
1973 Series A
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency
1973 Series A
1972
1973
1972
1973
1974
1971
1972
1973
433
State of New York Mortgage Agency
1973 Series A
Virginia Housing Development Authority
1973 Series A
West Virginia Housing Development Fund
1971 Series A
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INTERVIEWEES
Illinois Housing Development
Authority
Daniel Kearney (Exec. Dir.)
Irving Gerick (Exec. Dir.)
Peter Blomstrom
Ralph Brown
Anne Davies
Frank Fallon
Frank Glickman
Mark Golan
Jay Golden
Henry Hyatt
John McCoy
Kenneth Marshall
David Midgley
Birgit Gerdes Nomura
Don S. Samuelson
Steven Theobald
Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency
William White (Exec. Dir.)
Barbara Berger
John Bok
Paul Burbine
Joy Conway
J.O. Chike Enwonwu
Reese Fayde
Ellen Feingold
Pat Geoters
Justin Gray
William Haynsworth
Matthew Hobbes
Richard J. Howrigan
Stephen Rioff
Carl F. Saunders
Thomas Welch
New Jersey Housing Finance
Agency
Paul Ylvisaker (Chairman)
Ralph Brown
William Clarke
George Feddish
Raymond Howell
Henry Hyatt
John McCoy
Harris Osborne
George Tuttle
Michigan State Housing Development
Authority
David Froh (Exec.
Margaret Bruckner
Cullen Dubose
Bernard E. Fedewa
Arthur Fine
George A. Fox
Sol M. Friedman
Kenneth Hance
Isaac Green
J. Michael Jones
Peter Long
Marilyn Meachen
James Roberts
Eric Schneidewind
Otis Will
Thomas White
Katherine Wilcox
Dir.)
New York Urban Development
Corporation
John Burnett (Acting Exec. Dir.)
Robert Adelman
Irving Colloff
Laura Denny
Frank Kristof
Robert Mackin
Jane McGrath
George Moskowitz
Fred Truslow
William Vivian
James Wiley
Douglas Wonderlic
New York DHCR/HFA
Lee Goodwin (Commissioner)
Edward Bopp
Milton Duke
Fred Hecht
Myron Holtz
Arthur Shulman
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Other State Agencies
John Biasucci, WVA
Thomas Charles, Del.
Robert E. Cooper, Haw.
James Dlugosh, Minn.
Talbert Elliot, Alas.
J.D. Foust, N. Car.
Benjamin Hackerman, Md.
Kenneth Hance, Vir.
Robert Hiatt, S. Dak.
William Hunt, Md.
Robert Lena, Maine
Edward Levy, NYC
'John McCoy, Pa.
Steven Mayfield, S. Car.
John Maylott, Conn.
Robert Miller, Md.
Robert Moyer, Del.
Albert Point, R.I.
John W. Polk, Ky.
Barbara Sall, Idaho
George Simos, Wisc.
Douglas Smith, Minn.
M. Gregg Smith, Ore.
Robert Smith, Miso.
William Timmermeyer, Colo.
Yoshio Yanagawa, Haw.
Arnold Yoskowitz, NYC
HUD
John Brady
Andrew Euston
Chester Foster
John Jennings
Gary Kane
Daniel Kearney
James Montgomery
Wayne Nickols
M. Daniel Richardson
Melville Roth
Robert Sacrey
Kenneth Salk
Robert Sangster
James Snyder
James J. Tahash
Eleanor White
Wall Street
Thomas Caine - Paine Webber
Arnold Happeny - Salomon Bros.
Richard Huff - Standard & Poor
Edward Kermin - Moody's
Triff Kroll - Moody's
Robert McDonald - Salomon Bros.
John McDowell - Standard & Poor
Stanley Pardo - Blyth, Eastman, Dillon
Susan Rush - First Boston
Warren Sutherland - State Street Bank
Miscellaneous
Robert Alexander; McKinsey & Co.
Rachael Bratt, ,M.I.T.
Anthony Downs; Real Estate Research Corp.
Charles Edson; Frosh, Lane & Edson
Roger Evans; Gaston Snow & Ely
Bartlett
Margaret Frisby; Fed. Home Loan Bank
Joel Kirschner; Mass. Dept. of
Community Affairs
Richard Lincoln; Nat'l. Governors
Conference
Peter Morris; Harvard Law School
Vincent F. O'Donnell; Boston Urban
Observatory
J. Dennis O'Toole; Nat'l. Alliance
of Home Byiiders
Milton Patton; Council of State
Governments
Theodore Schultze; Bolt Baranek
& Newman
Manie Seferi; MHFA Social Audit
Team
William Wheaton, M.I.T.
Several others who wished to
remain anonymous or who may
have inadvertently been left
out.
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CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS
Council of State Housing Agencies, Charleston, South Carolina,
1974.
State Housing Agencies, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1974.
New York Law Journal, New York, 1973.
M.I.T. Independent Activities Period, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1974.
MHFA Lawyers Conference, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971.
